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This thesis consists of a collection of studies investigating various aspects of the 
interplay between the markets for derivative securities and their respective underlying 
assets in the presence of market imperfections. The classic theory of derivative pricing 
and hedging hinges on three rather unrealistic assumptions regarding the market 
for the underlying asset. Markets are assumed to be perfectly elastic, complete 
and frictionless. This thesis studies some effects of relaxing one or more of these 
assumptions. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the thesis, details the structure of 
what follows, and gives a selective review of the relevant literature. Chapter 2 focuses 
on the effects that the implementation of hedging strategies has on equilibrium asset 
prices when markets are imperfectly elastic. The results show that the feedback 
effect caused by such hedging strategies generates excess volatility of equilibrium 
asset prices, thus violating the very assumptions from which these strategies are 
derived. However, it is shown that hedging is nonetheless possible, albeit at a slightly 
higher price. In Chapter 3, a model is developed which describes equilibrium asset 
prices when market participants use technical trading rules. The results confirm that 
technical trading leads to the emergence of speculative price “bubbles”. However, 
it is shown that although technical trading rules are irrational ex-ante, they turn 
out to be profitable ex-post. In Chapter 4, a general framework is developed in 
which the optimal trading behaviour of a large, informed trader can be studied in
1
2an environment where markets are imperfectly elastic. It is shown how the optimal 
trading pattern changes when the large trader is allowed to hold options written on 
the traded asset. In Chapter 5, the results of the preceding chapter are used to study 
the interplay between options markets and the markets for the underlying assets 
when prices are set by a market maker. It turns out that the existence of the option 
creates an incentive for the informed trader to manipulate markets, which implies that 
equilibrium on both markets can only exist when option prices are adjusted to reflect 
this incentive. This requirement of price alignment explains the “smile” pattern of 
implied volatility, an empirically observed phenomenon that has recently been the 
focus of extensive research. Chapter 6 finally addresses recent proposals by some 
researchers suggesting that central banks should issue options in order to stabilise 
exchange rates. The argument, in line with the findings of Chapter 2, is based on the 
fact that hedging a long option position requires countercyclical trading that would 
reduce volatility. However, the results of Chapter 6 show that the option creates an 
incentive for market manipulation which, rather than protecting against speculative 
attacks, in fact creates an additional vehicle for such attacks. Chapter 7 concludes.
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Foreword
The chapters of this thesis are derived from several research papers, some of which 
are the result of joint work, and some of which have subsequently been published. 
Chapter 2 is an extended version of a working paper entitled “Portfolio Insurance and 
Volatility”, written jointly by Rudiger Frey and myself. An updated version of this 
paper has been published in Mathematical Finance under the title “Market Volatility 
and Feedback Effects from Dynamic Hedging”. Rudiger Frey was also partly involved 
in the very early stages of the development of Chapter 3. Chapter 5 is the result of 
joint work with Asbj0rn Hansen and has been submitted to the Review of Financial 
Studies. All other chapters are my own work.
As a result of the attem pt to keep each chapter self-contained, some arguments which 
are needed in more than one chapter are at least in part repeated accordingly. This 
applies in particular to the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, variants of which appear in Sec­
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This thesis consists of a collection of studies investigating various aspects of the 
interplay between the markets for derivative securities and their respective underlying 
assets in the presence of market imperfections. Classic theory of derivatives pricing 
and hedging hinges on three key assumptions regarding the market for the underlying 
asset. Markets are assumed to be perfectly elastic (traders can trade arbitrarily large 
quantities without affecting prices), frictionless (there are no transaction costs), and 
complete (all contingent claims can be replicated). Clearly, this is a very stylised 
view of real financial markets, where these assumptions are satisfied only to a very 
limited extent. This is why in recent years, a rapidly growing strand of literature has 
focused on studying the implications of relaxing one or more of these assumptions.
Throughout this thesis, we assume that markets for the underlying asset are imper­
fectly elastic, i.e. agents’ trading activities have an effect on equilibrium prices. We 
investigate the manner in which the dynamic properties of equilibrium asset prices 
are affected by different types of trading behaviour. More specifically, we consider 
cases in which market participants implement dynamic trading strategies designed
14
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to hedge option positions, follow technical trading rules, or strategically exploit their 
market power in order to maximise expected profits.
Classic option pricing theory is based on the concept of replication. Based on the 
stochastic law governing the dynamics of the underlying asset’s price, a self-financing, 
dynamic trading strategy is constructed which replicates the option’s pay-offs. How­
ever, in imperfectly elastic markets, the implementation of such strategies is likely to 
affect the underlying equilibrium price process, thus perturbing the very model they 
are derived from. The Group of Ten (1993) for example reports that the strategies 
related to option hedging or replication do indeed have significant impact on prices, 
in particular on volatility. Moreover, typical hedging strategies require selling into 
falling markets and buying into rising markets and are thus likely to have destabil­
ising effects on prices. In fact, hedging has been blamed as one of the contributing 
factors in the October 1987 stock market crash.
Similar arguments have been put forward with regards to the implications of techni­
cal trading. While economic theory generally classifies technical trading as irrational, 
empirical evidence underlines its importance, in particular in foreign exchange mar­
kets; see Allen and Taylor (1992). Like hedging, technical trading creates positive 
feedback effects of past returns on current prices, and is hence seen as one of the 
contributing factors in recent market crashes. Moreover, in contrast to the predic­
tions of most of the theoretical literature, empirical evidence seems to prove that 
technical trading rules are indeed profitable; see Levich and Thomas (1993), Brock, 
Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992), and Sweeney (1986).
The implications of finitely elastic markets and the inherent opportunities for market 
manipulation become particularly important in the presence of asymmetric informa­
tion. While extensive literature has arisen in recent years which studies the effects of
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asymmetric information on asset prices, comparatively little has been said about the 
implications of information asymmetries for the pricing of options. In classic models 
of optimal trading under asymmetric information such as Kyle (1985), the informed 
trader always has an incentive to move prices towards the asset’s expected true value, 
thus partially revealing her private information. However, if the informed trader holds 
an option, written on the underlying asset, this may no longer be true. Intuitively, 
such an option would create an incentive for the informed trader to manipulate prices, 
thus pushing the option into the money. The gains from this manipulation will be 
traded off against potential losses made in the underlying market. This manipula­
tion incentive is likely to have important implications on the amount of information 
revealed by the informed trader’s actions. Moreover, the value of the option to the 
informed trader will incorporate potential gains from manipulation and will hence 
be different from the option’s arbitrage price. This has important consequences for 
the pricing of options in the context of asymmetric information and market power.
The effects outlined in the preceding sections are likely to have important implications 
in many other situations. For example, recent suggestions for central banks to use 
options as exchange rate policy instruments will have to be re-evaluated in light 
of the market manipulation incentives created by such options. Empirical studies 
suggest that the main objectives of central bank intervention on the foreign exchange 
market is to stabilise nominal rates and keep them in a certain “target zone”; see for 
instance Edison (1993) or Almekinders (1995). The use of options as instruments of 
exchange rate policy was first proposed by Taylor (1995). He suggests that central 
banks should buy put options, written on the domestic currency. When the domestic 
currency depreciates as a result of a speculative attack, Taylor argues, the option 
is deep in the money allowing the central bank to buy foreign currency at deflated 
rates, which can then be sold in the spot market to support the domestic currency.
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Breuer (1997) identifies five main drawbacks of the approach suggested by Taylor, 
the most important of which is the destabilising effect of “delta hedging”. Market 
participants who have written the options bought by the central bank would typically 
hedge their position by appropriate strategies in the spot market. Following the 
arguments made earlier, this type of trading activity is likely to have destabilising 
effects on equilibrium exchange rates. Empirical evidence supporting the importance 
of such effects has been reported, amongst others, by Malz (1995). In view of this, 
Wiseman (1996) and Breuer (1997) propose an alternative way of utilising options as 
exchange rate policy instruments. Rather then buying put options, they argue, the 
central bank should write call options. As a result, when hedging their long option 
position, market participants would be required to sell in rising markets and buy in 
falling markets, thus stabilising exchange rates. However, this argument rests on the 
assumption that the buyers of such options indeed content themselves with hedging 
their position. In light of the arguments made earlier, the following question arises: 
While it is true that the option induces extremely risk-averse market participants to 
hedge their positions thus stabilising rates, the situation might change drastically if 
instead the option is held by speculators who, being risk-neutral, have no incentive 
to hedge risk but to maximise expected profits.
In Chapter 2, we study the manner in which the additional demand generated by 
strategies designed to hedge an option position affects the underlying asset’s equi­
librium price, and in particular its volatility structure. There have been a number 
of studies on the impact of dynamic hedging on the price of the underlying asset. 
Grossman (1988) focuses on informational differences between buying an option and 
running the corresponding replicating strategy. Gennotte and Leland (1990) study 
the effects of hedging in an asymmetric information model similar to the one con­
sidered by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Jarrow (1994) analyzes, in a discrete-time
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model, how standard option pricing theory can be extended to the situation where 
hedging does affect the underlying price process. The results have subsequently been 
extended to the continuous-time case in Frey (1996). Platen and Schweizer (1998) 
use the feedback effect of portfolio insurance to explain the “smile pattern” of implied 
volatility. Their model relies to a large extent on the model outlined in Chapter 2, 
and previously published in Frey and Stremme (1997). The study by Brennan and 
Schwartz (1989) is the one most closely related to the one presented in Chapter 2. 
However, while in their model optimal trading is solely based on exogenous infor­
mation on the long-term, fundamental prospects of the underlying assets, we allow 
expectations to be affected by current prices. This approach is supported by empiri­
cal evidence, as reported for example by the Group of Ten (1993), Allen and Taylor 
(1992), or De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a).
As analytical framework for our analysis, we first construct a discrete-time equi­
librium model in which myopic, profit-maximising agents interact with “program 
traders” who follow dynamic hedging strategies. To facilitate the qualitative analy­
sis, we then pass to the continuous-time limit. This approach to the construction of 
diffusion models for asset prices was first proposed by Follmer and Schweizer (1993). 
While in the absence of hedging, equilibrium prices follow a geometric Brownian mo­
tion as in the classic Black-Scholes model, the introduction of program traders causes 
market volatility to increase and become time and price dependent. The magnitude 
of this effect is much greater than that observed by Brennan and Schwartz (1989). 
Our findings are in line with empirical observations, as reported for example by the 
Group of Ten (1993).
The transformation of volatility as predicted by our model has important implications 
for practical applications. While replicating strategies can still be shown to exist, 
they can no longer be calculated explicitly. This is why most practioners rely on the
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simple strategies prescribed by the Black-Scholes formula. This bears the obvious 
question as to how well these strategies perform if in fact the feedback effect caused 
by their implementation violates the very assumptions they are derived from. Using 
an idea of El Karoui, Jeanblanc-Picque, and Shreve (1998) we show that while perfect 
replication is impossible, simple Black-Scholes strategies can nonetheless be used to 
“super-replicate” the option’s pay-off.
In Chapter 3, we consider an equilibrium model for exchange rates in which some 
agents follow technical trading rules. There have been a number of theoretical stud­
ies analysing the effects of technical trading. In Day and Huang (1990), rational 
“information traders” interact with technical traders, and equilibrium is determined 
by a market maker. Unlike in the model considered here, Day and Huang do not in­
troduce any source of noise into the market. As a result, prices in their model follow 
deterministic chaotic dynamics. In Lux (1995), traders act upon rumours and fads 
rather than technical analysis. Contagious mood swings cause cyclical fluctuations 
of equilibrium prices.
As analytical framework for our study, we first construct a discrete-time equilibrium 
model in which technical traders interact with pure “noise traders” . To facilitate 
the analysis of the resulting equilibrium exchange rate process, we then pass to the 
continuous-time limit. It turns out that, as long as technical traders are active, 
bubbles will always emerge. Exchange rate fluctuations caused by noise are picked 
up by technical analysis and amplified by the buy or sell signals generated by the 
corresponding trading rules. However, we also show that any bubble will always 
burst within finite time.
We demonstrate that, while the expected profit from simple buy-and-hold strategies 
is zero, technical trading rules themselves are profitable on average. In other words,
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technical trading can be seen as a type of “self-fulfilling prophecy”. These results are 
in line with the empirical findings of Levich and Thomas (1993), Brock, Lakonishok, 
and LeBaron (1992), and Sweeney (1986).
In Chapter 5, we investigate the manner in which an option, held by a large, informed 
trader, changes the nature of equilibrium prices for the underlying asset, and how 
this feeds back into option prices. As analytical framework, we choose the model 
developed in Chapter 4, which in turn is based on continuous-time Kyle (1985) 
model. A large trader, who receives a private signal about the fundamental value of 
the traded asset, interacts with pure noise traders. Prices are set by a risk-neutral 
competitive market maker. In this type of model, the informed trader typically drives 
prices towards the expected value of the asset, thus successively revealing the private 
information to the market maker. We extend the Back (1992) model by introducing 
an over-the-counter market on which options can be traded prior to trading in the 
underlying asset.
Unsurprisingly, it turns out that the presence of the option creates an incentive for 
the informed trader to manipulate prices of the underlying asset in order to increase 
the option’s pay-off. Uninformed traders might hence face a price mark-up over the 
expected true value of the asset. In other words, the informed trader creates a price 
bubble at the expense of uninformed traders. It is the potential existence of such 
bubbles which constitutes the main difference between our model and the model by 
Back (1993), in which this kind of manipulation is precluded by the existence of a 
liquid options market with additional noise.
In our model, the only feasible equilibrium requires that the market maker does not 
believe the informed trader to have an incentive to manipulate prices. This belief 
can only be rational if equilibrium option prices are “synchronised” with prices on
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the underlying market. As a consequence, option prices are non-linear in quantity. 
This is in line with the findings in Jarrow (1994) and Frey (1996), where option 
prices are determined by the cost of replication, and thus non-linearity arises as a 
consequence of finite elasticity of the underlying market. It is also consistent with 
empirical observations made in the OTC market for options, in particular for large 
quantities. We derive an explicit expression for implied volatility. We show that the 
implied volatility pattern generated by equilibrium prices in our model displays the 
famous “skew smile pattern”, which has been observed in most financial markets ever 
since the October 1987 crash.
There have been a number of studies that explain the smile pattern of implied 
volatility. While most of these explain the smile pattern by exogenously altering 
the volatility structure of the underlying price process, no assumptions regarding 
the underlying price volatility are needed in our model. The smile pattern rather 
occurs endogenously as a consequence of the market structure. To the best of our 
knowledge the only other paper in which the smile has been obtained endogenously 
is the paper by Platen and Schweizer (1998). Their analysis is based on a modified 
version of the feedback model developed in Chapter 2 and published previously in 
Frey and Stremme (1997). However, in order to explain the smile pattern, Platen 
and Schweizer have to assume an upward-sloping demand curve for the underlying 
asset, which implies that the equilibrium they obtain is highly unstable.
The emergence of the skew smile pattern in our model is a result of the attem pt to 
prevent market breakdowns. Empirically, the skewness is a feature which has only 
been observed after the October 1987 stock market crash. The explanation offered 
by our analysis could be that after the crash, market participants and regulators 
implemented measures aimed at preventing similar events in the future. This might 
have brought option prices more in line with the markets for the underlying asset.
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According to our findings, such an increased level of price synchronicity would indeed 
result in the implied volatility pattern that has been observed since the crash.
In Chapter 6, we analyse the possible implications of using options as central bank 
exchange rate policy instrument. We model the situation in which a speculator, 
having bought the option issued by the central bank, instead of simply hedging her 
position, strategically exploits the leveraged position in the market provided by the 
option. As theoretical framework, we chose the continuous-time model developed in 
Chapter 4, with prices given by Walrasian equilibrium. The risk-neutral speculator 
interacts with “information traders” , who base their demand for foreign exchange on 
the flow of fundamental “news”. We assume that the central bank’s objective is to 
stabilise exchange rates and to keep them within a given “target zone”, which is in 
line with the empirical findings of Edison (1993). In order to achieve their objective, 
the central bank can intervene using spot transactions or by issuing options. In 
addition to trading in the spot market, the speculator may purchase the options 
issued by the central bank.
It turns out that in the absence of options, the speculator has no incentive to manip­
ulate markets. In fact, in this case it is optimal not to trade at all. An option issued 
by the central bank however creates an alternative way for the speculator to realise 
the gains from market manipulation. Upon arrival of “bad news”, when information 
traders cause the domestic currency to depreciate, the option creates an incentive for 
the speculator to squeeze exchange rates even further. Scenarios can arise in which 
without speculation, the central bank’s foreign currency reserves would have been 
sufficient to support the domestic currency, while they cannot sustain the additional 
pressure arising from the speculator’s manipulation. In other words, instead of pro­
tecting against speculative attacks, options issued by the central bank in fact create 
an additional vehicle for such attacks.
Chapter 2
Feedback Effects from  
Dynam ic Hedging
2.1 Introduction
Standard derivative pricing theory is based on arbitrage arguments, which in turn 
rest on three key hypotheses about the markets for the underlying asset. Markets 
are assumed to be complete, frictionless and perfectly elastic. Clearly, this is a very 
stylised view of real financial markets, in which these assumptions are satisfied only 
up to a certain extent. This is why a rapidly growing literature has concentrated 
on the implications of relaxing one or more of them. In this chapter we drop the 
elasticity assumption and study the manner in which dynamic hedging strategies 
affects the underlying asset’s equilibrium price, in particular its volatility structure.
Hedging strategies are derived from specific assumptions on the stochastic law that 
governs the underlying price dynamics. In practice they are seen both as theoretical
23
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concept for option pricing and, more importantly for our analysis, as device to manage 
risk as incurred for instance by selling OTC derivative contracts.
We believe an analysis of the feedback effects caused by dynamic hedging in im­
perfectly elastic markets to be important for a number of reasons. To begin with, 
when carried out on a large scale, dynamic hedging is most likely to perturb the 
very stochastic law it is based upon. We ask how hedging strategies perform when 
we allow the underlying price process to be affected by their implementation, even 
if this effect is not fully taken into account in designing them. Moreover, hedging is 
mostly used to replicate payoffs that are convex functions of the underlying asset’s 
price, requiring the investor to sell shares of the underlying asset when its price de­
clines and to buy when its price goes up.1 Therefore one should expect an increase 
of market volatility under the impact of such trading behaviour. Dynamic hedging 
is thus likely to have a destabilising effect on prices.
There have been a number of studies on the impact of dynamic hedging on the price of 
the underlying asset. Grossman (1988) focuses on informational differences between 
buying an option and running the corresponding replicating strategy. Gennotte and 
Leland (1990) study the effects of portfolio insurance in a model with asymmetric 
information similar to the one considered by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). They 
find that the better this activity is understood by the other market participants, the 
weaker is the effect of hedging.
Jarrow (1994) analyses, in a discrete-time model, how standard option pricing theory 
can be extended to a situation where there are feedback effects from the demand of 
a “large trader” on the underlying price process. Platen and Schweizer (1998) use
1This kind of trading behaviour is also referred to as “Portfolio Insurance”.
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the feedback effect of portfolio insurance to explain the “smile pattern” of implied 
volatilities that is observed in practice. Their model relies to a large extent on the 
model developed here and previously published in (Frey and Stremme 1994) and 
(Frey and Stremme 1997).
Brennan and Schwartz (1989) address an issue very similar to the one discussed here. 
They analyse the transformation of market volatility under the impact of portfolio 
insurance in a finite-horizon economy in which securities are traded continuously but 
consumption takes place only at the terminal date. Agents are hence only concerned 
about the long-term prospects of the asset. Since the risky asset’s terminal value is 
entirely determined by an exogeneously given random variable, which is interpreted 
as the fundamental value of the asset, agents’ expectations axe solely driven by the 
successively revealed information about the value of this state variable. In partic­
ular, agents do not alter their expectations in reaction to changes in current price. 
Markets are thus very liquid, causing the feedback effect of hedging on volatility to 
be relatively small.
Empirical evidence however suggests that in many situations there is “an enormous 
amount of short-term position taking”, whereas the funds dedicated to long-term 
investment are limited by uncertainty and agents’ risk aversion; see for instance 
Goodhart (1988). A theoretical justification for this kind of trading behaviour is given 
by De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990b). Moreover, when making 
trading decisions for very short periods, like in intra-day dealing, investors seem 
to rely more on the information conveyed by current price movements than on the 
long-term fundamental prospects of the assets. This “Keynesian” view of investment 
is supported by evidence reported by the Group of Ten (1993) or Allen and Taylor 
(1992). In fact there is evidence for a positive feedback effect of current price changes 
on expectations, see De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a).
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In the present chapter we develop a framework in which the effect of dynamic hedging 
on the underlying asset’s price process can be studied. We start by constructing a 
general discrete-time temporary equilibrium model in which short-term investment 
can be modelled. To get a clearer picture of the equilibrium price process, and in 
particular of its volatility, we then pass to a limiting continuous-time diffusion. This 
approach to the construction of diffusion models for asset prices was first proposed 
by Follmer and Schweizer (1993).
As a special case we consider an economy populated by traders whose preferences 
over future wealth exhibit constant relative risk-aversion as in the Brennan-Schwartz 
study. Agents take changes in current prices as signals for future price movements. 
If they were the only traders in the market the equilibrium price process would be 
a geometric Brownian motion as in the classic Black-Scholes option pricing model. 
However, if they interact with program traders who are running dynamic hedging 
strategies, the structure of the limiting equilibrium price process becomes more com­
plex: while it still can be represented as an Ito process, its volatility increases and be­
comes time and price dependent. A comparison reveals that the increase in volatility 
is much more pronounced in our study than that observed by Brennan and Schwartz 
(1989). This finding underlines the importance of agents’ expectations in determining 
the liquidity of the market. Moreover it illustrates that there exist realistic scenarios 
in which the effect of hedging is far larger than predicted by Brennan and Schwartz.
We derive an explicit expression for the transformation of market volatility under 
the impact of hedging. We use this transformation rule to study in particular the 
feedback effects generated by the strategies derived from the classic Black-Scholes 
formula. It also allows us to study the importance of different payoff structures 
being hedged. We show that increasing heterogeneity of the distribution of hedged 
contracts reduces both level and price sensitivity of volatility.
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As reported by the Group of Ten (1993) the effects predicted by our analysis are 
indeed observed in practice:
“[T]he existence of options and related dynamic hedging could increase 
volatility, especially in the smaller and less liquid currency segments, as 
the spot exchange rate approaches the strike price. When strike prices 
and/or option maturities are highly concentrated, a large volume of one­
way hedging could occur in a short period. Market participants reported 
that sharp [ . . .  ] movements in spot prices were frequently observed as 
a result of such concentrations.”
Price dependent volatility, as results from hedging in our model, causes problems in 
practical application. While hedging strategies can still be shown to exist they can 
no longer be calculated explicitly. This is why most practioners rely on the classic 
Black-Scholes formula. Using an idea of El Karoui, Jeanblanc-Picque, and Shreve 
(1998) we are able to show that simple strategies derived from a constant-volatility 
Black-Scholes model are still sufficient to completely hedge the risk incurred by selling 
OTC derivatives. This remains true even if their implementation causes the actual 
volatility to be price dependent, as is the case in our model. However, the misper­
ception of the feedback effect on volatility generates a “tracking error”: the terminal 
value of the hedge portfolio might exceed the payoff it was supposed to replicate, 
thus requiring an initial “over-investment” in the strategy. But again, heterogeneity 
proves to be beneficial: the tracking error and hence the over-investment diminishes 
with increasing heterogeneity of the distribution of hedged payoffs.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we develop the 
general discrete-time temporary equilibrium framework. We then specify a concrete 
sample economy in which agents whose preferences exhibit constant relative risk-
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aversion interact with program traders who run dynamic hedging strategies. Section 
2.3 is devoted to the passage to the continuous-time limit. We characterise the limit­
ing price process as the solution of an Ito type Stochastic Differential Equation, thus 
obtaining an explicit expression for its volatility. In Section 2.4 we conduct a detailed 
study of the feedback effect caused by the implementation of Black-Scholes hedging 
strategies and directly compare our findings to those of Brennan and Schwartz (1989). 
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Discrete-Tim e M odel
We consider a sequence of discrete-time infinite-horizon economies. More precisely, 
for each n = 1, 2 , . . .  there is a sequence of times 0 =  <  t" < . . .  <  t% < . . .  at
which trading takes place on a Walrasian market. In view of the intended passage to 
a continuous-time limit diffusion we assume that
An := sup(££+1 — t l )  — y 0 as n —y oo.
k
T r a d e d  A s s e t s :
There are two assets in the economy, a riskless one (typically a bond or money 
market account), and a risky one (typically a stock or foreign exchange rate). We 
take the riskless asset as numeraire, thereby making interest rates implicit in our 
model. Moreover, we assume the market for the riskless security to be perfectly 
elastic. This is an idealisation of the fact that money markets are far more liquid 
than those for the typical risky asset considered here. The equilibrium price at time 
f l  of the risky asset, accounted in units of the numeraire, is denoted by X%.
In the present paper we are only interested in the feedback effect of hedging on the
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underlying asset’s volatility, and not in developing a pricing theory. In finitely liquid 
markets it is no longer obvious how to derive option prices from the prices of the 
underlying. To avoid the price inconsistencies that can arise from an inadequate 
modelling of the relationship between stock and options markets we assume that 
there is no liquid market for options on the risky asset.
A g g r e g a t e  D e m a n d  S c h e d u l e :
At any time tJ the aggregate demand function for the risky asset is assumed to be 
given by a smooth function Gn : [0, oo) x 1R+— »-IR in the form
x * G * ( t l ,F £ , x ) .  (2 .1)
Here, x is the (proposed) Walrasian price. (F£)k=o,\,... is a stochastic process describ­
ing the current state of the economy, to be specified in more detail later. Note that 
the above form of the demand function implies in particular that all the information 
necessary for the investors to form their demand can be summarised in F£ and x.
E q u il ib r iu m :
We normalise total supply of the risky asset to one, hence the equilibrium price X% 
at time is determined by the market clearing equation
cr(rk,F ? ,x i) =  i. (2.2)
The following assumptions are of technical nature. They ensure existence and unique­
ness of equilibria and guarantee convergence of the equilibrium price processes (see 
Section 2.3). We will see later how these assumption can be achieved in a more 
concrete specification of the economy (see Section 2 .2.1 and Corollary 2.3.4).
A ssu m p tio n  2 .2 .1  The functions Gn are smooth, and the sequence {Gn}n=1)2,... con­
verges uniformly on compacts to a smooth function G : [0,00) xIR++ —► 1R. Moreover,
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1. For every (f, / )  € [0, oo) x IR++ the equations Gn(t, / ,  x) = 1 and G(t, / ,  x) =  1 
have exactly one solution in x, denoted by i>n( t , f )  and xp(t,f), respectively.
2. For every compact set K  CC IR++ the sequence {V,n}n=i,2,... is relatively com­
pact in the space of all bounded functions on K  endowed with the supremum 
norm.




< 0  and - r r f i ,  / ,  x)
x = 1pn ( t , f )  j
> 0,
x=4>n { t j )
and the analogous statements hold for the limit function G.
REMARKS: Note that (1) guarantees that there is a unique solution to the market 
clearing equation in each discrete-time economy characterised by Gn as well as in 
the continuous-time limit economy characterised by G. The first inequality in (3) 
together with the Implicit Function Theorem implies in particular that the solution in 
the limit economy depends smoothly on / ,  i.e. the function xp : [0 , oo) x IR++— >-IR is 
smooth. The second inequality in (3) implies in addition that for fixed t the mapping 
/  i—^ f )  is invertible, i.e. there exists a smooth function xj)-1 : [0 , oo) x IR++— >-IR 
such that x!>~l {t, xj)(t, / ) )  =  /  and xl>(t,xl)~l(t,x))  =  x  for all t , f  and x. Finally note 
that differentiability of the Gn together with (3) implies that the ij)n are differentiable, 
too. The Arzela-Ascoli Theorem then implies that (2) holds if the ipn and their first 
derivatives are uniformly bounded on compacts.
A g e n t s :
There are two groups of agents in the market, called “reference traders” and “pro­
gram traders”, respectively. The economy in which there are only reference traders 
active constitutes the benchmark case for our analysis. It will be compared with the
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case in which reference traders interact with program traders, who are running dy­
namic hedging strategies. To measure the relative market weights of the two groups 
we introduce the parameter p E [0,1], which denotes the relative market share of 
program traders, thus leaving a share of 1 — p to the reference traders. The total 
aggregate demand function can then be written in the form
G“(t, / ,  *) =  (1 -  p)D "(f, x) +  P4f‘(t, x), (2.3)
where Dn( f ,x )  and <f>n(t,x)  are normalised2 aggregate demand functions for the 
reference traders and program traders, respectively. We neglect the aggregation 
problem and specify a representative reference trader whose (normalised) demand 
function takes the form x i-y Dn(F^,x).  A more detailed specification in which the 
reference trader’s preferences exhibit constant relative risk-aversion will be given in 
Section 2.2.1.
A typical program trader might be a bank hedging a portfolio of written OTC con­
tracts by running a dynamic trading strategy in the underlying asset. Since the 
majority of the demand for such contracts is motivated by considerations beyond the 
scope of our model,3 we take the extreme view that the hedging objectives of our 
program traders are exogenously given. Moreover, the hedging strategy for a portfo­
lio of payoffs is just the portfolio of the hedging strategies for the individual payoffs. 
Thus we can concentrate on a representative program trader, whose (normalised) 
demand function takes the form x t-> 0n(Q ,x). We make the following assumptions 
on the strategy functions (f>n:
2Normalised in the sense that, if reference resp. program traders were the only agents in the
market, D n resp. <j>n would be their demand function. When both groups interact, their demand
functions are weighted by their respective market weights, 1 — p and p.
3The Group of Ten (1993) for example reports that “derivative instruments were primarily used
for risk hedging purposes” .
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A ssu m p tio n  2 .2 .2  The functions <j)n are smooth, and the sequence {<^ n}n=i,2,... con­
verges uniformly on compacts to a smooth function <j>: [0, oo) xIR++— ^IR. Moreover,
1. for every compact set K  C [0, oo) x IR++ we have
d(j>sup sup
n ( t , x ) £ K dt
(t,x) < oo,
2. 4>n is increasing in the underlying price, i.e.
d(j)n
r. (t, x'j ^  0 for 3,111 ^  0 and all x £ IR++5 ox
3. and <j>n is normalised in such a way that
sup |<j>n(t, :r)| =  1.
t , x
Finally, the limit (f) satisfies the analogous conditions to (2) and (3).
Note that by (3) p also determines the fraction of the total supply of the risky asset 
that is subject to portfolio insurance. Also note that (2) reflects the fact that a 
typical hedging strategy requires that shares of the underlying be sold when its price 
has declined and vice versa, as was mentioned in the introduction.
Assumption (2.2.2) is satisfied in particular if <fn and cf> are mixtures of hedging strate­
gies as given by the Black-Scholes formula. It is also possible to consider strategies 
<j)n derived from the discrete state-space model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979). 
Convergence of such strategies to their continuous-time counterpart (f> follows, for 
instance, from results by He (1990).
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2.2.1 A Case with Constant Relative Risk Aversion
In this section we provide a concrete specification of the preferences and beliefs of the 
representative reference trader. The assumptions introduced in this section ensure 
that the aggregate demand functions of this particular economy satisfy Assumption
(2 .2 .1) (see Corollary 2.3.4 below). The model considered here is closely related to the 
kind of temporary equilibrium models discussed by De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and 
Waldmann (1990b). Consider an overlapping generations model without bequests, in 
which agents live for two periods. When young, the representative reference trader 
receives an exogenous stochastic income F£ which she invests in the available assets. 
When old, she just consumes all her wealth and then disappears from the market. 
Thus, at any time f% the young agent chooses the number d of shares of the risky 
asset she wants to hold in order to maximise expected utility of next period’s wealth. 
Given her income is / ,  her demand function will be
Dn{f ,x )  = B x g m * x E [ u ( j r + d-(X%+1( x ) - x ) >)  ] ,
where u is her von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and A£+1(:c) the agent’s 
belief about next period’s price. Note here that we allow the expected future price to 
depend explicitly on the current price x , i.e. agents may update their expectations 
in reaction to changes in current prices.
Of course this overlapping generations scenario must not be taken literally. It is a 
stylised model of a market where agents’ investment decisions are made sequentially 
over time and where each decision is determined mainly by myopic optimisation. 
For example, market participants might be managers of investment funds who are 
managing a stochastically fluctuating amount of funds. Typically fund managers 
are (at least partly) compensated according to the performance of their portfolio, 
evaluated at certain predetermined dates. Therefore their investment decisions are
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often predominantly aimed at the next evaluation date.
A ssu m p tio n  2.2.3 Reference traders’ beliefs and preferences and the evolution of 
their income over time are assumed to be given as follows:
1. The representative reference trader’s preferences exhibit constant relative risk 
aversion, i.e. her von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u satisfies u'(z) =  
z -1 for some 7  > 0 .
2. Given current price x, the agent believes next period’s price X%+1(x) to be of 
the form  X£+1(:r) =  x • fjj for some random variable (%. We assume (fJ)fc=o,i,... 
to be serially independent and independent of x, and that >  1 .
3. Given current income F%, next period’s income F£+1 is given by F£+1 =
for some random shock Q  > 0 . We assume (Ck)k=0,1,... to be serially indepen­
dent.
Note that by (2) there is a positive feedback from current price x into agents’ expecta­
tions: after a rise of x  they anticipate a rise in future prices and in the case of a price 
decline they expect future prices to fall as well. A list of striking observations which 
emphasise the importance of such extrapolative expectations on financial markets has 
been compiled by De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a). We will see 
in Section 2.4.3 that this way of expectation formation leads to destabilising effects 
of dynamic hedging which are much larger than those observed in the framework of 
Brennan and Schwartz (1989).
By Assumption (2.2.3) the solution to the agent’s utility maximisation problem, given
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income /  and proposed price x, is uniquely determined by the first order condition
0 =  E ' u' ( f  + d • (X?+1 (*) -  *)) • ( X ^  (*) -  *) ] (2.4)
=  £ [ ( /  +  < / . * • ( f f - i ) p . * - ( g * - i ) ] .
As an immediate consequence of this characterisation we get
Lem m a 2.2.4 Under Assumption (2.2.3) the representative reference trader’s de­
mand function Dn satisfies the following homogeneity properties:
1. Dn( a f ,x )  =  aD n( f ,x )  for all a, and
2. Dn(a f ,a x )  = Dn( f ,x )  for all a.
In particular, using these homogeneities we find
Dn( f ,x )  = Dn(x -^ - ,x )  = i - - D n( l , l ) - X - D : .  (2.5)
X X  X
Note that, due to homogeneity, the weighted demand function (1 — p)Dn(F£,x)  can 
also be written as Dn((l — p)FJ), x). It can hence be interpreted as the demand of a 
representative reference trader who has only a fraction 1 — p of the aggregate wealth 
FJ) at her disposal. Thus p plays the same role in our model as does the parameter 
a  in the model of Brennan and Schwartz (1989).
E q u il ib r iu m  w it h o u t  P r o g r a m  T r a d e r s :
In the absence of program traders the market clearing equation takes the form
i = d :  ■ H  =► x s  =  d : -  f*". (2.6)
A k
Using Assumption (2.2.3) (3) this implies X % + 1  =  DJ • F£+l =  D* • • Q  =  XJ) • ££.
We summarise this in the following
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Lem m a 2.2.5 In the economy specified in Assumption (2.2.3), the equilibrium price 
process (X%)k=o,i,... in the absence of program traders is given by
* 1 +1 =  XS ■ Q .  (2.7)
In particular, expectations are rational if  and only t / f j  =  for all k.
As an example of income dynamics consider the sequence
Q  =  exP ( ( f1 -  y f W k + i  -  t l )  +  >/%/<*+1 -  t l  ■ ®*+i) .
where (£k)k=o,i,... is an i.i.d. sequence of random variables. If, for instance, the are 
standard-normally distributed, then prices follow a discretised geometric Brownian 
Motion. If, on the other hand, the eJJ are just the increments of a random walk, then 
prices are given by a geometric random walk as in Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979).
E q u il ib r iu m  w it h  P r o g r a m  T r a d e r s :
In the presence of program traders the market clearing equation becomes
i = ( i - p ) . D: - § ; + p - r ( t nk, x z ) .  (2 .8)
In order to ensure existence of a unique equlibrium we have to make an additional
technical assumption. It will turn out later that this is mainly a restriction on the
market weight p of program traders (see Section 2.4 below).
A ssum ption 2.2.6 There exists a constant k > 0 such that for each n
dd>n
1 — p • 4>n(t, x) — p • x ——(t , x) > k for alH  > 0 and x E IR++. (2-9)
Moreover, we require (2.9) also to hold for the limit function cf).
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Proposition 2.2.7 Given Assumption (2.2.6), there exists for every market weight 
p £ (0,1) a unique equilibrium in the economy specified in Assumptions (2.2.3) and 
(2 .2.2) .
REMARKS: As the proof of Proposition 2.2.7 below shows, condition (2.9) guaran­
tees that in equilibrium the aggregate demand function is strictly decreasing in x , 
such that equilibrium prices will depend smoothly on the reference trader’s income 
FJ). This rules out price jumps and “crashes” of the kind discussed by Gennotte and 
Leland (1990) and Schonbucher (1993). Moreover, (2.9) ensures that the equilibrium 
is stable under the usual Walrasian tatonnement process. We believe that this is 
an important feature of our model, which contrasts with the analysis of Platen and 
Schweizer (1994). In order for them to explain volatility smiles by feedback effects 
from dynamic hedging they have to assume an (excess) demand function for their 
reference traders that is increasing in price. Not only does this result in the equi­
librium being unstable, it even gives rise to arbitrage opportunities for the program 
traders in the sense of Jarrow (1994).
PROOF: Existence follows from continuity of the demand functions and 
limsup ((1 — p)Dn(f,  x) +  p4>n(t, x)) < p < 1,
x - ¥o o
lim ((l - p ) D n( f ,x )  + p(j>n(t,x))  =  +oox—^0
for all t , f >  0. For uniqueness it is sufficient to show that whenever t , /  and x  solve
the market clearing equation (2.8), we have ^  ((1 — p)Dn( f , x )  +  p(f>n(t,x))  <  0 . A
direct computation using Lemma 2.2.4 gives
2 -  ((l -  p)Dn(f,  x) + p<f>"(t, x)) = - 1  • ((1  -  p)Dn{f, x) -  * ) )  •
The term in the brackets on the right-hand side equals 1 — p<j>n(t , x) — p x ^ - ( t ,  x) in 
equilibrium, which is positive by Assumption (2.2.6). □
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2.3 The Continuous-Time M odel
In order to get a clearer picture of the equilibrium price process and in particular of 
its volatility structure, we will now pass to the limiting continuous-time model. This 
also brings us closer to the original Black-Scholes model. To maintain a maximal level 
of generality we turn back to the situation described in the beginning of Section 2 .2 . 
That is, we assume a general aggregate demand function of the form (2.1) satisfying 
Assumption (2.2.1). For each n = 1,2, . . .  let (X£)jt=o,i,... be the unique equilibrium 
price process, i.e. solution to the market clearing equation (2 .2), which we know 
exists by Assumption (2.2.1) (1).
In order to formulate our results we need a common base space on which the distribu­
tions of all these processes can be compared. Let 2>d[0, oo) denote the d-dimensional 
Skorohod-Space; cf. Jacod and Shiryaev (1987). We identify any sequence • • •
defined for times £[}, £f , . . .  with the RCLL function
oo
6 * • ! « * < « « ) •
k=0
Let (Afn)*>0 and (Ftn)*>o denote the RCLL versions of (X%)k=o,i,... and (F£)k=o,i,..., 
respectively. For the passage to the limit we require the state variable processes 
(Fg)k=o,i,... to converge to a continuous-time limit. Remember that for the CRRA 
case without program traders the equilibrium price process (X^)k=oti t... 1S propor­
tional to (F£)k= ; cf. Lemma 2.2.5. Since our objective is to study the effect 
of hedging in a Black-Scholes type environment we assume that the limiting state 
variable process is a geometric Brownian Motion.4
4The main result of this section, Theorem 2.3.2, easily carries over to more general diffusion 
processes.
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A ssu m p tio n  2.3.1 Suppose that the sequence {F n}n=1,2,... of state variable processes 
converges in distribution to a geometric Brownian Motion with constant drift and 
volatility parameters p and rj, respectively.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section:
T h eo rem  2.3.2 Suppose the sequences {Gn}n=1,2,... and { F n}n=i,2 of aggregate de­
mand functions and state variable processes satisfy Assumptions (2.2.1) and (2.3.1), 
respectively.
Then the sequence {Xn}n=i)2,... of equilibrium price processes converges in distribu­
tion, and the limit distribution is uniquely characterised as the law of the solution 
{Xt)t>0 of the SDE
ao(s ,F „ X ,)
Xt = Xo -  / Z  ■ ■ dw ,  (2 .10)
§g , 
a/ 1
to \ ° £ ( s , f s , x s ) ' d£ ( s ,F „ x sy
where 0 is a standard Wiener process, (Ft)t>0 is just short for Ft =  0 -1(£, X t),
and H  is a smooth function that depends only on first and second order derivatives 
of G. In particular, the instantaneous volatility of the process (X t)t>0 at time t is 
given by
8£(t ,rl(t,xt),xt) r ^ Xt) 
v ( t , X t ) - r )  : =  -  X   t ; --------»?• (2.11)d G
d x
PROOF: By Assumption (2.2.1) (1) the equilibrium price process in economy n is 
given by X f  =  ^ ( t ”, F ”), where rj) =  if t \  <  t < t j+1. We first show that the 
ipn converge:
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Lem m a 2.3.3 The sequence {'0n}n=i,2,... converges uniformly on compacts to the 
smooth function ip defined by the relation G(t, f,ip(t,  / ) )  =  1 .
Smoothness of ip follows from the Implicit Function Theorem and Assumption (2.2.1) 
(3). Convergence is shown in Appendix 2.A. By Assumption (2.3.1) the sequence 
{ F n}n=i,2 ,... converges in distribution by to a process (Ft)t>o satisfying
Ft = F0 + f  r)Fs dWs + f pFs ds (2 .12)
Jo Jo
for some standard Wiener process (W*)*>o. A version of the Continuous Mapping 
Theorem then implies convergence in distribution of the triplet (t/1, F f,ip n(Tf, Ff ) )  
to {t, Ft,ip(t,Ft)). To characterise the limiting distribution on D3 [0, oo) we apply 
Ito’s Lemma to ip(t, Ft) and use (2.12) to obtain
=  xl>(0,Fo) + f ‘ ( ^ { s , F s)r ,F ^ dW,
+ J *  F.) + FS)»FS +  F .tfF p )  ds.
By differentiating the defining equation G(t, f,ip(t,  / ) )  =  1, the derivatives of ip can 
be expressed in terms of those of G , proving that X t =  ip(t, Ft) indeed solves the 
SDE (2.10). Expression (2.11) for the volatility is obtained by simply plugging Ft = 
ip~l (t, X t) back into (2.10). To complete the proof note that the drift and dispersion 
functions in equation (2.10) are smooth by assumption and thus locally Lipschitz. 
This implies pathwise uniqueness of (2.10) and hence uniqueness in distribution. 
□
We now relate the concrete specification with CRRA utility as outlined in Assump­
tions (2.2.3) and (2.2.2) to the general situation characterised by Assumption (2.2.1), 
and deduce the shape of the volatility in this special case.
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Corollary 2.3.4 Suppose that the sequence of discrete-time economies specified in 
Assumptions (2.2.3) and (2.2.2) satisfies in addition Assumption (2.2.6). I f  the 
DJ from (2.5) converge to some D* as n — ►oo, then the corresponding sequence 
{Gn}n=1,2,... of demand functions satisfies (2.2.1) with a limiting demand function G 
of the form
G(t, / ,  x) = (1 -  p) • D* • -  +  p • <j)(t, x ).
x
Hence, under (2.3.1) the corresponding sequence of price processes { ^ n}n=i,2,... by 
Theorem 2.3.2 converges in distribution to a continuous-time diffusion process (X t)t>o 
whose instantaneous volatility at any time t is given by
v ( t ,X , ) - t ] : = ---------- 1 ~ P^ t’X i l i  v- (2-13)
In particular, volatility is increasing in the market weight p of program traders, 
bounded below by the “reference volatility” r) and bounded above by t]/k . Note also 
that in the absence of program traders, i.e. when p = 0, v ( t ,X t) =  1. Market 
volatility then equals the volatility 77 of the exogenous state variable process (Ft)t>o-
PROOF: The convergence of Gn to G is obvious by the assumed convergence of D™ 
to D* and (2.2.2). It is easily seen that (2.2.6) implies (2.2.1) (1) and (3). Finally
(2 .2 .1) (2 ) follows since the ipn and their first derivatives are uniformly bounded on 
compacts by (2.2.6) and (2.2.2) (1). The form of the volatility function is derived in 
Appendix 2.A. □
REMARKS: Of course, when taken literally, the overlapping generations scenario of 
Section 2 .2.1 does no longer make sense when passing to the continuous-time limit, 
since the lifespan of every generation becomes infinitesimal. However, in the specific 
case considered there, we view the discrete-time model as the main focus of our 
interest, and the continuous-time model merely as a useful tool for analysing its
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properties. The reason for taking this view is that we want to contrast the study of 
Brennan and Schwartz (1989) by a temporary equilibrium model in which investors’ 
decisions are driven by myopic considerations. One could, for instance, fix a time 
discretisation, i.e. an index N  £ IN, and keep the reference traders’ demand functions 
fixed: Dn = DN for all n £ IN. The convergence results, Theorem 2.3.2 and Corollary 
2.3.4, provide the necessary link between the discrete-time and the continuous-time 
model, thus permitting the use of the limiting diffusion as a tool for the analysis. Note 
that the above construction does not necessarily imply that we restrict the program 
traders to the same fixed discretisation. Their strategy functions may converge to 
continuous trading as n — »oo.
In our model, the Brownian Motion driving the dynamics of the state variable process 
(Ft)t>o is the only source uncertainty. However, had we allowed the aggregate hedging 
function 0  or the weight p to depend on some exogenous uncertainty, we would 
typically have ended up with a “Stochastic Volatility Model”. Such models recently 
have become a focus of attention, see for example Hull and White (1987), Follmer 
and Schweizer (1990), or Ball and Roma (1994).
2.4 Feedback-Effects from Black-Scholes Trading
Price dependent volatility—as generated by dynamic hedging in our model—causes 
major problems in practical applications of option pricing theory. Although hedging 
strategies may still be shown to exist they can in most cases no longer be calculated 
explicitly. This is why in practice most investors base their trading on the classi­
cal Black-Scholes Formula, which postulates constant volatility. In this section we 
therefore study in more detail the feedback effect generated by the corresponding 
strategies and analyse the extent to which they are still appropriate, when the effect
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of their implementation on prices is taken into account.
We work directly in the limiting diffusion model, because the explicit expression for 
the volatility faciliates the analysis. Therefore we contend ourselves with specifying 
properties only of the limiting demand function G which we assume to be of the 
form G =  (1 — p)D +  p(j> with (j> being a mixture of Black-Scholes trading strategies. 
We remark, however, that under Assumption (2.2.2) the weak convergence of the 
equilibrium price processes implies the convergence of the corresponding gains from 
trade; see Duffie and Protter (1992). Hence our results on the performance of hedge 
strategies are also meaningful for the discrete-time models of Section 2.2.
2.4.1 Hedge Dem and Generated by Black-Scholes Strategies
First we want to specify the strategy used by the representative program trader in 
more detail. As shown by Leland (1980), every convex payoff can be represented 
as the terminal value of a portfolio consisting of a mixture of European call options 
and a static position in the underlying. Therefore we concentrate on such portfolios. 
Consider first the problem of replicating the payoff of one single call option with 
strike price K  and maturity date T. As was shown in the seminal paper by Black and 
Scholes (1973), if the trading decisions are based on the assumption of the underlying 
asset price following a geometric Brownian Motion with constant volatility cr, the 
corresponding price at any time t is given by the solution c ( t ,X t) of the terminal 
value problem
i^ t + \cr2x2lx^ )c(<t’x^ ~0, C(T ’X) =  [x _  A’]+> (2-14)
and the corresponding strategy is fj(£, X t). We denote the price and strategy func­
tionals for a fixed contract (K , T) by C(cr, K ,T  — t, x ) and </>(cr, K ,T  — t, x ), respec­
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tively.5 The terminal value problem (2.14) is explicitly solvable and the strategy 
function is given by
<p(o, K , r, x) := N  ^  ’ 2^' 15^
where Af is the standard normal distribution function and r  denotes the time to
m aturity T  — t. In the sequel we will refer to cr also as the input volatility, since it is 
the volatility used for the computation of hedging strategies.
We assume that the aggregate demand of our representative program trader is in­
dependent of time. This models the scenario of many program traders entering and 
leaving the market at random times, so that the average composition of payoffs be­
ing replicated is constant over time. Formally, the representative program trader’s 
demand is given by p<j>(cry x) where p is the market weight and
<^ >(cr, x) =  a -f I (p(cr, K, r, x) v(dK  (g) dr). (2.16)
Jjr2+
Here, a represents the static position in the underlying and v  is a measure on IR+ 
that describes the distribution of strike prices K  and times-to-maturity r  in the 
portfolio. For convenience we define T(<7 We want to show that
the feedback effects of portfolio insurance are mitigated if the distribution of strike 
prices and times to maturity is relatively heterogeneous. To this end we concentrate 
on the following extreme case:
5 Note that both value and strategy function depend on current time t  and maturity time T  only
via their difference, the time-to-maturity r =  T  — t.
6In the standard option pricing theory the price derivative of a strategy function is known as
the strategy’s “gamma”, which motivates this notation.
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A ssu m p tio n  2.4.1 v has a smooth density with respect to the Lebesgue-measure,
i.e. v is of the form v(dK  <S> dr) =  g(K , r) dK  ® dr , where g : IR+ x [0, oo) — > IR+ 
is a smooth density function having compact support in 1R+ x [0 , oo) .7
Next we want to verify that Assumption (2.4.1) ensures that for p sufficiently small 
there is a unique equilibrium in the economy with CRRA agents (i.e. that As­
sumption (2.2.6) holds). Observe first that on the single contract level the function 
x ^ ( a ,  K, r , x) explodes when x - ^ K  and r —>-0. This corresponds to the well-known 
fact that option hedging strategies require extremely large changes of the hedge 
portfolio when the option is at the money and close to maturity. Surprisingly, this 
problem disappears in the aggregate, if the distribution v is non-singular. The fol­
lowing proposition shows that bounds on r(:r,<7) can be found that depend only on 
the degree of heterogeneity of the distribution v\
P ro p o sitio n  2.4.2 Suppose that a  > 77 for some 77 > 0. Under Assumption (2.4-1) 
we have the following estimates for all x E 1R++;
( 0  |r(<T’l ) l - / 0° i ° °  \j k {K9 ( k ' t ) )
dK  dr,
(**) £ r ( c , x )
c\ poo poo  I Q2
dK  dr.
The proof is given in Appendix 2.B. Because of (i) we can achieve Assumption 
(2 .2 .6) without further restrictions on the distribution v  simply by requiring the 
porfolio insurance weight p not to be too large. Calculations with some sample 
density functions have shown that any reasonable value for p can be permitted.
7Note that we explicitly allow g ( K , 0) >  0 for some K , i.e. arbitrarily small times to maturity.
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REMARK: By dK  = K d (log K ) the expression on the right-hand side of (i) above can 
be interpreted as a measure of the heterogeneity of the distribution of logarithmic 
strike prices, averaged over the time to maturity r. An inspection of equation (2.17) 
below reveals that the feedback effect of dynamic hedging on market volatility mainly 
manifests itself through the appearence of r(<r, x) in the denominator of v(cr, x). 
Hence by (i) we see that this “disturbance” is controlled by the degree of heterogeneity 
of v. This is most apparent in the economy with CRRA agents. Here we get from 
Corrollary 2.3.4
1 -p</>(q,x) 1 - pV ( (j x  ) =  ------------------------------------ -------------------------------
’ 1 — x) — pT(o,x) ~  1 — p — p sup T(cr, x ) ’
such that even the maximal increase in volatility is controlled by the degree of het­
erogeneity of i/.
2.4.2 Rational Black-Scholes Trading
We now investigate the extent to which the Black-Scholes formula is still appropriate 
for the design of hedge strategies in our setting. We work with a limiting demand 
function of the form8
G(<7, / ,  x) =  (1 -  p) • D(f ,  x) -f- p • <j>((7, x),
where <f>(cr,x) is as in (2.16). Throughout the rest of this section we require only 
Assumptions (2.2.1) and (2.4.1) to hold. In particular we do not require the specific 
CRRA utility. By Theorem 2.3.2 the volatility of the limiting diffusion is
(1 — p)^r  (^ >- 1(x), x)
• r { x )  ■»  (2‘17)
8In the subsequent analysis a  is a parameter which does not vary with /  or x. Its appearence 
does not alter the validity of Theorem 2.3.2.
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As a first step, we use an idea of El Karoui, Jeanblanc-Picque, and Shreve (1998) 
to derive a formula for the “tracking error”. This number measures the difference 
between the actual and the theoretical value of a self-financing hedge portfolio for a 
European call calculated from the Black-Scholes formula with constant volatility <r. 
Recall that the theoretical value is given by Ct := C(cr,K,T  — t , X t). The actual 
value Vt of the self-financing portfolio defined by initially investing Vo =  Co and 
holding ip (a ,K ,T  — t , X t) shares of the underlying at any time t < T  is given by the 
cumulative gains from trade, i.e.
V5 =  V0 +  [ \ { v , K , T - s , X s) d Xs 
Jo
The tracking error et is then defined as the difference between actual and theoretical 
value:
et := Vt -  Ct.
Since Ct  =  [Xt  — K ]+, c t  measures the deviation of the hedge portfolio’s terminal 
value from the payoff it is supposed to replicate. In particular, if the tracking error 
is always positive, the terminal value of the hedge portfolio of an investor following 
the strategy cp(o, K ,T  — t, X t) always completely covers the option’s payoff. The 
following is a simplified version of Theorem 6.2 in El Karoui, Jeanblanc-Picque, and 
Shreve (1998).
P roposition  2.4.3 Suppose that the underlying asset’s price follows a diffusion with 
volatility (2.17). Then the tracking error for a single option is given by 
i r* fp n
e< =  j  J  ~  ' A V , * .) )  ' X2. f c ¥ {a' K ’T ~ S' ds■ <2-18)
In particular, i f  a  >  r)v(cr, x), the tracking error is always positive.
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PROOF: By Ito’s Lemma,
\ { a , K , T - s , X s)dXs 
= Vt
+ f  K ,T  — s ,X ,)  + l-r? v 2(<T, X ,)  • X 2^ ( < r ,  K ,T  -  s, X .) )  ds.
Substituting (2.14) into the above equation yields the desired expression for the 
tracking error. Moreover, C(<7, K ,T  — t, x ) being convex in x , its second derivative is 
always positive. Hence by (2.18) the sign of the tracking error is entirely determined 
by the sign of the volatility difference o 2 — r]2v2(o, x ) .  □
Proposition 2.4.3 shows that in the presence of the feedback effect, simple Black- 
Scholes hedging strategies, (i.e. strategies based on the assumption of constant 
volatility,) are no longer sufficient to perfectly replicate a derviative security’s payoff: 
the tracking-error is almost surely non-zero. Given this observation, there are then 
two possible directions in which one could proceed. First, retaining the restriction to 
the class of Black-Scholes strategies, one can study the tracking error and its deter­
minants, thus addressing the question how well hedging performs within this class. 
Second, one can ask whether the class of strategies can be enlarged in such a way 
that perfect hedging becomes possible again. Or, in other words, whether rational 
agents who understand the feedback effect caused by their trading, could fully take 
it into account when designing their hedging strategies.
In this paper we take the first route, for the following reasons. The replication 
problem in finitely elastic markets becomes very complex, since the feedback effect 
on volatility introduces non-linearities in the partial differential equation that has to 
be solved in order to obtain hedging strategies. Not only does solving this problem 
exceed the scope of this paper, it is also true that practitioners rely almost exclusively 
on Black-Scholes type models. We therefore believe it a valid and important question
Ct — Cq +  f  
Jo
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to ask how well Black-Scholes hedging can perform in the presence of a feedback effect, 
even if perfect replication is impossible. However, solving the replication problem in 
finitely elastic markets is a very promising area for future research.
As we have just seen, if the terminal value of the hedge portfolio is to be no smaller 
than the payoff it is supposed to cover, the input volatility cr used for the computation 
of the hedging strategy must be no smaller than the actual market volatility. On 
the other hand, following the Black-Scholes strategy corresponding to a certain input 
volatility o requires an initial investment of C(cr, K, T, Xo). Since C is increasing in 
cr, to keep the initial “over-investment” as low as possible, investors should seek to 
find the smallest such cr. This motivates the following
D efinition 2.4.4 The constant a is called a super-volatility if  a is the smallest 
positive solution of the equation
cr =  sup { r]v(a, x) : x  € IR++ } • (2.19)
Note the recursive structure: Since the choice of the input volatility and hence of 
the trading strategy affects the actual volatility, cr appears on both sides of (2.19). 
It will turn out that sufficient for the existence of a super-volatility is the following
A ssum ption 2.4.5 The volatility function (2.17) has the following properties:
1. There are constants O < 77< 7 7 < 0 0  so that 77 < v(a ,x) < rj, V cr £ [77, fj],
V x E IR++ >
2. There is a positive constant (d so that rj • |^(<j, x ) <  1 — f3, V cr £  [77, 77],
V x  G 1R++.
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Essentially (ii) means that variations in the input volatility do not affect the actual 
market volatility too much. Since ^T(cr, x) is bounded according to Proposition 
2.4.2, this assumption holds as long as p is not too large. Of course to check if (i) is 
satisfied one has to know the function D. In case of the economy with CRRA agents 
(i) is implied by Assumption (2.2.6).
Proposition 2.4.6 Suppose Assumption (2 .4 -5)  holds. Then the super-volatility in 
the sense of Definition 2 -4-4 exists and is given by
a := sup{<7*(a;) : x G IR++},
where cr*(x) is the unique solution of the fixed point problem rjv(a,x) =  cr.
PROOF: Assumption (2 .4 .5 ) implies that the equation rjv(a,x) — cr =  0 has a unique 
solution cr*(x) for each x > 0. Now by definition a > cr*(x) for any x  G IR++. Since 
by Assumption (2 .4 .5 ) (ii) the mapping a 77u(cr, x) — cr is strictly decreasing, we 
get
77u(a, x) — cr < r]v(cr*(x), x) — &*(x) =  0
for all x  G IR++, hence a is indeed an upper bound for rjv(a^ x). It is also the smallest 
such bound. This is obvious in the case when the supremum in (2.19) is attained 
for some x , and it follows from Assumption (2.4.5) (ii) in the general case. To prove 
that <r is also the smallest solution to (2.19), simply note that by definition a*(x) 
gets arbitrarily close to <7. Hence for cr < <f there is always an x with a < v*(x) such 
that by monotonicity
r}v(d, x) — a > rjv(<r*(x), x) — cr*(x) =  0.
□
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REMARK: From a practioner’s viewpoint it is reasonable to use a Black-Scholes 
strategy based on the supervolatility o  for hedging purposes as long as the difference 
between o and inf{771;(if, #), x  € 1R++} and hence the possible initial overinvestment 
is relatively small. As we will see in the simulations reported below, this issue, and 
hence the robustness of the Black-Scholes Formula with respect to the feedback from 
dynamic hedging, depends largely on the heterogeneity of the insured payoffs.
2.4.3 Comparison w ith the Brennan and Schwartz Study
Using explicit numerical computations (see below for details) we can compare our 
results to those obtained by Brennan and Schwartz (1989). Table 2.1 lists the ratios of 
the volatility in the presence of program traders to that in the benchmark economy 
without program traders. While the utility functions, and hence notably the risk 
aversion, of the reference traders are identical in both models, an inspection of Table 
2.1 shows that the effects of program trading on volatility are much stronger in our 
model. As was explained in the introduction this is due to the different expectation 
formation of the reference traders in the two models.
2.4.4 Num erical Com putations
First we computed the resulting volatility function r)h(o, a:) as a function of x , using 
as hedging input the super-volatility W for a variety of different weights p, different 
reference volatilities 77, and different levels of heterogeneity of p. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
show the dramatic effect of heterogeneity. Here, we graphed the reference volatility 
“0” and the resulting volatility against the current price using a value of p =
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10%.9 All numerical results, including those not featured in this paper, support our 
findings from the qualitative analysis: Volatility increases with the market share p 
of portfolio insurance as well as with reference volatility rj. Both the level of increase 
and the price dependency are reduced by heterogeneity.
We then ran Monte Carlo simulations to generate sample price paths and used the 
tracking error formula (2.18) to compute the terminal value of a hedging portfolio 
based on the super-volatility a. We compared the results to the payoff of the option it 
was supposed to duplicate, again for a variety of different parameter constellations. 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 again capture the striking effect of heterogeneity. For every 
sample path we graphed the terminal value of the portfolio against the terminal 
price of the underlying. The straight line depicts the exact option payoff. Again 
all results we obtained strongly support our qualitative findings: The tracking error 
is largest around the option’s striking price and almost vanishes as the option gets 
deeper in the money or out of the money. We see that even a comparatively low level 
of heterogeneity is sufficient for the super-hedging portfolio to duplicate the option’s 
payoff almost perfectly.
9The fraction of the aggregate equity value subject to formal portfolio insurance prior to the 
events of October 1987 was approximately 5%. However, one should bear in mind that the amount 
of “informal” portfolio insurance may have amounted to considerabely more than this. Moreover, 
part of the aggregate equity supply is held because of the associated control rights and not for 
speculative reasons, such that the actual “supply” should be considered smaller than aggregate 
equities. Hence the “actual” market weight of program trading might be larger than just these 5%.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the feedback effect of dynamic hedging strategies 
on the equilibrium price process of the underlying asset in an economy where the 
market for the latter is only finitely elastic. We gave an explicit expression for the 
transformation of market volatility which allowed us to carry out a detailed study 
of the feedback effects caused by dynamic hedging. A comparison with the analysis 
of Brennan and Schwartz revealed the importance of agents’ expectations in deter­
mining market liquidity and hence the amplitude of the feedback effect on volatility. 
Adding to the existing literature, we identified heterogeneity of the distribution of 
hedged contracts as one of the key determinants for the transformation of volatility. 
Moreover, we showed that simple hedging strategies derived from the assumption of 
constant volatility may still be appropriate even though their implementation obvi­
ously violates this assumption. However, investors might have to “over-invest” in 
their hedging strategies. To sum up, we find that classical Black-Scholes theory is 
quite robust with respect to the feedback effects discussed, as long as the distribution 
of different payoff claims being hedged does not become too homogeneous. Nonethe­
less future research is needed to extend the work of Jarrow (1994) on option pricing 
theory in an economy where agents’ hedging strategies affect the underlying asset’s 
price process.
2.A Appendix: Complements to Section 2.3
PROOF OF Lemma 2.3.3: First we prove the pointwise convergence of the ipn to 
ip. For t and /  fixed, every subsequence of the sequence xn := ipn( t , f )  contains a 
further subsequence { ^ ^ '= 1,2,... which converges to some x £ IR+ by Assumption
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(2.2.1) (2). Now we have the following estimate:
<  |Gni( t , f , x nj) -  G ( t , f ,x nj)| +  |G ( t , f ,x nj) -  G ( t , f ,x ) | .
The first term on the right-hand side tends to zero for j — »-oo because Gn converges 
to G uniformly on compacts. The second term tends to zero because of the uniform 
continuity of G on compacts. It follows that G (t ,f ,x )  = limj Gnj(t, f , x nj) = 1 and 
hence x = Now by Assumption (2.2.1) (2) the sequence {tpn}n- 1,2,... also
converges uniformly on compacts to □
PROOF of Corollary 2.3.4: Using (2.11) and the particular form of the limiting 
demand function together with Ft =  •0 ~1(f,Xf) we get
, ' | f ( t , r \ t , X t),Xt) 4 , - \ t ,Xt) - ( 1  - p ) D . - %
I ^ - l( t ,x t) , x t)'  x t - ( 1  - p ) D. - %  + pXt%(t,Xty
Using the market clearing equation 1 =  (1 — +  p<f>(t,Xt) to substitute for
(1 — p)D^Y~t in the above expression gives the desired shape of the volatility of the 
limiting diffusion. □
2.B Appendix: Complements to Section 2.4
ESTIMATES for T(cr, z): Observe first that by (2.15) we have
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which implies:
r°° r°° d
r(cr,x) =  j  I x — ip (a ,K ,T ,x )g (K ,T )d K d r  
f°° f°° d
= ~  Jo J  K ’d K V ( a ’ K ’ T’ x ) 9 ( K ’ T ) d K d T 
=  lo L  v (a’K i Ti x ) - ^ ( K 9 (K i T)) dK  dT
by partial integration and the assumption of g having compact support. But since 
0 <  V7 <  1 by (2.15), this implies
lr (<r,x)\< J ~ \ ^ ( K 9 (K, t ) )  dKdr.
ESTIMATES FOR (cr,x): Observe first that by (2.15) we have
d d
(Td a <P^  K ’T’X  ^ =  2r K ’T’
which together with the results from the previous paragraph implies
d f°° f°° d  d
r(<7 ,i) =  j  ^ J  — t p ( < r , K , T , x ) j j f ( K g ( K , T ) )  d K d r
/OO poo  Q QJo 2 - ^ ^ , K , T,x)M {Kg(K,T)) dKdi-
2 /*oo poo  p p
=  - -  J o J o < p (^ ,K ,T ,x ) -^ ^ (T K g (K ,T ) )  d K dr
again by partial integration and the assumption of g having compact support. But 
since 0 <  ip <  1 by (2.15) and furthermore cr > rj, this implies
2 p o o  p o o  I pp.
- v L  L  \ d ^ K { T K 9 ( K ’ T))
d K  dr.
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P ro g ra m  T ra d e r’s 
M ark e t W eight







80 1.01 1.00 1.06 1.02 1.13 1.04
90 1.02 1.00 1.08 1.02 1.18 1.04
100 1.02 1.00 1.09 1.02 1.19 1.05
110 1.02 1.00 1.08 1.02 1.18 1.05
120 1.01 1.00 1.06 1.02 1.14 1.05
Table 2.1: Comparison with the Results of Brennan and Schwartz.
This table shows the ratios of actual to reference volatility in our model (F-S) and the 
Brennan-Schwartz model (B-S) for different market weights of the program trader.
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Figure 2.1: Volatility if Hedged Contracts are Concentrated.
This graph shows the actual market volatility (•) compared to reference volatility (o) 
when hedging is based on the super-volatility <7 . The variances of strike prices and 
times-to-maturity are 0.0625, i.e. the distribution is highly concentrated. The market 
weight of portfolio insurance is p =  10%.
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Figure 2.2: Volatility if Hedged Contracts are Heterogeneous.
This graph shows the actual market volatility (•) compared to reference volatility
(o) when hedging is based on the super-volatility a. The variances of strike prices 
and times-to-maturity are 0.5, i.e. the distribution is relatively heterogeneous. The 
market weight of portfolio insurance is p = 10%.
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Figure 2.3: Tracking Error if Hedged Contracts are Concentrated.
This graph shows for 100 sample paths the terminal value (•) of a portfolio designed to 
hedge a European call with strike price 100.0, based on the super-volatility a , compared 
to the option’s pay-off itself. The variances of strike prices and times-to-maturity are 
0.0625, i.e. the distribution is highly concentrated. The market weight of portfolio 
insurance is p = 10%.
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Figure 2.4: Tracking Error if Hedged Contracts are Heterogeneous.
This graph shows for 100 sample paths the terminal value (•) of a portfolio designed to 
hedge a European call with strike price 100.0, based on the super-volatility a , compared 
to the option’s pay-off itself. The variances of strike prices and times-to-maturity are
0.5, i.e. the distribution is relatively heterogeneous. The market weight of portfolio 
insurance is p =  10%.
Chapter 3
Technical Trading in 
Foreign Exchange Markets
3.1 Introduction
Technical Trading has always enjoyed a higher reputation amongst practitioners than 
amongst economists. This is so mainly because the theory of efficient markets leaves 
no scope for profits to be made on basis of technical analysis of historical price pat­
terns. If money can be made by predicting future returns based on past prices only, 
one should expect market participants to take advantage of this opportunity, causing 
current prices to adjust thus eradicating any such profit opportunity. However, two 
important facts have brought technical trading into the focus of attention of a grow­
ing strand of economic research. First, technical trading and its inherent positive 
feedback effect of past returns on current prices have been blamed for causing or at 
least aggravating some of the market crashes in recent history; as reported amongst
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others by the Group of Ten (1993). Second, empirical evidence shows that technical 
trading rules are indeed widely used by market participants, in particular on foreign 
exchange markets and, more importantly, the trading activity triggered by such rules 
has significant effects on prices; see for example Allen and Taylor (1992).
Two main questions arise in this context. First, if market participants do follow tech­
nical trading rules, what is the effect on equilibrium exchange rates? Second, can the 
use of technical trading rules be rationalised? Empirical evidence seems to suggest 
that profits can indeed be made by following technical trading rules, see Levich and 
Thomas (1993), Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992), and Sweeney (1986). This 
chapter addresses these questions from a theoretical viewpoint. We consider an equi­
librium model for exchange rates in which some agents follow technical trading rules. 
As analytical framework, we choose the discrete-time equilibrium model developed in 
Follmer and Schweizer (1993). Technical traders interact with pure “noise traders” , 
and exchange rates are determined by Walrasian equilibrium. To analyse the proper­
ties of the resulting equilibrium exchange rate process in more detail, we then pass to 
the continuous-time limit. It turns out that, as long as technical traders are active, 
bubbles will always emerge. In other words, exchange rate fluctuations caused by 
noise will be picked up by technical analysis and amplified by the buy or sell signals 
generated by the corresponding trading rules. However, whether these bubbles can 
grow into market crashes depends on how far traders are willing to go in following 
their technical trading rules. If there is a certain amount of “fundamentalism” in the 
market, i.e. traders who expect a trend reversal when exchange rates have moved 
too far from their fundamental level, bubbles will always burst.
There have been a number of theoretical studies analysing the effects of technical 
trading. In Day and Huang (1990), rational “information traders” interact with 
technical traders. Equilibrium is determined by a market maker who sets asset
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prices such as to maintain a target inventory. Unlike the model considered here, Day 
and Huang do not introduce noise. As a result, equilibrium prices in their model 
follow deterministic “chaotic” dynamics. The qualitative behaviour of equilibrium 
prices however is similar to that obtained here. In Lux (1995), traders act upon 
rumours and fads rather than technical analysis. Two types of agents, “optimistic” 
and “pessimistic” traders interact with one-another. Contagious mood swings cause 
equilibrium prices to fluctuate cyclically. While both these papers explain the emer­
gence of price bubbles, neither addresses the rationality of agent’s behaviour and the 
profitability of the resulting trading strategies.
Interestingly, despite that fact that technical trading obviously introduces a substan­
tial amount of autocorrelation of returns, it can be shown that expected returns over 
any finite horizon are nonetheless zero. However, while no profits can be made using 
simple buy-and-hold strategies, the existence of technical trading causes technical 
trading rules themselves to be profitable. In other words, technical trading can be 
seen as a kind of “self-fulfilling prophecy”: If market participants believe in technical 
trading rules, then they are indeed profitable. That is, although markets are efficient 
ex-ante, the use of technical trading rules can be rationalised by their ex-post prof­
itability. These results are in line with the empirical findings of Levich and Thomas 
(1993), Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992), and Sweeney (1986). Profitability 
of support and resistance rules was shown in Curcio and Goodhart (1992).
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce the 
model and the mathematical framework for our analysis. In the following section we 
formalise the demand arising from technical trading rules and discuss its properties. 
Section 3.4 analyses the structure of equilibria and the stochastic properties of the 
resulting equlibrium exchange rate process. The profitability of technical trading 
rules is studied in 3.4.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 The M odel
We employ the discrete-time framework introduced in Follmer and Schweizer (1993). 
We will model the dynamics of equilibrium exchange rates in discrete time and then 
pass to the continuous-time limit to facilitate the qualitative analysis (see Section 
3.4). More specifically, we consider a sequence of discrete-time economies for n = 
1 ,2 , . . .  with trading intervals A tn > 0 . In a given economy n , trading takes place at 
times t% := k- A tn, (k = 0 ,1 , . . . ) .  In view of the intended passage to the continuous­
time limit we furthermore assume that
A tn — > 0 as n —» oo.
T r a d e d  A s s e t s :
There are two assets in the economy, a riskless one (typically a domestic bond or 
money market account), and a risky one. We normalise the price of the riskless 
asset to one, thereby making interest rates implicit in our model. Since our focus in 
this chapter is the foreign exchange market, we think of the risky asset as a foreign 
currency, and refer to its price sometimes as exchange rate. Note that this is the 
inverse of the notion of exchange rate as it is used in the U.K., where it specifies 
the amount of foreign currency one can buy with one unit of domestic currency. 
We would like to stress that although we interpret our analysis in the context of 
foreign exchange markets, the results are also applicable to other scenarios such as 
for example equity markets. The price of the foreign currency at any trading date 
is denoted X%.
A g e n t s :
There are two types of agents active in the market; noise traders and information
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or technical traders. At any time £JJ, noise traders’ aggregate demand for the foreign 
currency is given by a random variable which we assume to be serially independent
and independent of the price history.
T e c h n ic a l  T r a d e r s :
There are m  technical traders in the economy, denoted i =  1, . . .  ,m. Each agent i 
is characterised by an element 0, £  0  C IRP of some p-dimensional parameter space, 
to be made more specific later. The 0{ are assumed to be drawn independently from 
a probability distribution p on 0 . Agent Vs trading behaviour is expressed in terms 
of a demand function for the foreign currency. More specifically, if at time an 
exchange rate of X  is quoted, agent i will demand an amount
a ^ e K X - A )
of foreign currency. Here, a{9{) is the “market weight” of agent z, and e jp f ,  0t) is 
agent Vs normalised demand function. Note that eJJ can (and will) depend on the
history of past prices, X%_l t X%_2, __  The aggregate demand from all technical
traders is then m
i'=l
L o g -L in e a r  D e m a n d :
In order to be able to model explicitly the demand arising from technical trading 
rules, we assume individual agents’ demand functions to be log-linear:
el(X-A) =  l o g ^ l .
We interpret X%(9i) as agent Vs view on what the exchange rate should be. The above 
demand specification then says that agent i will buy the foreign currency if its price 
is below X%(9i) and sell if it is above. We will refer to X%(0i) as agent z’s reference
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A
level at time t%. Note that, by the very nature of technical trading rules, X£(0i) will
depend on the price history   We will formalise this in more detail
later in Section 3.3. Although the assumption of log-linear demand functions seems 
arbitrary, it is very common in Monetary Economics, see for example Gourieroux, 
Laffont, and Monfort (1982), and is thus in line with our focus on foreign exchange
A
markets. It will be convenient to express agents’ reference levels X^(0i) in terms of 
return projections. More precisely, we define agent z’s return projection i2jj(0i) at 
time f l  implicitly so that we can write
*?(*.-) =  X k-1 ■ exp (Hue, )  • A i») .
Note that, by explicitly including the time interval A£n, we have effectively nor­
malised R%(0i) to reflect the projected return per unit of time. We can now re-write 
the model in logarithmic terms. Defining Yjf := logX J, Yk{Qi) := logX%(Qi), etc., 
we can write agent’s z’s excess demand function in logarithmic form as
ek(X; Si) =  ( n - 1  - Y  + %(SS) • a  r ) .
Note that, in slight abuse of notation, we use the same symbol eJJ for the demand 
function in logarithmic terms.
E q u il ib r iu m :
Denote by p £ [0,1] the relative share of total demand attributable to technical 
trading. In the context of foreign exchange markets, it is appropriate to assume that 
the total supply of foreign currency is zero, reflecting the fact that all that m atters is 
the net balance of foreign currency held by domestic traders versus domestic currency 
held by traders in the foreign country. The equilibrium exchange rate at any time ijj 
is then given as the solution X% of the market clearing equation
m
p  ■ £  p T (*0eZ(AT; 0i) +  ( l - p ) -  51 =  0. (3.1)
i=l
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Here, (3m(6i) is the normalised relative market weight of agent i, defined as
ot(6i)rm :=
£  a (°i)i= 1
W ith the log-linear demand specification, the market clearing equation takes the 
form
m 1
A Y ?  = T r W R l W A t "  +  ■ Snk . (3.2)
£ ?  p
Note that is as yet unspecified, so that by suitable rescaling we can assume that 
the term  (1 — p)/p  equals one. In order to write the equilibrium equation in form of 
a Stochastic Difference Equation, we define the cumulative noise demand process as
2 ? : = £  +  -  +  ss-
The market clearing equation then takes the form
m
A 1 7  =  £ /?“ (0O£2(0.) • A<" +  AZJ. (3.3)
1= 1
Since Rk(Qi) depends on the price history YJJli, VJ12, . . . ,  equation (3.3) for the (log­
arithmic) price process (l'in)jfc=olif... can be seen as a Stochastic Delay Equation.
REMARK: For large m, the Law of Large Numbers implies
m  -j2pm(mw)-*X--= /  awAsw/.(<»)
*=i
We will later make use of this limiting argument to analyse the behaviour of the 
equilibrium exchange rate process. In the following Section 3.3, we will give examples
A
of some explicit specifications of Rjj(0t) for a variety of technical trading rules, and 
derive a set of basic properties. In Section 3.4 we will then use these properties 
to characterise the dynamic behaviour of the equilibrium exchange rate process and
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analyse the profitability of different trading strategies. In the limit, for very large 
numbers of technical traders, the equilibrium equation hence takes the simple form
A Y ? = T k • A tn +  A Z f.
In particular, in the absence of technical trading, we have A Y£ =  A ZJ, i.e. exchange 
rate fluctuations are driven by noise alone. This implies
Ek-1 [ x n  = X U  • E [ exp (AZf) ].
In order to focus on the effect of technical trading, we assume that in the absence of 
technical trading, the expected return on the exchange rate is zero, E k-1[ AZ£ ] =  1. 
Thus, exchange rates in this case satisfy the Efficient Market Hypothesis in its weak 
form, i.e. E k- 1[ X k ] =  X k- \ .
3.3 Technical Trading Rules
In this section, we will formalise the demand arising from technical trading rules. 
Consider for a moment the situation where all agents believe in the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis in the weak form, i.e. the current price is the best estimate of next 
period’s price. Formally, this would be expressed as R k ( 0 i )  =  0 for all i. In this case, 
the market clearing equation (3.3) implies
A Y ? = A  Z l
In other words, =  X%_t • exp(AZ£), i.e. changes in price are purely driven by 
noise. By assumption, Ek-\[  exp(AZjf) ] =  1, so that
Ek-! [ X U  = X U
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In other words, if agents believe in market efficiency, then it turns out that markets 
are in fact efficient. In view of this, “taking a position” in the market means diverting 
from the assumption of efficiency, which is formalised by a non-zero return projection
k m .
B o u n d e d  M e m o r y :
Technical trading rules are typically based on past price patterns. Therefore, the re­
turn projection R jj at any time tJJ depends on the history of past prices, Y£_x, Yjf_2, . . .  
To facilitate the analysis, we will however require R j  to display bounded memory, i.e. 
to depend on price observations only up to a certain time in the past. We formalise 
this as follows:
A ssum ption 3.3.1 We assume there exists a fixed depth of memory T  >  0 and 
a deterministic function R n : 0  x IRZ— I^R such that for any 0* £ 0  the return
A
projection R % ( 0 i )  can be expressed as
b n (  n  \    pn ( o  . V"n V n
R k W i )  ~  R  ( V t ,  Y k - h  • • • > Y k - l )  > 
where I is the largest integer such that I • A tn < T .
Note that I depends on n, but for notational convenience we omit the superscript n. 
It is also worth mentioning that we assume the function R n to be independent of k ,
i.e. trading rules are only allowed to depend on price patterns but not directly on 
time. This assumption is made for computational convenience only and could easily 
be relaxed.
In other words, we assume that the return projection at time depends only on past 
price realisations no longer than T  in the past. Note in particular that we assume 
demand memory to be bounded uniformly accross all agents. Note also that we
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assume T  to be independent of n, so that also the trading rules in the continuous­
time limit will have a memory bounded by T. For notational convenience, we denote 
the relevant price history at time tJJ by
so that we can write =  For the remainder of the chapter, we
will express everything in terms of the generic function P 71, and we will omit the 
argument whenever it is unambiguous.
3.3.1 Generic Trading Rules
Generically, the majority of technical trading rules can be described as a combination 
of a signal rule and a set of actions. The signal rule determines, as a function of past 
price patterns, when an action is to be taken. The action taken typically consists of 
taking a position in the market, i.e. buying or selling a certain quantity of foreign 
currency when the price is below or above some projection. For example, a simple 
Trend Chasing rule generates a “buy” signal whenever past price patterns seem to 
show an upward trend, and a “sell” signal in case of a downward trend.
Specifically, let j  indicate a specific trading rule. Denote by P" the return projection 
corresponding to the application of rule j ,  i.e. an agent i who bases her trading 
exclusively on rule j  would be characterised by P n(0t) =  P". Note that in prac­
tice, the majority of traders would not follow any one rule exclusively, but rather 
implement a “mix” of different rules according to the price patterns observed. We 
will model this type of behaviour below, after discussing some examples of specific 
trading rules most widely used in practice. For further reference regarding specific 
technical trading rules see the survey by Neely (1997).
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3.3.2 Support and Resistance Levels
Support and Resistance (S&R) rules are among the most widely used technical trad­
ing rules. Resistance levels are thresholds set above the maximum of past exchange 
rates over a certain period, while the support levels are set below the minimum of 
past exchange rates. The S&R rule generates a buy signal when exchange rates rise 
beyond the resistance level, and a sell signal when rates fall below the support level. 
Formally,
if Y£_x > max +  M  then P? = 1 M  >  0,
t= 2 , . . . ,/
if < min Y ^  -  M  then P f  =  - 7 M  < 0,
i—2,... ,1
for some positive constant 7 .
3.3.3 M oving Average Rules
Besides support and resistence levels, the moving average (MA) rule is probably 
the most commonly used technical trading rule in foreign exchange markets. A 
trader following an MA rule tracks a short-term and a long-term moving average of 
past exchange rates. Whenever the short-term average moves above the long-term 
average, the rule generates a buy signal. Analogously, a sell signal is produced when 
the short-term average falls below the long-term average. Formally,
1
if w ’ Y k - i  >  M  then P i  =  7 V  > 0,
t'=l
I
if w iY ^  < - M  then P? = - 7 M  < 0,
1 = 1
for some positive constant 7 . Here, w\ >  • • • >  wi are weights with u;i > 0 > w\.
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3.3.4 Other Rules
There are many other technical trading rules. Oscillator rules for example generate 
buy or sell signals whenever the difference between the short and the long moving 
average reverses its trend. Charting techniques on the other hand generate buy or sell 
signals when certain price patterns are detected. Examples include so-called “Head- 
and-Shoulders”, “V-Base” or “Saucer” patterns. Instead of formalising all possible 
rules explicitly, we summarise their key features in the follwing
A ssu m p tio n  3.3.2 The Pp are uniformly bounded, and for fixed Y£_i, . . .  , Y£_2,
as y*n_i — > +  oo, P f  > 0 eventually
as Yjp_i — > — oo, P f < 0 eventually
In other words, technical trading rules generate buy signals when current rates in­
crease by a sufficient margin beyond their past maximum, and sell signals when 
current rates fall by a sufficient margin below their past minimum.
3.3.5 Fundamentalism
Most practitioners trust technical analysis only up to a certain point. When exchange 
rates move too far away from what is perceived as their “fundamental” level, many 
traders anticipate a trend reversal. To model this kind of behaviour, we introduce 
an additional trading rule j  = 0 as
if min Yfcn_t- > F  -f M  then P0n =  - 7 M  < 0,
if max YjP_i < F — M  then P£ =  7 M  > 0,
t=l,...,Z
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for some positive constant 7 . In other words, when exchange rates move too far 
away from the “fundamental” level F , traders expect the trend to revert towards 
that level.
In practice, most traders will be neither pure “fundamentalists” nor pure technical 
traders. Therefore, we allow agents to “mix” different rules. Formally, we assume 
that agent z’s total return projection is of the form
R n(0,) = Y l SJ(e>')-p "-
j
For any given rule j ,  the indicator SJ(0{) determines whether to apply rule j  or 
not, contingent on the observed pattern of past rates. Note that we allow Sj(0i) to 
depend on 0,-, i.e. the choice of trading rule may vary accross agents. Moreover, we 
do not restrict to take values only in {0 , 1}, i.e. an individual agent may apply
a weighted mix of different rules. For example, agents might follow pure technical 
rules as long as rates stay within reasonable distance of their fundamental level, while 
gradually shifting to fundamentalism as rates move further away.
3.4 Equilibrium
3.4.1 Aggregation
To facilitate our analysis, we now move to the limiting case which is characterised by 
an infinity of agents, i.e. we consider the aggregate demand of technical traders as 
their number, m, tends to infinity. Assuming sufficient regularity, the Law of Large 
Numbers implies
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T h eo rem  3.4.1 For any given t) 6  IR',
8i) — b 7T (tj) :=  I  a(9)Hn(t); 9) n(d9) as m — >00.
J 0
Although an individual agent’s return projection R n(6{) may well be a discontinuous 
function, we assume for what follows that in the aggregate, : 0  x IR/ — ^IR is suffi­
ciently smooth. For what follows, we will work with the limit economy characterised 
by TV. This should be seen as an approximation of the situation where there is a 
comparatively large number of heterogeneous technical traders active in the market.
3.4.2 D iscrete-Tim e Equilibrium
In the limit economy, we can then write the equilibrium equation for the (logarithmic) 
exchange rate process as
A l^  =  B ® ; ) . A t n +  AZJ. (3.4)
In order to derive qualitative results regarding the dynamic behaviour of the price 
process, we will focus our attention on the IR*-valued process (2}JJ)fc=o,i,... of price 
histories, rather than on the price process itself. It is obvious that, since # ” (2)2) 
depends on the price history, the exchange rate process (Yk)k=o,i,... itself cannot be 
Markovian. However, it can be shown that the process (2)J)a:=o,i,... of price histories 
is a Markov process, see Scheutzow (1984). We will now define the concepts of 
recurrence and transience, which we will use to characterise the dynamic behaviour 
of the equilibrium exchange rate process.
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D efin ition  3.4.2 The process (2)J)fc=o,i,... is called
(i) recurrent if  for all bounded Borel sets A  C IR* with non-zero Lebesgue-measure, 
there exists a sequence k{— >oo such that
2)£. G A for all i
almost surely; and
(ii) transient if  for all bounded Borel sets A C E 1 with non-zero Lebesgue-measure,
2)]J ^  A for sufficiently large k
almost surely.
In other words, the process is recurrent if it visits any set A  C IR* of price histories 
infinitely often. In particular, a recurrent process cannot converge as k — >oo. A 
transient process on the other hand eventually leaves any bounded set A  C IR*, i.e. 
transient processes must diverge as k — ►oo.
T h e o rem  3.4.3 Let be a solution to the Stochastic Delay Equation (3.4)-
I f  the function R  : IR/— »IR is locally bounded and measurable, then (2}jJ)fc=o,i,... is 
either recurrent or transient. Morover, in the recurrent case there exists a unique 
stationary probability distribution tt* on IR*.
PROOF: Scheutzow (1984, Theorem 10). □
This remarkable theorem says that the exchange rate process (V^ n)A:=o,i,... can only 
display either of two radically different types of asymptotic behaviour. Exchange 
rates either fluctuate randomly, with bubbles emerging and bursting, or they drift
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off to infinity. The theorem also implies that, however strong the fundamentalism 
is in the market, it can never keep exchange rates within a certain region, unless 
traders have unlimited funds. It is intuitively clear that whether the exchange rate 
process is recurrent or transient will depend on the relative weight of technical trading 
versus fundamentalism. In order to analyse the dynamic behaviour of the equilibrium 
exchange rate process, in particular to derive sufficient conditions for recurrence, we 
will now pass to the continuous-time limit as the trading intervals, A tn, tend to zero.
3.4.3 Continuous-Time Equilibrium
In order to facilitate the passage to the limit, we have to choose a common base 
space on which the distributions of the equilibrium exchange rate processes can be 
studied for every n. Denote by V d[0, T] and £>d[0, oo) the d-dimensional Skorohod 
Space of Unvalued RCLL functions on [0, T] respectively [0,oo); cf. Jacod and 
Shiryaev (1987). To simplify notation, we write simply T>[0, T] and £>[0,00 ) in the 
case where d =  1 . With any given sequence numbers we associate the
RCLL function
for tnk < t < t nk+1.
In this fashion, we identify the discrete-time processes JJ, Y£  and with their 
respective continuous-time counterparts r" , Ytn, and Z", all having paths in T>[0 ,00). 
In the same way, we identify the price history with an element 2)? in V[0, T]. 
Finally, we need to extend in the obvious way the aggregate return projection R” to 
be defined on £>[0,T]. To ensure the convergence of the equilibrium exchange rate 
processes as n — >-oo, we have to make the following
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A ssu m p tio n  3.4.4
(i) There exists a continuous, uniformly bounded function R  : C[0, T ]— ► IR with 
the following property: Whenever t)n E P[0,T] and t) E C[0,T] are such that 
X)n — > t) in D[0,T], then
— y R (tj) as n — »-oo.
(ii) The sequence of processes {Zn}n=i,2,... converges in distribution on T>[0, oo) to 
a continuous semi-martingale Z.
Part (i) of this assumption merely states that technical traders react in a similar 
fashion to a given exchange rate pattern in continuous time as they would to a 
discrete-time approximation of the same pattern. We are now ready to state the 
desired convergence result.
T h e o rem  3.4.5 Suppose that Assumption 3-4-4 holds. Then the triplet (T f ,Z f ,Y tn) 
of processes is tight in oo); and any limit ( t ,Z t,Yt) is a weak solution to the 
Stochastic Delay Equation
dYt = R(%)t) dt +  dZt, (3*5)
where 2)* E C[0,T] is defined in the obvious way. Moreover, if  (3.5) admits a unique 
weak solution, then (T f,Z f ,Y tn) converges in distribution to ( t ,Z t,Y t) as n — >oo.
PROOF: Memin and Slominski (1991, Theorem 2.10). □
In order to study the qualitative behaviour of the equilibrium exchange rate process, 
we will now define the concepts of recurrence and transience in continuous time.
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D efin ition  3.4.6 The process (2)0*>o is called
(i) recurrent if  for all bounded Borel sets A  C C[0,T] with non-zero Lebesgue- 
measure, there exists a sequence t{— ^oo such that
2)*, G A for all i
almost surely; and
(ii) transient if  for all bounded Borel sets A  C C[0,T] with non-zero Lebesgue- 
measure,
2)* ^  A for sufficiently large t
almost surely.
The interpretation of recurrence and transience is essentially the same as in discrete 
time. A recurrent process will always return to any given set A  C C[0,T] of price 
histories, while a transient process eventually leaves every bounded set.
In order to be able to explicitly study the dynamic behaviour of the equilibrium 
exchange rate process, we will have to assume a more concrete specification of the 
cumulative demand of noise traders. As is common in the literature, we will assume 
that noise traders’ demand is actually driven by white noise, so that the cumulative 
demand process is a generalised Brownian motion. More specifically, we assume that 
the process Zt satisfies a Stochastic Differential Equation of the form
dZt =  A dt +  a dW t ,
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion, and A and a are constants. The equation 
describing the dynamics of logarithmic exchange rates, Yt , then becomes:
dYt =  (A + R  (2)0) dt A a dWt. (3.6)
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Ito’s Lemma implies that the actual exchange rate process itself, X t := exp(l*), 
satisfies
dXt = (m +  R  (2)*)) X t dt +  crXt dWt , with m := A +  ^cr2. (3.7)
Note in particular that the exchange rate model we have thus obtained is in fact dy­
namically complete in the sense of Harrison and Pliska (1981). In particular, although 
the exchange rate in our model may display cyclical fluctuations and bubbles, from 
the point of view of derivatives pricing, it “looks” just like the classic Black-Scholes 
model.
Theorem  3.4.7 Let (lf)*>o be a solution to the Stochastic Delay Equation (3 .6) .  
I f  the function R  : C [0 ,T ]— I^R is locally bounded and measurable, then (2)f)*>o is 
e ith er  recurrent or transient. Moreover, in the recurrent case there exists a unique 
stationary probability distribution 7r* on C [0 ,T ], and for any initial distribution 7To of 
2)o the distribution 7rt ofVQt converges in total variation to n*.
PROOF: Sch eu tzow  (1984, T heorem  3). □
W e are now  in  th e  p osition  to  derive sufficient con d ition s for th e  recurrence o f  th e  
eq u ilib riu m  exch an ge rate process. For any elem en t t) E C[0, T ], define
ti :=  m in  ti(f); fi :=  m a x  n(£);
-  0< t < T  V n  0< t < T  V n
Theorem  3.4.8 Suppose the function R  : C[0, T]— I^R has the following properties:
(A -|- R(t})) • X)— > — oo as X)— >■ +  oo,
(A +  R(x))) • tj— y — oo as X)— y — oo.
Then the process (2)*)t>o is recurrent.
Chapter 3. Technical Trading in Foreign Exchange Markets 80
PROOF: Scheutzow (1984, Theorem 5). □
Note that the recurrence on IR of the logarithmic exchange rate process Yt obviously 
implies recurrence on IR+ of the exchange rate process X t itself. In light of Sec­
tions 3 .3 .4  and 3 .3 .5 , it is obvious that the condition for recurrence translates into a 
requirement regarding the relative balance of fundamentalism versus pure technical 
trading. More precisely, if on average fundamentalism becomes dominant eventually 
when rates become arbitrarily high or low, then the resulting equilibrium exchange 
rate process will be recurrent. For what follows, we will assume that the hypotheses 
of Theorem 3 .4 .8  are satisfied.
3.4.4 Profitability o f Trading Strategies
We will now study the profitability of different trading strategies in an environment 
in which technical traders are active. For the purpose of doing so, we consider a 
small investor, i.e. one whose trading does not affect equilibrium prices. Let 0(f) 
be a trading strategy, i.e. at time t , the amount of foreign currency held is given by 
0(f). We assume that 0(f) is adapted and predictable with respect to the filtration 
generated by the exchange rate process X t. Note that predictability merely reflects 
the intuition that the decision on the amount of currency held over any given period 
must be based on the information available at the beginning of that period. However, 
beyond the intuition, predictability is also an important technical requirement in 
order for the gains from trade to be well-defined; see Harrison and Pliska (1981) for a 
detailed elaboration on the issue of admissibility of trading strategies. For any given 
trading strategy 0(f), we can now define the gains from trade as
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Note that, by running a suitable strategy in the domestic money market, we can 
always make the trading strategy self-financing. Hence, since we have normalised 
the price of the domestic bond to one, the process Gt{4>) indeed describes the gain 
made from following the trading strategy <fi(t).
BUY-AND-HOLD:
Let use first consider a simple “buy-and-hold” strategy, i.e. <j>= 1. Recall that from 
Theorem 3.4 .8  we know that the exchange rate process X t is ergodic. The Ergodic 
Theorem then implies that the expected gain over any finite period is the same as 
the long-term average gain along any given trajectory. More precisely,
1 n_1
E  [ ] =  lim -
n—►oo Tl
k=0
Here, dkt is the shift operator, i.e. X t o d kt =  X(k+i)t- We are now in the position to 
study the profitability of the buy-and-hold strategy:
P ro p o sitio n  3.4.9 Over any finite period t, the expected gain from the buy-and-hold 
strategy is zero,
E [ ] =  0.
PROOF: For the buy-and-hold strategy, the gains from trade over any finite period t 
are simply Gt{4>) = X t — Xo. Hence we obtain
1 n—1
E[G,(<j>)] = lim — Y  (X(fc+1)< — Xm)
n —►oo Tl — 
k=0
=  lim -  (X nt -  X 0) =  lim - X nt.
n—► oo n  n—►oo Tl
Hence, the limit of X nt/n  as n — >-oo must exist. But since Xt  is recurrent, this limit 
can only be zero, since otherwise X t would have to diverge to infinity which would 
contradict recurrence. □
Gt((f>) of lkt, alsmost surely.
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The interpretation of this result is interesting. Even though we allow the noise de­
mand to impose a non-zero trend on the exchange rate process, and even though one 
would expect that such a trend will be amplified by technical trading, the expected 
return on investment in the foreign currency is nonetheless zero.
T e c h n ic a l  T r a d i n g :
In this section, we will investigate the profitability of technical trading rules them­
selves. More specifically, suppose an investor simply “mimics” the trading behaviour 
of the “average trader”,
<f)(t) =  (m +  #(?)*)) .
P r o p o s i t i o n  3 .4 .1 0  The expected gains from  the average m arket stra tegy are posi­
tive,
E [ G t{4>)]> 0.
PROOF: U sing  th e  defin ition  o f  th e  gains from  trade process to g e th er  w ith  th e  equ i­
libriu m  eq u ation  (3 .7 ) for th e  exchan ge rate process, w e ob ta in
Gt(<t>) = f  (J4,{S) dW s + f  (m  +  # ( 2 ) a)) <£(s) ds.
Jo Jo
Upon taking expectations, the integral with respect to the Wiener process vanishes, 
and we obtain
f t  v______ _
xx2 ds > 0E [ G t(<t>))= f  E \ ( m  + R(Z)s)) 
Jo L
□
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3.5 Conclusions
We have studied the dynamic properties of equilibrium exchange rates when market 
participants follow technical trading rules. By its very nature, technical trading leads 
to feedback effects similar to those inherent in the implementation of dynamic hedging 
strategies. As a consequence, technical trading causes exchange rate fluctuations of 
a magnitude far beyond the level justified by changes in the economic fundamentals. 
In other words, technical trading leads to the emergence of irrational price bubbles. 
However, if there is a sufficient level of fundamentalism in the market, it can be 
shown that bubbles will always burst in finite time.
Moreover, our results demonstrate that, while being ex-ante irrational, their very ex­
istence can make technical trading rules ex-post profitable. In other words, technical 
trading can be seen as a kind of “self-fulfilling prophecy”. These results are in line 
with the empirical evidence.
Chapter 4
Optim al Trading for a 
Large Trader
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of the present chapter is twofold. First, it provides a unified generic 
framework in which the optimal trading pattern of a large trader who might possess 
private information can be studied. The framework is general enough to encompass a 
wide variety of standard models, most notably classic micro structure models such as 
Kyle (1985), as well as general equilibrium models. Second, it analyses the manner 
in which the optimal trading pattern changes if the large trader holds an option, 
written on the traded asset.
The equilibrium price setting mechanism is specified in reduced-form, encompassing 
as special cases price-setting by a competitive market maker as in Kyle (1985), Back 
(1992) or Chapter 5, as well as Walrasian equilibrium models like the ones considered
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in Chapters 2 and 6. The results of this chapter will be used in the subsequent chap­
ters to study the interplay between options markets and the market for the underlying 
asset in the presence of asymmetric information, and to analyse the implications of 
market power for the use of options as exchange rate policy instruments.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce 
the model and the mathematical framework for our analysis. The next section gives 
a detailed account of the large trader’s optimisation problem. The main result of this 
section is the characterisation of the large trader’s optimal trading strategy in the 
presence of an option, (Theorem 4.3.1). Section 4.4 analyses the value of the option 
to the informed trader and compares it to its arbitrage price.
4.2 The M odel
We will outline the model here in its most general form. More detailed specifications 
and interpretations of its components will be given later, see Chapters 5 and 6. The 
structure of the model is closely related to the model developed in Back (1992) and 
Back and Pedersen (1996). Their model in turn is essentially a continuous-time 
extension of the classic Kyle (1985) model. While prices in these models are set by a 
competitive market maker, we consider in this chapter a reduced-form specification 
in which prices are given by a generic reaction function. Obviously, price setting 
by a market maker is included in this setup as a special case, but our formulation 
allows also for alternative price setting mechanisms such as for example Walrasian 
equilibrium.
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T r a d e d  A s s e t s :
Two assets are traded continuously over the period from time zero to some final date 
T. The first asset is a riskless bond or money market account. We use the bond 
as numeraire, normalising its price to one, thus making interest rates implicit in our 
model. The second asset is risky, typically a stock or a foreign currency. After time 
T, the risky asset yields a random pay-off Vt . While the distribution of Vt  is common 
knowledge, its actual value is unknown ex ante.
A g e n t s :
There is a single, risk-neutral, large trader active in the market. For the sake of 
generality, we specify the model in reduced form from the point of view of the large 
trader. At any time t € [0, T], we denote the total demand of the large trader by X t. 
Trades at time t take place at price Pt . In the reduced form specification, we assume 
that prices are given by a reaction function in the form
Pt = H ( t ,X t,Z t).
Here, Zt is the value of some exogenous stochastic factor process, to be made more 
specific later. In lack of anything better, we will refer to Zt as the “noise” process. 
We will see in the applications how this type of reduced form pricing can be obtained 
as a result of a market equilibrium in which the large trader interacts with other 
economic agents and prices are determined by a market maker or a Walrasian auction 
mechanism, see Chapters 5 and 6, and Section 4.2.2. Note that the fact that the 
large trader’s actions may affect prices is reflected by the fact that X t appears as an 
argument of the pricing rule. More specifically, we will assume that
r \  a
- ^ H { t , x , z ) >  0; - ^ H ( t , x , z ) >  0. (4.1)
In other words, we assume that the price of the risky asset is positively related
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to both the factor Zt as well as the large trader’s demand, X t. In addition to 
observing the process Zt , the large trader may also receive a signal St• The large 
trader’s expectation at time t of the terminal value of the risky asset, based on 
the information available, is denoted by F(t,  St, Zt). Note that the signal will be 
informative for the large trader only in some of the applications considered below. 
In these cases, we will refer to the large trader also as the informed trader. Based on 
the information available at time t , the large trader forms his or her demand X t for 
the risky asset. For reasons of expositional simplicity, we restrict the large trader to 
using trading strategies 6(t) so that the demand X t is given by d X t = 0(t) dt. Note 
in particular that this assumption forces the demand process X t to be absolutely 
continuous. Although this assumption might seem unnecessarily restrictive, it can 
be shown that even if the large trader is allowed to choose from a more general set of 
strategies, the optimal strategy will turn out to be absolutely continuous; see Back
(1992).
The main difference to the Back and Pedersen (1996) model is the following; In 
addition to trading in the market for the risky asset, the large trader may hold an 
option which, if exercised, pays off an amount <p ( P t ) at time T.  Note that we assume 
the pay-off to depend on the terminal price of the asset, Pt,  and not its true value. A 
simple example would be a cash-settled European call option with strike K , in which 
case <p(Pr) = (Pt — K).  In addition to the trading strategy 0(t), the large trader 
hence has to choose an exercise policy I  for the option, which we assume to take on 
the value 1 if the option is exercised, and 0 if not. The large trader’s objective is 
then to choose a trading strategy $(t) and an exercise policy I  for the option such as 
to maximise expected terminal wealth. We will formalise the large trader’s problem 
formally in the next section. Note that we do not model the options market here, 
since this chapter focuses primarily on the large trader’s optimal trading strategy.
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The way in which the results developed here relate to equilibrium on the options 
market and what implications they have for the pricing of options is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5.
We will now discuss briefly some examples of equilibrium models which would lead 
to the reduced form pricing rule given above.
4.2.1 Market Maker
In the models developed in Kyle (1985) and Back (1992), and further extended in 
Chapter 5, the large trader interacts with noise traders whose demand for the risky 
asset, Z t , is exogenously given. A competitive market maker observes aggregate order 
flow, Yt = X t +  Zt, and sets prices according to a pricing rule of the form
Pt = H(t ,Y t).
It is obvious that from the large trader’s point of view, this specification constitutes 
a special case of the generic framework introduced in the preceding section. In the 
next chapter, we analyse the interplay between equilibrium on the underlying market 
and the options market within this framework. We show that the existence of the 
option creates an incentive for the large trader to manipulate prices away from the 
expected true value. As a consequence, the only feasible equilibrium requires option 
prices to be alighned with the prices for the underlying asset in a way which gives 
rise to the famous “smile pattern” of implied volatility, see Chapter 5 for details.
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4.2.2 Walrasian Equilibrium
As a second example, we consider the case in which the large trader interacts with an­
other group of agents, and prices are set by a Walrasian auction mechanism. Without 
being specific about the nature of these other traders, we assume that their demand 
at time t for the risky asset, given a quoted price p, is given by the demand function
pt- t  D ( t ,Z t ,p). (4.2)
Here, the process Zt could be interpreted either as the randomly fluctuating income 
of these traders, as a noise term driving liquidity demand, or as a process describing 
some fundamental information on which traders base their expectations about the 
terminal value of the asset. We will give more explicit examples of such demand 
functions D(t , Zt,p) below. At any time t the equilibrium price is the solution Pt of 
the market clearing equation
D ( t ,Z u Pt) + X t = l. (4.3)
Here, we have normalised the total supply of the risky asset to one. In other words, 
in this scenario the pricing function H (t ,x , z )  is defined implicitly by the relation
D(t , x , H (t , x , z)) +  x =  1.
Differentiating this relation it is obvious that sufficient for Assumption (4.1) to hold 
is that the demand function D(t,z ,p)  is differentiable with
O  r \
— D(t, z,p)  > 0, Z’P) < °- (4*4)
In this scenario, the value at time T  of the risky asset to the large trader is given 
by the price at which the terminal position X t can be “unloaded” in the market, i.e. 
Vt  =  h(0, Zt ). Note that in this setting, the signalling process St does not play any 
role at all. In Chapter 6, I use the framework developed in this section to study the 
use of currency options as exchange rate policy instruments.
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4.2.3 M athem atical Setup and N otation
For expositional simplicity, we will assume that both the signalling process, St, as 
well as the noise process, Z t , are given by generalised Brownian motions. More 
specifically, we assume that St and Zt are solutions to the stochastic differential 
equations
dSt = <rs(t) d W f  and dZt =  crz{t) d W f , (4.5)
where W f  and W f  are independent standard Brownian motions, and crs(t) and <?z{t) 
are deterministic functions. Note however that the results of this chapter can easily 
be extended to more general diffusion processes. A trading strategy is a process 0(t), 
adapted to the filtration generated by St and Zt, such that the corresponding demand 
process
X t  ~ x ° +  f  0{s) ds (4.6)
Jo
is well-defined.
Let P*'x,z be a weak solution to (4.5) and (4.6) conditional on St = s, Zt = z 
and X f  =  x , defined on some suitable measurable space (Q,JF). We will omit the 
superscripts s, x or  z whenever there is no ambiguity, and we also write P s'x'z for 
PqX,z. Denote by {^Ft)t>o the filtration on (D ,^7) generated by St and Zt , augmented 
to satisfy the “usual conditions”, see Karatzas and Shreve (1988, Section 1.2) for 
details. Finally, for notational convenience we introduce the following convention: 
whenever we are given a function which depends on the state variables and time 
t , we will use lowercase letters to denote the value of this function at time T.  For 
example, we write f ( s , z )  := F (T , s , z )  and h(x,z )  := H (T ,x , z ) .
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4.3 The Large Trader’s Problem
We develop a precise formulation of the large trader’s maximisation problem in Sec­
tions 4 .3 .1 , 4 .3 .2  and 4 .3 .3 . The main result is stated at the end of Section 4 .3 .3  
(Theorem 4 .3 .1 ). An intuitive derivation is provided in Sections 4 .3 .4  . . .  4 .3 .7 , while 
a rigorous proof is given in Appendix 4 .A.
4.3.1 W ealth Dynam ics
Suppose first that the large trader changes her position X t in the risky asset only at 
discrete times 0 =  to < t\ < . . .  < tn =  T. Denote by Xk  the number of shares held 
over the period from tk to tk+1 , and by By. the number of bonds. Trade at time tk 
in the risky asset takes place at price P*. The budget identity for the large trader is 
hence
Bk-i = Bk +  Pk * A Xk,
where AX k  := Xk — X k - i . That is, the wealth from previous period’s bond position, 
Bk-1, is used to finance the change in the position in the risky asset, Pk • A X k , and 
any remaining funds are re-invested in bonds, Bk . We can rewrite this as
A Bk =  - P k ■ A X k =  - P k - 1 * AXfc -  A Pk • AXfc. (4 .7)
The continuous-time equivalent of this equation is
dBt =  - P -  dX t -  d[P, X ] ( , (4 .8 )
where P~ denotes the left-continuous version of P. Note that, under the working 
assumption of absolute continuity of the large trader’s strategy, dXt =  6{t) dt , the 
covariation term vanishes and the budget dynamics become dBt =  —Pf6( t )d t .
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4.3.2 Objective Function
The large trader’s objective is to maximise expected terminal wealth. Ignoring the 
option for the moment, the large trader’s terminal wealth is given by
Bt  +  VT ■ X T = B0 +  VT ■ X 0 + f  (VT -  P f )  0(t) dt. (4.9)
Jo
Since Bo and X o  are exogenously given and thus irrelevant for the optimisation 
problem, we will assume Bo = Xo = 0 and focus on the last term in the above 
expression. Given any strategy 6(t) and the associated demand process dXf  =  0(t) dt, 
prices are set according to the rule Pt = H(t , X \ , Zt). Note here that since X f  and Zt 
are by definition continuous, so is the price process Pt. Recall also that given a final 
value S t  of the signalling process, the expected value of Vt  is given by 
Using the law of iterated expectations, we can hence write the expected terminal 
wealth of the large trader for given starting values *So =  5, Xo =  x, Z q =  z, and given 
strategy 6(t) as
T
I  (VT -P , )0 ( t )d t  
Jo
= E' '*A f T ( F ( t , S „ Z , ) - H ( t , x ! , Z t))$(t)dt  
[ Jo '-------------------v------------------- '
=: n  ( t , s „ x f , z t)
Note that the function II(£, St, X f , Zt) has an economic interpretation: It describes 
the expected marginal benefit of holding an extra unit of the risky asset, F(t, St, Zt), 
minus the current purchasing price, H ( t ,X f , Zt). Following our convention, we write
E s , x , z
7r(s, re, z) := II(T, s , x , z) = f ( s , z) — h(x , z).
W e now  incorporate th e  op tion  in to  th e  large trader’s o b jec tiv e  fu n ctio n . S in ce we 
do n ot m o d el th e  m arket for op tion s, w e treat th e  num ber o f  o p tio n s h eld  by th e
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large trader as exogenous for the large trader’s optimisation problem. Recall that the
option, if exercised, pays off an amount ip(Pr) at time T, and the price Pt  at time
T  is set according to the rule Pt =  h(Xj.,ZT).  Since from the large trader’s point
of view the pricing rule h(x, z) is exogenously given, we shorten notation by setting
4>(x,z) := <p(h(x, z)). Hence, if the large trader holds p units of such an option, his
expected terminal wealth becomes
•Tf  n (i, St, X t , Zt)9(t) dt + pI4>{XsT, Zt) 
Jo
(4.10)
Here, I  denotes the exercise policy, which we assume to be =  1 if the option is 
exercised, and =  0 if not. The exercise policy will be determined endogenously later, 
see Section 4.3.6.
4.3.3 Admissible Strategies
The choice variables for the large trader are the trading strategy 9(t) and the exercise 
policy I. Note that due to our assumption of absolute continuity, the demand process 
X t is automatically predictable. This is in line with the intuition that the decision 
on what assets to hold over any period of time must be based upon the information 
available at the beginning of that period. It is also important for technical reasons, 
see for example Harrison and Pliska (1981) for a detailed elaboration on this issue. 
On the other hand, since the decision whether to exercise the option or not is made 
at time T, it can be contingent on all information available to the large trader at 
that time.
Formally, an admissible policy is a pair (0, /) ,  where I  is an .Fr-measurable random 
variable taking values in {0,1}, and 0(t) is a process adapted to o such that
.  Jl .
J  n(r, ST, X ST, Zt )$(t) dr  +  PI<j>(XeT, ZT)
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is well-defined for every s, x, z E IR and t E [0, T). We can interpret V 6,I(t , s, x , z) as
the gain that is made starting at St =  s, X t = x and Zt = z  at time t and following
trading strategy 6 and exercise policy I  thereafter. The large trader’s problem is 
thus to find an admissible policy (0,1) which maximises V e,I(t, s, x, z). As usual in 
the theory of stochastic control, we define the value function of the problem as
V*(t, s, x , z) := sup V 6,I(t , s , x , z). (4.11)
(0,i)
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
T h e o rem  4.3.1 (O p tim al S tra teg y ) There exists a non-degenerate solution to 
the large trader’s problem if  and only if  the pricing rule satisfies the no-arbitrage 
condition H ( t ,x , z )  =  E%[ h(x,ZT)  ]. In this case, there exist functions X * ( t , s , z )  
and I*(s ,z ) such that the optimum is attained by exercise policy I* =  I*(St , Zt )> 
and any trading strategy of the form
9(t) := a(t) ( X ‘(t, S„ Zt) -  X et ) , (4.12)
where a(t) is any deterministic function such that X f  — > X *( t , St, Z t) as t — > T.
The following Sections 4.3.4 . . .  4.3.7 provide an intuitive derivation of this result, 
while a rigorous proof is given in Appendix 4.A. It makes use of standard results 
from the theory of controlled diffusion processes. For reference, see Fleming and 
Soner (1993) or Krylov (1980).
4.3.4 Bellman Equation
The key to finding the large trader’s optimal policy is the Bellman equation, a partial 
differential equation which characterises the value function of the problem. We will
Chapter 4. Optimal Trading for a Large Trader 95
give an intuitive derivation of this equation, and refer to the standard literature on 
stochastic control theory for the rigorous proofs. We will see that the boundary 
condition of the Bellman equation can be used to pinpoint the optimal policy.
To develop an intuitive motivation for the Bellman equation, consider first any arbi­
trary strategy 6(t). By optimality of V* we see that
V*(t, s, x , z)
/
tf+5
n ( r ,  ST, x ° ,  Z t )9(t ) dr  +  E [ V ( t  + S, S t+s, X°+s, Zt+S) ]
with equality at the optimum. If the value function is sufficiently smooth, we can 
divide both sides of this inequality by 8 and pass to the limit as 8 — > 0 to obtain
( J ^  +  l { ^  V*(t, s, X , z) +  n ( t ,  5, X , z)9 < 0. (4 .13)
Here, Let is the infinitesimal generator (see for example Karatzas and Shreve (1988) 
for the precise definition) of the joint stochastic process ( S t , X f , Zt), i.e.
L‘:=^ +K4w£ +a|(<)£)- ( 4 - i 4 )
Since 6 was arbitrary, inequality (4 .13) holds for all strategies. Intuitively, an op­
timal strategy should attain equality, so that we should expect the value function 
V*(t, s, x, z) to be a solution V  of the following partial differential equation:
d_
e t
This equation is known as the “Bellman Equation” associated with the large trader’s 
optimisation problem. Indeed, it can be shown that if the value function V*(t , s, x , z) 
is finite and sufficiently regular, then it must be a solution to the Bellman equation 
(4 .1 5 ), at least in a generalised sense.1 Conversely, if a function V ( t , s, x , z) is a solu­
tion to (4 .15) under suitable boundary conditions, then it can be shown to coincide
sup<| ( ^  +  / , A y  +  I w j = 0 .  (4.15)
1This result is known as “Bellman’s Principle” .
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with the value function, i.e. V(t, s, x, z) = V*(t, s, z, z)?  See Fleming and Soner
(1993) or Krylov (1980) for a rigorous mathematical derivation of these results. Let 
us now take a closer look at the Bellman equation: Substituting the definition of L\  
back into (4.15) we get
T  \ v, + l  ^ zV" + +  (v* + n) 4  = °-
We see that the above equation is linear in 9, i.e. in order for the supremum to be 
finite the co-efficient of 0 must be zero. We can thus split up the Bellman Equation 
into the following two separate equations:
Vt + l  =  0, (4.16)
Vx + n  = 0. (4.17)
Equation (4.16) is just the heat equation associated with two-dimensional Brownian 
motion. The Feynman-Kac formula (see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1988)) allows us 
to write its solution (if it exists) in the following form:
V { t , s , x , z )  = E ’/ [ V ( T , S t , x , Z t ) } ,
Note that the right-hand-side of this equation corresponds to the expected terminal 
value of V,  given that the large trader’s position x is kept constant from time t 
onwards. Equation (4.17) has a more economic interpretation. It states that the 
marginal gain Vx(t, s, x, z) from holding an extra unit of the risky asset at time t , 
must equal the purchasing cost, H (t ,x , z ) ,  minus the expected marginal benefit, 
F(t , s , z ) .  To see the intuition behind this, recall that the function V(t,  5, x, z) is 
supposed to give the maximal gain achievable by starting at St =  s, X t — x, and
2Results of this kind are called “Verification Theorems”.
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Zt = z y and trading optimally hence. Now assume that the equation was violated, 
say Vx( t , s ,x , z )  +  Tl( t ,s,x,z)  < 0. The large trader could then short 8 units of the 
risky asset at time t , and trade optimally from the new starting point Xt  =  x — 8, 
which would yield a gain of V ( t , s , x  — 8, z) «  V ( t , s , x , z )  — 8Vx( t , s ,x , z ) .  The 
approximate loss thus incurred, 8Vx(t, s, x, 2), is by assumption smaller than the 
expected gain, — <£II(i, 5 , x, z). We have thus constructed a strategy which yields a 
higher gain starting from Xt  =  x than the original V ( t , s, x , 2 ), and hence V ( t , 5 , x , z) 
cannot have been the maximal achievable gain.
4.3.5 Boundary Condition
We will now try to get a better intuition for the boundary condition for the Bellman 
equation and see how it can help us pinpoint the optimal strategy. Let V ( t , s , x ,  z) 
be any solution to (4.16) and (4.17). For a given admissible strategy 6 consider the 
process V ( t ,S t ,X f ,Z t ) .  Ito’s Lemma gives:
d v  = {Vt + \  (?zV„ + ° l v ss) } d t  + V J  dt + az Vz dWtz  + c sVa d W f
'-------------- v-------------- '
=  0 by (4.16)
=  -110 dt +  (tz Vx d W f  +  (75 K  d W f ,
where we have omitted the arguments (t^St^Xf^Zt)  of V  and its derivatives. Upon 
taking expectations, the integrals with respect to the Wiener processes vanish,
[ y (Tj 5r! x sr , ZT) ] -  K (0,5, x, z)
=  - E s ,x , z f  n ( t , s , x 6, z t)e(t)dt 
Jo
= - V s'1 (0, s , X, z) +  E°*'z [ P H { X ^  Z t ) ] .
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Now suppose the value function V*(t, s, x, z) exists and is sufficiently smooth. We 
then know that it solves the Bellman Equations (4.16) and (4.17), so that we can 
substitute V*(t, 5, x, z) for V ( t , s , x , z )  in the above equation to obtain
V"*(0, s , x , z )  (4.18)
=  V»-'(0, s, X, z) +  \ V*(T, S t ,  X eT, ZT) -  pI<t>{XeT, ZT) '
L s ^  ✓ J
=:q '{ST, X 9T, Z r , I )
This equation has the following interpretation; the quantity E s,x,z[ q*(Sx, X?,  Zt \ I )]  
measures the difference between the value V0,/(O, s, x, z) of any given policy pair (6, 1) 
and the maximal achievable value ^*(0, s, x, z). The function q*(Sr,X^,  I)  can 
thus be identified as the loss incurred by the large trader by deviating from the 
optimal strategy. In particular we deduce that E s,x,z[ q*(Sr, Zt ', I) ] must be 
non-negative, and zero at the optimum. We will reverse this argument to construct 
the optimal policy and value function. More specifically, we will construct a function 
q*(s, x, z-1) and “optimality conditions” x*(s,z) and I*(s,z) in such a way that 
q*(s, x , z; I) > 0 and =  0 if and only if x =  x*(s, z) and I  =  /*(s, z), see Section 4.3.6 
below. Based on this we use (4.16) and the Feynman-Kac representation to construct 
a candidate V*(t, s, x , z) for the value function which satisfies (4.18), see Section 4.3.7 
below. From this and the above arguments we can conclude that an exercise policy 
I*(St , Z t ) and a trading strategy which ensures that X?  =  x*(St , Z t ) will attain 
the optimum, and that V*(t, s, x , z) is indeed the value function of the large trader’s 
problem. The formal proofs for all these statements can be found in Appendix 4.A. 
We interpret x*(s, z) as the optimal “target position” towards which the large trader 
should drive his position X f  in the market as t — >■ T, conditional on St  = s and 
Zt =  2 - This is similar to the arguments presented in Back (1992) and Back and 
Pedersen (1996).
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Let us begin our analysis by noting that we can deduce the shape of q*(s,x, z; I)  
from the Bellman equations: Evaluating (4.17) at t = T  implies:
r \  a
— q*(s, x , z; I) = z) - pl(j)\x, z). (4.19)
'--------- V--------- '
=  — 7r(s, £, z)
Given any functions x*(s,z) and I*(s ,z ), it easy to check that
r x * ( s , z )
q*(s,x ,z ;I )  = ir(s,£,z)d(  + pl*(s,z)<f>(x*(s,z),z) -  pl<j>(x,z) (4.20)
J x
satisfies (4.19) with “boundary condition” q*(s, x*(s, z), z\ /*($, z)) =  0. We can give 
an intuitive interpretation of (4.20). Recall that we think of z*(.s,z) as an optimal 
“target position” towards which the large trader should drive X f  as t — >T. Recall 
also that q*(s,x,z; I) measures the “loss” incurred by the large trader by deviating 
from the optimal policy. Any marginal decrease in x away from x*(5 , z) for example 
yields an expected marginal loss of f ( s , z )  due to the reduced position in the risky 
asset, contrasted by a marginal gain of h(x,z)  due to lower cost of acquiring this 
position. The total marginal loss from deviation in x is hence n(s ,x ,z ) .  Iterating 
this argument motivates the integral term in (4.20). Similarly, implementing exercise 
rule I  at x instead of I*(x,z)  at x*(s,z) results in losing pl*(s, z)(f>(x*(s, z), z) while 
gaining pl(j>(x,z), which motivates the remaining terms in (4.20).
4.3.6 Optimal Policy
By construction, we have q*(s,x*(s,z),z\  I*(s, z)) =  0. Our remaining task is hence 
to find x*(s,z)  and I*(s,z)  in such a way that the mapping (x , I )  i->- q*(s,x,z; I) 
has a global minimum at x = x*(s,z) and I  = I*(s,z).  We will proceed in two 
stages. First we keep the exercise decision fixed and derive optimal positions arj(s, z )
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and z j(s ,z )  conditional on no exercise respectively exercise. We then determine the 
optimal exercise policy /*(s,z) endogenously.
N e v e r  E x e r c i s e :
Let us consider first the case in which the large trader never exercises the option, 
i.e. I* =  0. We define the conditional loss function as
q0(s,x ,z-,I ,x ')  := /  7r(s, f, z) d£ -  plcj)(x, z).
J X
Note that we made the dependency on the target position x l explicit since this is the 
variable we need to determine. Intuitively, for any given x , the optimal x' should be 
the one for which the loss from deviating is maximal. Therefore we set
a:2(s,z) := arg max q0(s ,x ,z ;  I ,  x ' ) .  (4-21)X1
The necessary first-order condition for this problem is
/ ( s ,  z) = h(xl(s,  z), z). (4.22)
Note that, since we assume that h(x, z) is monotonically increasing in x , the mapping 
x' i-»- qo(s,x, z; I ,x ' )  will be concave, so that the first order condition (4.22) is also 
sufficient to uniquely characterise the maximum. Note also that a:J(,s, z) indeed does 
not depend on x or / ,  so that our notation is justified. We now substitute the 
maximum back into the conditional loss function and define
q*(s, x , z; I) := q0(s, x, z; / ,  ^ ( s ,  z)).
Finally, since h(x , z) is monotonically increasing in x , differentiating the first-order 
condition (4.22) shows that a;J(5,z) is monotonically increasing in 5.
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A l w a y s  E x e r c i s e :
Analogously, we now consider the case in which the large trader always exercises the 
option, i.e. I* =  1. We define the conditional loss function as
q i ( s , x , z ; I , x f) :=  /  7r(s, f ,  z) d£ +  p<t>(x\ z) -  pl<t>{x, z).
J X
Again, x' is the variable we need to determine. As before, we set
x\(s ,z )  := argmax<?i(,s, :r, z; I , x r). (4.23)
X *
The necessary first-order condition for this problem is
/ ( s ,  z) =  h(xl(s,  z), z) -  p(j>x(x\(s, z), z). (4.24)
If <j)(xy z) is weakly concave in x, the mapping x' qi(s, x, z; I , x r) will be concave, 
so that the first order condition (4.24) is also sufficient to uniquely characterise the 
maximum. Note also that xl(s ,z)  indeed does not depend on x or / ,  so that our 
notation is justified. We now substitute the maximum back into the conditional loss 
function and define
q t ( s ,x , z ; I )  := qi(s,x ,z;  I ,x \ (s ,z ) ) .
An argument similar to the one used in the preceding paragraph shows that mono­
tonicity of h(x, z) and weak concavity of <f>(x, z) imply that x l ( s , z) is also increasing 
in s. Moreover, a direct computation shows that x l(s ,z )  > a:J(s,^).
E n d o g e n o u s  E x e r c i s e :
Continuing our intuitive argument of maximising the loss at the optimum, we should 
seek to determine the exercise policy I*(s, z) in such a way that the option is exercised 
if and only if qj(s, x , z] I) > <?J(s, z, z\ / ) ,  or, equivalently, if and only if
/  *r(s, f , z) < p<t>{x\(s, z), z). (4.25)
J x \ { s , z )
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Note that this condition shows that the optimal exercise policy depends only on s 
and z, and not on x or I. The economic interpretation of (4.25) is as follows. Recall 
that Xq(s , z ) is the optimal target position conditional on no exercise. Hence the 
left-hand side of (4.25) is the loss incurred by trading towards x j(s ,z ) instead of 
x j ^ z ) .  The right-hand side however represents the gain made from the option’s 
pay-off. Hence (4.25) states that the large trader should exercise the option if and 
only if the loss incurred by deviating from the optimal position is outweighed by the 
option’s pay-off.
Using the first-order conditions for xj(,s,z) and x j(s ,z ), we show in the appendix 
(Proposition 4.A.2) that for every 2 there exists a unique cut-off point s(z), defined 
by the equality
ql(s, x, z ; I) = q*(s, x, z ; I ), (4.26)
such that q$(s, x , z; I) > q ^ s , x , z; I)  if and only if s > s(z). Note also that by (4.25) 
the cut-off point does not depend on x or I. We can hence formalise the optimal 
exercise policy in the following way;
1 if s > s (z )
(4.27)
0 otherwise
By construction, x j(s ,z) and x \(s , z )  are the optimal target positions conditional on 
no exercise respectively exercise. Intuitively, the unconditional target £*(s, z) should 
hence equal xj(s, z) if exercising the option is optimal, and X q ( s , z) if not. Therefore 
we define
x*(s,z)  := I*(s,z)x*1(s,z)  +  (1 -  /*(s,z))a;J(s,z).
A similar argument regarding the loss function motivates setting
q*(s, x, z; I) := I*(s , z)q{(s, x, z; / )  +  ( ! -  I*(s, z))q£(s, x, z; I).
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It is easy to check that q*(s,x,z', I)  is indeed of the form (4.20). In the appendix 
(Proposition 4.A.3) we show that for any s and z, the mapping (x , I)  i->- q*(s, x , z\ I) 
indeed has a global minimum at x  =  x*(s,z) and I  = I*(s,z),  which qualifies 
q*(s, x , z; I)  as our loss function.
We argued in Section 4.3.5 that any strategy 9 which ensures that X f  — > x*(St , Zt ) 
as t — > T  is a candidate for the optimum. It is hence natural to construct 9 in such 
a way that X 6 behaves like a Brownian Bridge with random target. More precisely, 
set X*(t, s ,z )  := E f ’z[ x*(St ->Zt ) ] and define
e(t) := a(t) • ( X ‘(t, St , Zt) -  X f )  ,
where a(t) is some adjustment speed factor with a(t)  — > oo as t — > T  fast enough 
to make X f  converge to x*(St , Zt ). We show in Appendix 4.A that this strategy is 
indeed optimal.
REMARK: From the above we see that we can write the overall first-order condition 
for the large trader’s terminal position in the following form:
h (x*(ST, ZT), Zt ) = f { S T, ZT) +  pI*(ST, ZT)<f>x (x*(ST, ZT), ZT) . (4.28)
Since for an optimal strategy, we have X ? =  x*(St , Zt ), the above equation im­
plies that the terminal price of the asset, /i(X |-,Z t), equals its expected true value, 
/ ( St , Z t ), plus a mark-up pI*(St , Zt )4>'{Xt , Z t )- Thus, unlike in the models of 
Kyle (1985) or Back and Pedersen (1996), the existence of the option implies that 
the large trader has an incentive to drive prices away from the true expected value 
of the asset.
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4.3.7 Value Function
We will now construct a candidate for the value function V *( t ,s ,x ,z )  based on the 
analysis in the preceding sections. Guided by (4.18) we conjecture that the boundary 
condition for the value function be given by
u*(s, x , z) := q*(s, x , z\ I) +  pl<t>(x, z). (4.29)
Obviously, v*(s,x,z)  is smooth in x and 0 , and smooth in s for s 6 IR \  {s(z)}. 
Moreover, a straight-forward calculation, using the first-order conditions for #5(3 , 2) 
and x\(s ,z) ,  shows
lim v*(s,x,z)  — lim v*(s,x, z) = ql(s(z),x,  z; I) — qQ(s(z),x, z] I) = 0,
so that v*(s,x,z)  is continuous also at 3 =  3(2). In view of (4.16), we define a 
candidate for the value function via the Feynman-Kac representation formula:
V m(t, 3 , #, z) := E;* [ v*(ST, *, ZT) ] (4.30)
We will show in the appendix (Proposition 4.A.4) that under some additional assump­
tions the function thus defined indeed solves the Bellman Equation (4.15). From the 
analysis in the preceding sections it should then be clear that V*(t, 3, x, z) is the 
value function, and that the strategy defined above is an optimal strategy. Although 
the formal proof is deferred to the appendix, one remark is due here: A direct com­
putation shows that
r V ( « ,  *, *) = m  [ h(x, ZT) ] =  — E T  [ f (ST, ZT) } . oy s ✓
=  F ( t , s , z )
Recall that in order to satisfy the Bellman Equation, V*( t ,s ,x ,z )  must in partic­
ular solve (4.17). From the above we see that this is possible only if H ( t ,x , z )  =  
E*[ h(x, Z t ) ]• We have thus found a condition that the pricing rule must satisfy in 
order for the large trader’s problem to have a non-degenerate solution.
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4.4 Option Valuation
In this section we will make use of the results of the previous sections to derive the 
value of the option to the large trader. It will turn out that in contrast to classic 
derivatives pricing theory, the unit price of the option depends on the quantity held,
i.e. the price schedule is non-linear in quantity.
4.4.1 Pricing the Option
The value of the option to the large trader is obviously given by the expected gain 
that he or she derives from holding it. Denote by V* the value function associated 
with the large trader’s problem for a given option position p. Recall that from (4.18) 
we have
v ;  = v e’1 + E [ q ; ( s T, x >T, z r , i ) } ,
where q* is the “loss-function” for the given p, and (0 ,1) is any policy pair. Taking 
in particular $ to be the optimal trading strategy in the absence of the option, and 
I  = 0, we find that the value to the large trader of p units of the option which pays 
off (p(Pr) if exercised is given by
(y;-Vo) = e
= E
»x *(St ,Zt )
I*p( S t , Z t ) \  I k (S t ,  f, Z r ) d ^  +  p</>(xI(St,Zt),Zt)
x o(ST ,ZT )
= : i ’p ( I ( S t , Z t ))
Note that by the large trader’s first-order conditions, the term in the brackets indeed 
only depends on / ( S t ^ Z t ) ,  so that our notation is justified. By definition of the 
exercise policy, I* (S t , Z t )  =  1 if and only if ^ p( / { S t ,  Z t))  >  0. Thus,
(V; -  V0*) = E [ t f  ( f ( S T, Zt )) },
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which in particular shows that the value of the option to the large trader is positive. 
The above expectation can be seen to be the Black-Scholes price of a derivative which 
pays off an amount ^ v ( / ( S r , Z t ))  if exercised. Indeed, consider the ficticious price 
process Pt := F ( t , St, Zt). Note that Pt represents the best estimate of the true value 
of the asset, given the large trader’s information at time t. Using Feynman-Kac and 
Ito we find
dPt = <7s(t)F,(t , St, Zt) d W f  + <rz{t)Fz(t, St, Z t ) dWtz .
In other words, the process Pt is a martingale under the original measure. We 
summarise these results in the following
Proposition  4.4.1 The value to the large trader of p units of the option is given by
E  [ #  ( / ( S t ,  Z t )) ] ,
which can be identified as the Black-Scholes price of an option with pay-off pattern 
'tpp(pT); written on the (expected) true value Pt =  F ( t ,S t ,Z t) of the underlying asset.
4.A Appendix: Complements to Section 4.3
A ssum ption 4.A .1 Throughout this appendix, we make the following assumptions:
1. The function h(x,z)  is twice continuously differentiable in x, non-negative and 
strictly increasing in x, i.e. h(x ,z )  > 0 and hx(x ,z)  > 0 for all x , z .
2. The function 4>(x,z) is twice continuously differentiable in x, strictly increasing 
and weakly concave in x, i.e. (f>x(x ,z)  > 0 and <f)xx(x ,z)  <  0 for all x , z .
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Note that (2) is in particular satisfied if in addition to (1), h(x,z )  is weakly concave 
and <p(p) is strictly increasing and weakly concave in p. The latter is in particular 
true for the European call option pay-off <p(p) =  (p — K).
Proposition  4 .A .2 (Cut-O ff Point) Let q^s ,  x, z; I) and q^(s,x, z\ I) be defined 
as in Section 4-3.6. Then there exists a unique cut-off point s(z), independent of x 
and I , such that
ql(s,x,  z; I) > qQ(s,x,z; I)  if and only if s >  5(2)
PROOF: From the definitions of gj(s, £, z ; /)  and <?J(s, x, z\ I)  and the first-order 
conditions (4.22) and (4.24) for a;5(.s,z) and x\(s ,z )  we find
Q
—  (<?i(s, x , 2 ; I) -  qo{s, x, z; /))  =  (®;(s, z) -  ^ ( s ,  z)) f a(s, z) > 0, 
since f ' ( s )  > 0 by assumption, and a:J(s,z) > yo(s,z) as was shown in Section 4.3.6.
□
Proposition  4. A .3 (Loss Function) Let the function q*(s ,x ,z \ I)  be defined as in 
Section 4-3.6. Then, for any fixed s and z, the mapping (x , I ) *-> q*(s,x,z; I) has a 
global minimum at x =  x*(s,z) and I  =  /*(s,z).
PROOF: We consider the two cases, I*(s,z)  =  0 and I*(s,z)  =  1, separately.
Case (1): I*(s,z) =  0. Here, x*(s,z) =  z2(s,z) and q*(s,x,z;I )  =  <?J(s, x, z; I). We 
have
Q
— (q l{s ,x ,z ] I ) =  -7T (s,x,z)-pl<t>x(x ,z )  (4.31)
^2
— ql(s ,x ,z ' ,I )  = hx(x,z)  -  pl<j>xx{x,z)  (4.32)
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Hence, since <j>xx <  0 by assumption, gj(5, #, z; I)  is strictly convex in x  by (4.32), so 
that for each I  there exists a unique global minimum. From (4.31) we see that the 
minimum is attained at x =  a;J(s, z) if I  =  0, and at x =  #J(5, z) if /  =  1. We need 
to show that the overall minimum is at I  =  0, i.e. that
q£(s, xl(s,  2 ), z ; 1) > q*(s, x*(s, 2 ), 2 ; 0) =  0.
Since /*(s, z) =  0, we know already by definition that #J(s, x , 2 ; I) > ql(s , x , 2 ; I)  for
all x and I. Choosing x = #^(5 , 2) and I  = 1, this implies
qo(s, Xi(s, z), z; 1) > ^ ( s ,  a?;(s, z), z; 1) =  0 =  q^s ,  #5(5, 2 ), 2 ; 0),
which is what we had to show.
Case (2): I*(s,z) =  1. Here, x*(s,z) =  #^(5 , 2) and q*(s,x, z; I) = ql(s ,x ,  z; I). We 
have
d
— qi(s ,x ,z ; I )  = -n(s ,x ,z ) -p l< f>x(x,z )  (4.33)
Q2
— q \(s , x , z \ I )  = hx(x ,z)  -  pl(f>xx{x,z) (4.34)
Hence, since </>xx <  0 by assumption, ql(s, x , 2 ; I) is strictly convex in x  by (4.34), so
that for each I  there exists a unique global minimum. From (4.33) we see that the
minimum is attained at x =  z) if /  =  0, and at x =  #J(5, z) if I  = 1. We need
to show that the overall minimum is at /  =  1, i.e. that
0 =  q*(s ,x l(s ,z ) ,z; l)  < ^ ( 5 , #5(5 , 2 ), 2 ; 0).
Since /*(s, z) =  1, we know already by definition that #J(s, x , z\ I)  <  q$(s, x , z; I)  for 
all x and I. Choosing x  =  #5(5 , 2) and /  =  0, this implies
<71(5, # 1(5, z), z; 1) =  0 =  qg(s, x£(s, 2), z; 0) <  ^ (5 ,  #5(5,2) , 2; 0),
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which is what we had to show.
□
Proposition  4 .A .4 (Value Function) Let V*( t ,s ,x ,z )  be defined as in Section 
4-3.7. I f  the market maker’s pricing rule satisfies H ( t ,x , z )  =  E*[ h(x ,Zx)  ], then 
V*(t ,s ,x ,  z) satisfies the Bellman Equation (4.15) in the classical sense, with bound­
ary condition
V*(T, s , x , z) = v*(s, x , z).
PROOF: We have seen in Section 4.3.7 that the function v*(s ,x ,z ) is continuous. 
Results from the theory of linear parabolic differential equations ensure that there ex­
ists a classical solution to (4.16) with boundary condition V*(T, s, x, z) = v*(s,x,z).  
From the Feynman-Kac representation theorem (see for example Karatzas and Shreve 
(1988, Thm 5.7.6, page 366)) we know that the solution can be represented as
V ' ( t , 8 , x , z )  : = E 3t 'z [v*(ST, x , Z T)] .
A direct computation then shows that
A
V ' ( t , s , x , z )  = E ‘ [h (x ,Z T)} .  = -  E ‘t [ f ( S T) \
= F \ t , s {
Hence, if H (t , x , z) =  E%[ h(x, Z j )  ], the right-hand side of the above equation equals 
n ( t , s ,x , z ) ,  so that V*( t ,s ,x ,z )  also satisfies (4.17). Following the arguments made 
in section 4.3.4, this implies that V*(t ,s ,x ,z )  is in fact a solution of the Bellman 
Equation (4.15), which was to be shown.
□
P roof of Theorem  4.3.1: Define the function V*(t , s, x , z) as in Proposition 4.A.4. 
Under our assumption regarding the market maker’s pricing rule, we have seen in
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Proposition 4.A.4 that V*(t, s , x , z) solves (4.16) and (4.17). Let (6, 1) be an arbitrary 
admissible policy. Repeating the arguments made in Section 4.3.5, we apply Ito’s 
Lemma to the process V*(t1S t , X ^  Zt) and take expectations to obtain
V*(0,s , x , z )  = V s'1 (0 ,s,X ,z) +  [ < A S t,X 6t , Z t -,I)].
From Proposition 4.A.3 we know that q*{St) Z t \  /)  >  0 with equality if X j  =  
x * ( S t , Z t ) and /  =  7 * (5 t,^ t)-  But this is true by construction for the policy pair 
(6*, I*). Hence we conclude that
V 6,I{t^s^x^z) < V*( t ,s ,x ,z ) ,
with equality if 6 = 0* and I  =  I*. This shows that the policy pair (6*, I*) indeed 
maximises V e,I(t , 5, x, z), which is what we had to show. We also see that the function 
V*(t , s, x, z) constructed in Section 4.3.7 is indeed the value function associated with 
the informed trader’s problem, as defined in (4.11).
□
Chapter 5
A sym m etric Information and 
the “Sm ile” Pattern
5.1 Introduction
In recent years, a fast growing literature has arisen which studies the effects of asym­
metric information on asset prices. However, comparatively little has been said about 
the impact of asymmetric information on the pricing of derivative securities. The 
present paper investigates the manner in which an option, held by a large, informed 
trader, changes the nature of equilibrium prices for the underlying asset, and how 
this feeds back into option prices. As analytical framework, we choose an extension 
of the continuous-time Kyle (1985) model as laid out in Back (1992) and later ex­
tended by Back (1993) and Back and Pedersen (1996). Here, a large trader, who 
receives a private signal about the fundamental value of the traded asset, interacts 
with pure noise traders. Prices are set by a risk-neutral competitive market maker.
I l l
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As in the asymmetric information model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) the prices 
set by the market maker naturally satisfy a zero expected profit condition. In this 
type of model, the informed trader typically drives prices towards the expected value 
of the asset, thus successively revealing the private information to the market maker. 
We extend the Back (1992) model by introducing an over-the-counter (OTC) mar­
ket on which derivative securities can be traded prior to trading in the underlying 
asset. There is no liquid market for options once trading in the underlying market 
has commenced. In fact we can show that allowing options to be traded while there 
is asymmetric information regarding the underlying asset would cause market break­
down. Hence, closing the options market as soon as the underlying market opens 
can be justified endogenously in our model. Unlike Back (1993), we do not introduce 
additional noise in the options market. The focus of our attention is the endogenous 
effect that options held by the informed trader have on the underlying market equi­
librium and how this feeds back into option prices. These effects would be washed 
out by additional noise in the options market.
Unsurprisingly, it turns out that the presence of the option creates an incentive for 
the informed trader to manipulate prices of the underlying asset in order to increase 
the option’s pay-off. Uninformed traders might hence face a price mark-up over the 
expected true value of the asset. In other words, the informed trader creates a price 
bubble at the expense of uninformed traders. The size of this bubble is determined 
by the trade-off faced by the informed trader: On one hand, the informed trader 
gains from upward price manipulation due to the increased option pay-off. On the 
other hand, the informed trader incurs a loss from manipulation because he has to 
buy the underlying asset at prices higher than its expected value. It is the potential 
existence of such bubbles which constitutes the main difference between our model 
and the model by Back (1993), in which this kind of manipulation is precluded by
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the existence of a liquid options market with additional noise.
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria. It turns 
out that the only feasible equilibrium on both markets requires that the market maker 
does not believe the informed trader to have an incentive to manipulate prices. This 
belief can only be rational if equilibrium option prices are “synchronised” with prices 
on the underlying market. While this synchronicity has to be assumed in Jarrow 
(1994) and Frey (1996), it is an endogenous consequence in our model. This has two 
important implications.
First, it turns out that equilibrium option prices are non-linear in quantity. This is 
in line with the findings in Jarrow (1994) and Frey (1996), where option prices are 
determined by the cost of replication, and thus non-linearity arises as a consequence 
of finite elasticity of the underlying market. It is also consistent with empirical 
observations made in the OTC market for options, in particular for large quantities.
Second, for a special case, the equilibrium price process for the underlying asset can 
be shown to follow a generalised geometric Brownian Motion. This allows us to 
compare our findings with the classic Black-Scholes analysis. In particular, we are 
able to derive an explicit expression for implied volatility. We show that the implied 
volatility pattern generated by equilibrium prices in our model displays the famous 
“skew smile pattern”, which has been observed in most financial markets ever since 
the October 1987 crash. There have been a number of other studies that explain the 
smile pattern of implied volatility. Most of these obtain the smile by exogenously 
altering the volatility structure of the underlying price process. Examples include 
Stochastic Volatility or ARCH models. The reasoning here is quite different. Here, 
no assumptions are needed regarding the underlying price volatility, the smile pat­
tern rather occurs endogenously as a consequence of the market structure. To the
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best of our knowledge the only other paper in which the smile has been obtained 
endogenously is the paper by Platen and Schweizer (1998). Their analysis is based 
on a modified version of the feedback model developed in Chapter 2 and published 
previously in Frey and Stremme (1994) and Frey and Stremme (1997). However, in 
order to explain the smile pattern, Platen and Schweizer have to assume an upward- 
sloping demand curve for the underlying asset, which implies that the equilibrium 
they obtain is highly unstable. In other words, Platen and Schweizer have to assume 
an unstable equilibrium in order to explain the smile, while in our model the smile 
arises as a consequence of preventing instability.
The emergence of the skew smile pattern in our model is a result of the attem pt to 
prevent market breakdowns. Empirically, the skewness is a feature which has only 
been observed after the October 1987 stock market crash. The explanation offered 
by our analysis could be that after the crash, market participants and regulators 
implemented measures aimed at preventing similar events in the future. This might 
have brought option prices more in line with the markets for the underlying asset. 
According to our findings, such an increased level of price synchronicity would indeed 
result in precisely the implied volatility pattern that has been observed since the 
crash.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, we introduce 
the model and the mathematical framework for our analysis. The next section gives a 
brief account of the informed trader’s optimisation problem, following the arguments 
developed in Chapter 4. Section 5.4 analyses the structure of equilibria on both 
markets, and the implications for the pricing of the option. The resulting price 
schedule for options and the implied volatility pattern are studied in detail in Section 
5.5. Section 5.6 finally concludes.
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5.2 The M odel
The model is closely related to the one developed by Back (1992) and Back and 
Pedersen (1996). Their model in turn is an extended continuous-time version of 
the classic Kyle (1985) model. A single risky asset and a riskless bond are traded 
continuously over the period from time zero to some final date T. We take the riskless 
bond as numeraire, thus making interest rates implicit in our model. After time T, 
the risky asset is liquidated and yields a (random) pay-off Vt . While the distribution 
of Vt is common knowledge, the actual value is unknown ex ante. There are two 
agents in the market, a representative noise trader whose demand for the risky asset 
is exogenously given, and a single, large, informed trader, who receives a signal about 
the true value of the asset, V f . At any time t £ [0, T], we denote the noise trader’s 
demand for the asset by Z*, and that of the informed trader by X t. Let Yt :=  Xt  +  Zt 
denote the aggregate demand at time t. Trades at time t take place at price Pt , which 
is set by a competitive market maker. As in Back (1992) and Back and Pedersen 
(1996) we assume that the market maker only observes aggregate orders Yt and not 
individual orders X t or Zt.
We extend on the model presented in Back (1992) and Back and Pedersen (1996) by 
introducing an over-the-counter options market. Prior to trading in the underlying 
asset, agents can purchase options which, if exercised, pay off an amount <p (Pt ) 
at time T.  Note that we assume the option’s pay-off to depend on the terminal 
price of the asset, Pt , and not its true value, Vt . A simple example would be a 
cash-settled European call option with strike /T, in which case <p (Pt ) =  (Pt  ~  K).  
Options are issued by the market maker and traded over the counter; there is no 
liquid options market. Moreover, we assume that options cannot be traded once the 
market for the underlying asset has opened. We will see later that this restriction
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is necessary for the existence of equilibria: the closure of the options market is an 
endogenous consequence of the presence of asymmetric information, see Section 5.4 
for details. Note here that we deliberately chose to focus on OTC derivatives, since 
the results we obtain are radically different from those that pertain in the presence 
of a liquid options market, as studied for example in Back (1993). Since the options 
are sold over the counter, the market maker can distinguish individual orders. We 
maintain however that the market maker does not know whether an individual buyer 
is informed or just a liquidity trader. The price at which the market maker is willing 
to sell a quantity p of the option is therefore independent of the buyer’s identity. We 
denote this price by pHo(p), so that the price for one unit of the option contract is 
Ho(p).
5.2.1 Informed Trader
As in Back and Pedersen (1996), the informed trader is assumed to receive a contin­
uous signal St, successively revealing information about the terminal asset value, Vt. 
At any point in time t , the expected terminal value of the risky asset, conditional 
on the current signal St, is given by a function F(t, St). Based upon the information 
available at time t, the informed trader forms his or her demand X t for the risky 
asset. As in Back and Pedersen (1996) we restrict the informed trader to choosing 
trading strategies 6{t) such that the demand X t is given by dX t =  6(t) dt. Note 
in particular that this assumption forces the demand process X t to be absolutely 
continuous. Although this assumption may seem unnecessarily restrictive, it can be 
shown that even if the informed trader is allowed to choose from a more general set 
of strategies, the optimal trading strategy will turn out to be absolutely continuous; 
see Back (1992).
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The main difference to the Back and Pedersen (1996) model is the following; In 
addition to trading in the risky asset, the informed trader may decide to hold a 
quantity p of the option contract. In addition to the trading strategy 6(t), the 
informed trader hence has to choose an exercise policy I  for the option, which we 
assume to take on the value 1 if the option is exercised, and 0 if not. The informed 
trader’s objective is thus to choose a quantity of options p, a trading strategy 0, and 
an exercise policy for the option I  such as to maximise expected terminal wealth. We 
will solve the informed trader’s optimisation problem in two stages via a backward 
induction argument: For the second stage (which we will address first), we take the 
quantity p of options held by the informed trader as given and solve for the optimal 
strategy 6 and exercise policy / .  This will enable us to quantify the benefit that the 
informed trader derives from holding a certain number of options, so that we can 
then determine the optimal option position to solve the first stage of the problem. 
For the second stage, we will make use of the results derived in Chapter 4, see Section 
5.3 below. The first stage is dealt with in Section 5.4.2.
5.2.2 Market Maker
The price Pt at which the asset trades at time t is set by the market maker. As 
in Back (1992) and Back and Pedersen (1996) we assume that the market maker 
can only observe aggregate orders, Yt, and not the individual orders X t or Z t , or 
the informed traders signal St. Therefore we restrict the market maker to setting 
prices according to a pricing rule of the form Pt = H(t ,Y t). Also as in Back (1992) 
and Back and Pedersen (1996) we assume that the market maker acts perfectly 
competitive, i.e. that prices are set equal to the expected terminal value of the 
asset, conditional on the information available to the market maker. In addition to 
setting prices on the market for the risky asset, the market maker also maintains
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the over-the-counter market for option contracts. That is, the market maker has to 
choose a pricing schedule H0(p) for the option contract. We extend the requirement 
of competitive pricing to the options market, i.e. we assume that the price Ho(p) 
reflects the expected value of p units of the option. However, it is worth stressing 
that this assumption can be justified endogenously: it can be shown to be necessary 
for the existence of equilibria, see Section 5.4.
5.2.3 M athem atical Setup and N otation
We will formulate the model within the framework developed in Chapter 4. Note first 
that the informed trader can invert the market maker’s pricing rule H ( t , V*) to infer 
the aggregate order flow Yt and thus the noise trader’s demand Zt from quoted prices 
Pt . From the informed trader’s point of view, St and Yt thus form a sufficient statistic 
for the current state of the economy. We can hence formulate the model entirely in 
terms of the two processes St and Yt . For expositional simplicity, we assume that 
both the noise trader’s demand process, Zt , as well as the informed trader’s signal, 
St , are generalised Brownian Motions. It is worth noting however that our results 
can easily be extended to more general diffusion processes. Formally, we assume that 
St solves the stochastic differential equation
dSt =  <7 s( t )dWts , (5.1)
where W f  is a standard Brownian motion and (Ts{t) is a deterministic function. A 
trading strategy is an adapted process 9(t) such that there exists a unique solution 
to the equation
dYt6 = 0(t) dt + oz (t) dWtz , (5.2)
where Wtz  is a standard Brownian motion, independent of W f ,  and crz(t) is a deter­
ministic function. The solution Yf.  to (5.2) is the aggregate order flow that results
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if the informed trader follows trading strategy 0(t). The noise trader’s demand is 
reflected in the diffusion term crz(t)dWtz  =: dZt in (5.2). As a special case, denote 
by Yt° the aggregate demand process corresponding to the “do-nothing” strategy 
6(t) = 0. Obviously, the dynamics of this process are simply dYt° = (Tz(t) d W z , i.e. 
identical to the dynamics of the noise trader’s demand process, Zt.
Let P*'y be a weak solution to (5.1) and (5.2) conditional on St =  s and Yte = y , 
defined on some suitable measurable space We will omit the superscripts
s or y whenever there is no ambiguity, and we also write P s,y for Pq V. Denote by 
(Ft)t>0 the filtration on (D,.F) generated by St and Yt , augmented to satisfy the 
“usual conditions” , see Karatzas and Shreve (1988, Section 1.2) for details. Finally, 
for notational convenience we introduce the following convention: whenever we are 
given a function which depends on the state variables and time t , we will use lowercase 
letters to denote the value of this function at time T.  For example, we write f ( s )  := 
F(T,s)  and h(y) := H(T,y) .
5.2.4 Equilibrium
The choice variables for the informed trader in our model are, the quantity of option 
contracts held, p, the trading strategy in the underlying asset, 9(t), and the exercise 
policy for the option, / .  We refer to the triple (p, 0 ,1) as the informed trader’s policy 
choice. The market maker on the other hand sets pricing schedules Ho(p) for the 
option contract and H(t ,Y t) for the underlying asset. We are now ready to define 
tie  concept of equilibrium in our model:
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D efin ition  5.2.1 (E qu ilib rium ) An equilibrium is a tupel (H0, H',p,0,1) such that
(i) Given the market maker’s pricing schedule (Ho,H), the informed trader’s pol­
icy choice (p,0, I)  is optimal, i.e. maximises the informed trader’s expected 
terminal wealth.
(a) Given the informed trader’s policy choice (p, 0 ,/) ,  the market maker’s pricing 
schedule (Ho,H)  is rational, i.e. reflects the assets’ expected value, conditional 
on the market maker’s information.
5.3 The Informed Trader’s Problem
In this section, we derive the solution to the second stage of the informed trader’s 
problem, i.e. we take the number p of options held as given and solve for the optimal 
trading strategy $(t) and exercise policy I. Note that from the informed trader’s 
perspective, the market maker’s pricing rule H (t ,Y t) can be considered exogenously 
given, so that the informed trader’s optimisation problem is a special case of the 
problem considered in Chapter 4. Therefore, we will give here only a brief outline of 
the main result, Theorem 5.3.1. A detailed exposition can be found in Chapter 4.
5.3.1 O bjective Function
The informed trader’s objective is to maximise expected terminal wealth. Following 
the intuition developed in Chapter 4, terminal wealth in the absence of the option is 
given by
B t +  VT • X T =  B0 +  VT • X0 +  f T (VT -  Pt~) 0(t)dt.  (5.3)
Jo
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Since Bo and X 0 are exogenously given and thus irrelevant for the optimisation 
problem, we will assume Bo =  X q =  0 and focus on the last term in the above 
expression. Given any strategy 0(t), the dynamics of the aggregate demand process, 
Yte, are given by (5.2). The market maker sets prices according to the rule Pt =  
H (t , Yt) .  Note here that since Y f  is by definition continuous, so is the price process 
Pt . Recall also that given a final value St of the signalling process, the expected 
value of Vt  is given by /(S r)-  Using the law of iterated expectations, we can hence 
write the expected terminal wealth of the informed trader for given starting values 
So = s, Y0 = y and given strategy 0(t) as
E’A  I (yT -P,)6(t)dt  = E ' A  I (F(t, S t ) -  H(t,Yt' ) )0(t)dt
[ ./0 J J o  y------------ V-------------'
=: n(«,5(,r/)
Note that the function II(£, 5*, Yte) has an economic interpretation: It describes the 
expected marginal benefit of holding an extra unit of the risky asset, F ( t , St), minus 
the current purchasing price, H(t ,Y td). Following our convention, we write
7T(s,y) := n(T,s,y) = f ( s )  -  h(y).
We now incorporate the option into the informed trader’s objective function. Since 
there is no market for options after time 0, we can treat the number of options held 
by the informed trader as exogenous for the informed trader’s optimisation problem. 
We will analyse the options market in more detail in Section 5.5. Recall that the 
option, if exercised, pays off an amount tp(Pt ) at time T. The price Pt at time T  
is assumed to be set according to the rule Pt  =  h(Y}).  Since from the informed 
trader’s point of view the pricing rule h(y) is exogenously given, we shorten notation 
by setting <j>(y) := <p(h(y)). Hence, if the informed trader holds p units of such an 
option, expected terminal wealth becomes
E s , y
p / J i  .
I n(t,StX)9( t )d t  + pI<j>(Yf)
. Jo
(5.4)
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Here, I  denotes the exercise policy, which we assume to be =  1 if the option is 
exercised, and =  0 if not. The exercise policy will be determined endogenously later, 
see Section 5.3.3.
5.3.2 Admissible Strategies
The choice variables for the informed trader are the trading strategy 0(t) and the 
exercise policy I. Note that due to our assumption of absolute continuity, the demand 
process X t is automatically predictable. This is in line with the intuition that the 
decision on what assets to hold over any period of time must be based upon the 
information available at the beginning of that period. It is also important for technical 
reasons, see for example Harrison and Pliska (1981) for a detailed elaboration on this 
issue. On the other hand, since the decision whether to exercise the option or not 
is made at time T, it can be contingent on all information available to the informed 
trader at that time.
Formally, an admissible policy is a pair (6, /) , where I  is an .^-m easurable random 
variable taking values in {0,1}, and 0(t) is a process adapted to (fFt)t>o such that
V 6’!(t, s ,y)  := E ?  r  II(r, ST, Y?)9{t ) dr + pI<t>{Y°)
is well-defined for every s ,y  E IR and t E [0, T\. We can interpret V 9,I(t, s, y) as the 
gain that is made starting at St = s and Yt6 =  y at time t and following trading 
strategy 6 and exercise policy I  thereafter. The large trader’s problem is thus to find 
an admissible policy (0,1) which maximises V 6,I(t ,s ,y) .  As usual in the theory of 
stochastic control, we define the value function of the problem as
V*(t, s , y) := sup V 9J(t, s,y).  (5.5)
m
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We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
T h eo rem  5.3.1 (O p tim al S tra teg y ) There exists a non-degenerate solution to 
the informed trader’s problem if and only if  the market maker’s pricing rule sat­
isfies H( t ,y )  =  E\[ h(Yj!) ]. In this case, there exist functions Y*(t,s) and I*(s) 
such that the optimum is attained by exercise policy I * =  I*(St ), and any trading 
strategy of the form
9 ( t ) : = a ( t ) ( Y % t , S , ) - Y f ) ,  (5.6)
where a(t) is any deterministic function with a(£) — > oo as t — > T  fast enough to 
force the solution Y f  of (5.2) to converge to Y*(t,St) as t — > T.
We give a brief outline of the proof of this theorem in the following section. A 
detailed exposition can be found in Section 4.3. For general reference on the theory 
of controlled diffusion processes see Fleming and Soner (1993) or Krylov (1980).
5.3.3 P roof o f Theorem 5.3.1
The proof of Theorem 5.3.1 is essentially an application of Theorem 4.3.1 in Chapter 
4. As discussed there, the value function V*(t ,s,y)  can be characterised as the 
solution to the Bellman equation subject to appropriate boundary conditions. In the 
case considered here, the Bellman equation takes the form
T  I 14 +  \  ^ zVyv +  ^ +  (Vi  +  n ) f l |  = 0 .  (5.7)
Since this equation is linear in 0, in order for the supremum to be finite the co­
efficient of 0 must be zero. We can thus split up the Bellman Equation into the
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following two separate equations:
Vt +  \  (o*zV„ + =  0, (5.8)
Vy +  n  =  0. (5 .9 )
Equation (5.8) is just the heat equation associated with two-dimensional Brownian 
motion. The Feynman-Kac representation theorem (see Karatzas and Shreve (1988, 
Theorem 4.4.2)) allows us to write its solution (if it exists) in the following form:
V(t , s ,y )  = E t ’y [ V ( T ,S T, y ? ) ] ,
where Yt° is a solution of (5.2) corresponding to 0 = 0, i.e. it follows the simplified 
dynamics dYt° = crz(t) d W f .  Equation (5.9) has a more economic interpretation. It 
states that the marginal gain Vy(t , s , y) from holding an extra unit of the risky asset 
at time t , must equal the purchasing cost, H(t,y) ,  minus the expected marginal 
benefit, F(t ,s).  For a detailed elaboration on the intuition behind this, see Section 
4.3.4.
O p t i m a l  S t r a t e g y
We will now intuitively derive the appropriate boundary condition for the Bellman 
equation and see how it can help us pinpoint the optimal strategy. Suppose the 
value function V*(t ,s,y)  exists and is sufficiently smooth. We know then that is 
must solve the Bellman equations (5.8) and (5.9). For any given admissible strategy 
6(t) consider now the process V*(t, S t ,Y f) .  Following the arguments outlined in 
Chapter 4, an application of Ito’s Lemma in conjunction with equations (5.8) and 
(5.9) allows us to write
y*(0 ,S,y) =  V(''/ (0,3,3/) +  £:*->'f V ‘(T ,S T,Y°)-pI<l>(Y°)].  (5.10)
L '------------------ v------------------ ' J
=: q*{ST,Y°-,I)
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Here, V 0,I(O,s,y) is the value function for the arbitrarily chosen policy (0,1). The 
above equation has the following interpretation; the quantity E s,y[ q*(Srf I) ] 
measures the difference between the value V^’^ O, s, y) of any given policy pair (0, 1) 
and the maximal achievable value V*(0, s , y ). The function q*(Sr, Yf; I) can thus be 
identified as the loss incurred by the informed trader by deviating from the optimal 
strategy. In particular we deduce that E a,y[ q*(Sx, Yft; -0 ] must be non-negative, and 
zero at the optimum. We will reverse this argument to construct the optimal policy 
and value function. More specifically, we will construct a function q*(s,y; I)  and 
“optimality conditions” y*(s) and I*(s) in such a way that q*(s,y; I) > 0 and =  0 if 
and only if y = 2/*(«s) and I  = I*(s). Based on this we use (5.8) and the Feynman- 
Kac representation to construct a candidate V*(t ,s,y)  for the value function which 
satisfies (5.7). From this and the above arguments we can conclude that an exercise 
policy I*(St) and a trading strategy which ensures that =  y*(Sr) will attain the 
optimum, and that V*(t,s ,y)  is indeed the value function of the informed trader’s 
problem. The formal proofs for all these statements can be found in Chapter 4. We 
interpret y*(s) as the optimal “target position” towards which the informed trader 
should drive the aggregate position Yte in the market as t — »• T, conditional on 
S t  =  s. This is similar to the arguments presented in Back (1992) and Back and 
Pedersen (1996).
As shown in Chapter 4, evaluating the Bellman equation (5.9) at t = T  implies that 
the loss function q*(s,y; I) must be of the form
/*»•(»)
q*(s ,y]I)=  / n(s,r})dri +pl*(s)(/>(y*(s)) -  pl<fr(y), (5.11)
Jy
for suitably chosen y*(s) and I*(s). The intuitive interpretation of this equation is 
the same as the one discussed in Chapter 4: For any marginal deviation in y away 
from the optimal y*(s), the informed trader incurs a marginal loss of f ( s )  due to the 
reduced position in the risky asset, while gaining a marginal h(y) due to the lower
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cost of acquiring that position.
By construction, the loss function defined in (5.11) satisfies the desired “boundary 
conditions” q*(s,y*(s); = 0. Our remaining task is hence to determine y*(s)
and I*(s) in such a way that for each s the mapping (y, I) q*(s,y; I) has a global 
minimum at y = y*(s) and I  =  I*(s). Following the arguments developed in Chapter 
4, we first keep the option exercise decision fixed and construct optimal targets yj^s) 
and yj(s) conditional on the option being exercised or not, respectively. We can then 
establish the optimal exercise decision I*(s) endogenously. As shown in Chapter 4, 
the conditional target positions yj(s) and yj^s) can be characterised via the first- 
order conditions
f ( s )  =  h(yo(s)), and (5.12)
f ( s )  =  h(yl(s))-p<l/(yt(s)).  (5.13)
It can be shown that both yj(s) and yi(s) are increasing functions of the signal s , 
and that yj(s) < yj(^). As shown in Chapter 4, it is then optimal for the informed 
trader to exercise the option if and only if
rvo(s)
/  ir(s,r})drj < pc/>(yt(s)). (5.14)
Note that this condition shows that the optimal exercise policy depends only on s 
and not on y or I. The economic interpretation of (5.14) is as follows. Recall that 
yj(-s) is the optimal target position conditional on no exercise. Hence the left-hand 
side of (5.14) is the loss incurred by trading towards yl(s)  instead of yj(s). The 
right-hand side however represents the gain made from the option’s pay-off. Hence
(5.14) states that the informed trader should exercise the option if and only if the
loss incurred by deviating from the optimal position is outweighed by the option’s
pay-off.
Chapter 5. Asymmetric Information and the “Smile” Pattern 127
It is straight-forward to show that there exists a unique cut-off point s such that
(5.14) is satisfied if and only if s >  s. We can hence define the optimal exercise 
policy I*(s) to be =  1 if and only if s > s, and =  0 otherwise. Intuitively, the 
unconditional target y*(s) should then equal yl(.s) whenever exercising the option is 
optimal, and yj(s) otherwise. Therefore we define
if ( s )  := r (s )y l ( s )  +  (1 -  /*(s))yS(s).
The loss function q*{s,y\I) defined via (5.11) can then indeed be shown to have 
a global minimum at y =  y*(s) and I  =  /*(«s), see Proposition 4.A.3. From the 
arguments outlined in the beginning of this section it should now be intuitively clear 
that any strategy 6{t) which ensures that Y f  — )■ y*(Sr) as t — > T  is a candidate 
for the optimum. We hence set Y*(t,s) := E*[ y*(Sr) ] and define
e(t) := a(t)  (Y*(t, St) -  Yf )  ,
where a(t)  is a deterministic function with a(t)  — > oo as t — > T  fast enough to 
make Ytd converge to y*(Sr) as t — > T.  A rigorous proof for the optimality of 6(t) 
is given in the appendix to Chapter 4.
REMARK: W e can  w rite  th e  overall first-order con d ition  for th e  in form ed  tra d er’s 
term in a l p o sitio n  in  th e  follow ing form:
h (y*(ST)) =  f ( S T) +  p l ' i S r W  (jy*(ST)). (5.15)
Since for an optimal strategy, we have Y f  = y*(5r), the above equation implies that 
the terminal price of the asset, /i(V^), equals its expected true value, f ( S r ) ,  plus 
a mark-up pI*(St )<I>,(Yj '). Thus, unlike in the models of Kyle (1985), Back (1992) 
or Back and Pedersen (1996), the existence of the option implies that the informed 
trader has an incentive to drive prices away from the true expected value of the asset.
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V a l u e  F u n c t io n
Finally, we can now construct a candidate for the value function V*(^,s,y) based 
on the analysis in the preceding sections. Guided by (5.10) we conjecture that the 
boundary condition for the value function be given by
v*(s, y) := q*(s, y; I) +  pl<j>(y). (5.16)
Obviously, v*(s,y) is smooth in y, and smooth in s for s E 1R \  {s}. Moreover, 
a straight-forward calculation, using the first-order conditions for yj(-s) and yl(s),  
shows that v*(s, y) is continuous also at s =  s. In view of (5.8), we define a candidate 
for the value function via the Feynman-Kac representation formula:
V ( t , s , y )  :=  E ’"> [ »*(,&., V?) ] • (5.17)
It can be shown that the function thus defined indeed solves the Bellman Equation 
(5.7), see Proposition 4.A.4. From the analysis in the preceding sections it should 
then be clear that V*(t,s ,y)  is the value function, and that the strategy defined 
above is an optimal strategy.
REMARK: A  d irect co m p u ta tio n  show s th at
V) = E't [ f ( S T) ) - E !  { h ( Y ° ) }.
— E(t,  s)
Recall that in order to satisfy the Bellman Equation, Vr*(f,s,y) must in particular 
solve (5.9). From the above we see that this is possible only if H (t ,y )  =  E%[ h(YJ?) ]. 
We have thus found a condition that the market maker’s pricing rule must satisfy in 
order for the informed trader’s problem to have a non-degenerate solution.
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5.4 Equilibrium
In this section we characterise equilibria on both the market for the underlying asset 
as well as the OTC options market. Again we proceed in two stages. We first 
analyse equilibria on the market for the underlying asset, taking the informed trader’s 
option position as given. We then solve for the overall equilibrium on both markets, 
endogenising the informed trader’s option position.
Recall that equilibrium requires the market maker’s pricing rule to be rational, i.e. to 
reflect the expected true value of the asset, conditional on the available information. 
For fixed p, denote the by i^(p; ds) the distribution of St , conditional on p and the 
observed order flow up to time t. If we denote by p(dp) the market maker’s beliefs 
about p, then the beliefs regarding the joint distribution of p and St can be written 
as At(dp,ds) = p(dp) ® vt(p;ds). Rationality of the market maker’s pricing rule for 
the underlying asset can then be expressed as
H(t ,Y t) =  f  F(t ,s )  p(dp) <g> vt(p,ds). (5.18)
J B2
To characterise the dynamics of A*, we will make use of the theory of linear filtering. 
For general reference, see Kallianpur and Karandikar (1985).
5.4.1 Equilibrium on the Underlying Market
As benchmark, we first consider the two extreme cases in which the market maker 
either is not aware of the existence of options at all, or possesses perfect information 
regarding the informed trader’s option position. Note that although these extreme 
cases do not exactly reflect the structure of our model, they nonetheless provide valu­
able insights and will help us later determine the joint equilibrium on both markets.
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Not surprisingly, in the former case an equilibrium exists in which prices are set in 
the same way as in Back and Pedersen (1996). However, the latter perfect informa­
tion case only permits an equilibrium in the degenerate situation where no options 
are held by the informed trader. The main focus of this section, however, will be the 
case in which the market maker is aware of the existence of options, but is uncertain 
about the number held by the informed trader.
Throughout this section we will take the informed trader’s position p in option con­
tracts as given and assume that it is fixed over the entire time interval [0,T]. We 
will endogenise the informed trader’s position in Section 5.4.2.
I n c o m p l e t e  In f o r m a t io n
Consider the case in which the market maker is unaware of the existence of OTC 
derivatives. Formally, we can express this as p =  <£{o}. Due to this misperception of 
the true market structure, systematic errors might arise in the expectations formed. 
As a consequence, we shall see that situations might arise in which the informed trader 
realises increased profits at the market maker’s expense. This happens because in 
some situations it becomes profitable for the informed trader to create a bubble, 
pushing the options held (further) into the money. The market maker will not react 
to this mechanism as he is unaware of the existence of the options. We summarise 
the result in the following theorem.
T h e o rem  5.4.1 (In co m p le te  In fo rm atio n  E q u ilib riu m ) Define
S(t) =  £  (o iM  “  <?2s{s))ds.
By rescaling St (and adjusting F(t,St) accordingly), we can assume E(t) > 0 for all 
t. Then, in the case of incomplete information, an equilibrium on the underlying
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market is given by the triple (H,0 ,I ) ,  where I  =  I*(St ),
H(t ,y)  = E » [ f { Y ,? ) ] ,  and 
8{t) =  a ( t ) ( Y - ( t , S , ) - Y f ) .
Here, a(2) =  <7|(£ )/£ (£), and Y*(t,S t) and I*(St ) are defined as in Section 5.3.3. 
In particular, the terminal pricing rule is given by h = f .
PROOF: Optimality of the informed trader’s strategy follows from Theorem 5.3.1. 
The required convergence of Y f  to t/*(5r) as t — > T  for the chosen a(£) follows from 
the Law of Iterated Logarithms, see Back and Pedersen (1996, Lemma 2) for details. 
The proof of rationality of the pricing rule follows the lines of the proof in Back 
and Pedersen (1996). Details are given in Lemma 5.A.1 and Corollary 5.A.2 in the 
appendix.
□
Note that, even though the market maker’s pricing rule is the same as the one 
obtained in Back and Pedersen (1996), the informed trader’s incentive to manipulate 
markets is reflected in the term  Y*(t , St) in the optimal trading strategy. Recall from 
Section 5.3.3, that the informed trader’s first-order conditions imply
h (Y°)  =  / ( S t )  +  p I*{St )4> ( Y f ) .
That is, the informed trader creates a price bubble which manifests itself in the 
mark-up pI*{St )^{Xt ) over r^ue expected value of the asset, /(S 't)-
The qualitative conclusion from the analysis in this subsection is interesting. If in 
the presence of asymmetric information derivative markets are not properly aligned 
with the underlying market, informed traders will exploit this miss-alignment, thus 
creating price bubbles in the market for the underlying asset. These bubble arises
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because the informational content on the derivatives market is not transferred to the 
market for the underlying asset. This lack of informational synchronicity between 
the underlying and the options market makes up the difference between the analysis 
in this section and the equilibrium analysis in Back (1993). There, the market maker 
can also observe the order flow on the options market, which makes it impossible 
for the informed trader to profitably manipulate markets. In light of this, one might 
think that letting the market maker audit the order flows on attached OTC markets 
should lead to more rational price setting. This conclusion is however not necessarily 
true. To see why this is so, and to understand better the results of Back (1993), we 
will need the analysis from the following subsection.
C o m p l e t e  a n d  P e r f e c t  In f o r m a t i o n
We now consider the situation where the market maker is fully aware of the existence 
of OTC contracts and knows the exact quantity held by the informed trader; formally 
fi =  <£{p}. We maintain however the assumption that the market maker cannot
observe the informed trader’s private signal St. In this situation equilibria can be
characterised as follows.
T h eo rem  5.4.2 (P erfec t In fo rm atio n  E q u ilib riu m ) In the case of complete and 
perfect information an equilibrium exists if and only if p =  0, i.e. i f  the informed 
trader holds no options at all. In this case, the equilibrium reduces to the one de­
scribed in Theorem 5.4-1 with Y*(t ,S t) = St, that is
H(t,y)  =  E ? [ f ( Y ? ) ] ,  and
6(t) = a (t) (St — Y/) .
In particular, the terminal pricing rule is given by h = f .
Note that this equilibrium is, not surprisingly, identical to the one obtained in Back
Chapter 5. Asymmetric Information and the “Smile” Pattern 133
(1992) and Back and Pedersen (1996).
PROOF: We may assume that h \y )  > 0. Note from (5.15) that the necessary first 
order condition for the informed trader’s problem can be written as
/ ( S t )  =  h(YT) -  Pr ( S TW (YT). (5.19)
Together with the rationality requirement (5.18) this implies
h(Yr) = f  f ( s ) v T(p;ds)
J]R
=  h(YT) - p f  I* (s)<f/(Yt ) vT{p\ ds).Jm
Consequently we can conclude that
p f  I*(s)(j>,(Yr ) vt(p\ ds) =  0
R
is a necessary condition for existence of equilibria. Since h'(y) > 0 and thus > 0, 
and since I*(s) =  1 at least for some values of s whenever p ^  0, we can finally 
conclude that p =  0 is necessary for the existence of equilibria. The sufficiency 
follows easily from the analysis in the preceding section.
□
The intuition behind the non-existence of equilibrium lies in the the informed trader’s 
incentive to manipulate prices and the fact that in this scenario the market maker 
anticipates this. From (5.19) we see that it is optimal for the informed trader is 
to mark up prices relative to the expected true value by an amount pI*(St )(/>,(Yi ). 
The market maker, anticipating this, would have to adjust prices to account for the 
price mark-up, only to see the informed trader increase demand to push prices even 
further up. Hence, no rational pricing rule can exist in this situation.
The results derived in this section are dramatically different from those obtained 
in Back (1993). If the order flow on the options market is fully observable, no non­
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degenerate equilibrium can exist in our model, while in Back (1993) this observability 
in fact increases price accuracy by providing the market maker with additional in­
formation regarding the underlying asset. This qualitative difference arises because 
the equilibrium in Back (1993) is upheld by the assumption of additional exogenous 
noise in form of stochastic volatility. Without this additional noise term the results 
in Back (1993) reduce to the non-existence result established here.
In summary we conclude that situations where market makers can identify trades on 
the derivatives market, but where prices on the two markets are not aligned, might 
cause market failure. A stable market equilibrium for the underlying asset can only 
be sustained if the prices for OTC derivatives are set in such a way that an informed 
trader would never find them worth holding. This requirement of price synchronicity 
necessary to prevent manipulative bubbles has previously been addressed in discrete­
time models by Jarrow (1992) and Jarrow (1994), and in the related continuous-time 
generalisation by Frey (1996). However, while Jarrow and Frey simply assume price 
synchronicity, it is an endogenous consequence of the market microstructure of our 
model.
5.4.2 Full Equilibrium
We now return to the scenario in which the market maker is aware of the existence 
of the options market, but does not know the exact quantity p of options held by 
the informed trader. This is in line with the structure of our model, since we assume 
that the market maker maintains the OTC options market but cannot distinguish 
the identity of individual buyers of options. Following the arguments of the previous 
section, we find that rationality of the market maker’s pricing rule together with the
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informed trader’s first-order conditions imply
h(YT) = f  f ( s )  p(dp) ® vt(p\ ds)
J B2
= h^  ~ I jrP ( I n  V T d s ^ dp}'
Following the arguments of the preceding section we can conclude that this is only 
possible if p =  0 almost surely with respect to p. In other words, given the informed 
trader’s optimal strategy, rational pricing on the underlying market is only possible if 
the market maker believes that the informed trader holds no options. The intuition 
behind this result is analogous to the perfect information case: Whenever the in­
formed trader does hold an option, there will be an incentive to manipulate markets 
and create a price bubble. Hence, if the market maker has reason to believe that 
options are held by the informed trader, rationality would require prices to adjust 
to  counteract this manipulation incentive. This in turn would induce the informed 
trader to increase demand even further. Hence, no rational pricing rule could exist.
As a consequence of this, we can conclude that the only feasible equilibrium is one 
in which it is rational for the market maker to believe that no options are held by 
the informed trader. This however is only possible if option prices are set in such a 
way that the informed trader is indifferent between holding or not holding options. 
In other words, the price of the option must equal the expected additional benefit 
that the informed trader could derive from holding it. We have thus established the 
main result of this section:
T h e o rem  5.4.3 (Full E q u ilib riu m ) The full equilibrium on both markets is given 
by the quintupel (Ho, H; p, 6 ,1), where p = 0 and 1 = 0, and
(1) The option pricing schedule, Ho(p), is set such that the informed trader is
indifferent between holding or not holding options.
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(2) The market maker’s pricing rule H (t,Y t) and the informed trader’s trading 
strategy 0(t) are set as in Theorem 5.4-2.
Moreover, there exists no equilibrium in which the informed trader finds it optiomal 
to hold options.
PROOF: It is clear from Theorem 5.4.1 that (H, 9, 1) is an equlibrium on the under­
lying market, if the market maker believes that the informed trader holds no options. 
This belief on the other hand is rational, since option prices are set in such a way 
that holding options does not provide any benefit for the informed trader. This in 
turn implies optimality of the informed trader’s option position.
□
The interpretation of this result is very much the same as in the perfect information 
case. The presence of asymmetric information imposes a requirement of synchronicity 
between prices on the options market and the market for the underlying asset. Failure 
to guarantee this synchronicity leads to market breakdown. Hence, equilibrium in our 
model endogenously determines a price schedule for OTC derivatives which differs 
drastically from classic option pricing theory. While in the latter, the price of an 
option reflects its value from the point of view of a price-taker, in our study option 
prices account for the value of the manipulation opportunity they provide. In the 
next section, we will analyse the equilibrium option prices predicted by our model in 
more detail and show that they give rise to the “smile pattern” of implied volatility.
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5.5 Option Pricing and the Smile Pattern
In this section we will make explicit the implications that the equilibrium conditions 
derived in the preceding sections have on the pricing of options. From Section 5.4 
we know that the only feasible equilibrium requires option prices to be aligned with 
the underlying market in such a way that the informed trader cannot derive any 
additional benefit from holding options. In other words, the equilibrium price pHo(p) 
of a quantity p of option contracts must equal the value that these contracts would 
have to the informed trader. In contrast to classic option pricing theory, the resulting 
pricing schedule turns out to be non-linear in quantity, i.e. the price per unit depends 
on the amount demanded. Moreover, in a special case in which equilibrium prices 
of the underlying asset are given by a classic Black-Scholes model, we are able to 
explicitly characterise the “implied volatility” and show that it displays the famous 
“smile pattern” .
5.5.1 Arbitrage Option Price
We begin with establishing as a benchmark the arbitrage price of the option in our 
model. Recall from Section 5.4 that the equilibrium pricing rule for the underlying 
asset is given by
Assuming that the function H (t , y) is sufficiently regular, the Feynman-Kac repre­
sentation theorem, (see Karatzas and Shreve (1988, Theorem 5.7.6)), implies that 
H (t,y )  solves the partial differential equation Ht +  ^cr^Hyy = 0. Hence, by Ito’s 
Lemma the price process Pf := H (t,Y te) for any given strategy Q(t) satisfies
dP° = Hv( t ,Y f )d Y te.
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Inverting H (t,y )  we can write Yt9 = G(t, Pf), so that
dP? = Hy(t, G(t, Pf)) {8(t) dt + <TZ(t) d w f j  . (5.20)
' =: A(t, Pf)  '
This formulation implies that the market thus described is in fact complete, (see 
Harrison and Pliska (1981)), which ensures the existence of a unique equivalent mar­
tingale measure (EMM). In analogy with the above, we define the process Pt° by 
Pt° := H(t,Y®), i.e. the price process corresponding to the “do nothing” strategy. 
Obviously,
dP° = crz (t)X(t,P°)dW tz .
From (5.20) it is hence clear that the process P 6 under the EMM is distributionally 
equivalent with the process P° under the original measure. From standard derivatives 
pricing theory we know that the arbitrage-price of an option can be expressed as its 
expected terminal pay-off under the EMM. The above arguments imply that this is 
equivalent to the expected pay-off under the original measure with P 9 replaced by 
P°. We have thus shown:
Proposition  5.5.1 (Arbitrage Price) In equilibrium, the arbitrage price of an op­
tion which promises to pay an amount <p(Pt) tf  exercised, is given by
B  [ v +( i? )  ] =  E [ V+(f(Y°))  ] . (5.21)
In particular, this price does not depend on the informed trader’s strategy.
The arbitrage price for the option constitutes the benchmark with which we compare 
the equilibrium option price in our model. Note that the theory of derivatives pricing 
by arbitrage is based, amongst others, on the assumption of perfectly elastic mar­
kets for the underlying asset. This assumption is clearly not satisfied in the model 
considered here. Hence we expect equilibrium option prices to differ from arbitrage 
prices. This difference gives rise to the “smile pattern” of implied volatilities.
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5.5.2 Equilibrium Option Price
Recall that the equilibrium price of the option is equal to the expected gain the 
informed trader could derive from holding it. Denote by V* the value function 
associated with the informed trader’s problem for a given quantity of options held, 
p. Following the argument developed in Chapter 4, we use (5.10) to write
v ;  = v y  + E [ q;(sT,Y°;i)].
Here, q* is the “loss-function” for the given p (see Section 5.3.3), and (0,1) is any 
admissible policy pair. Taking in particular 6(t) to be the optimal trading strategy 
in the absence of the option, and I  =  0, we find that the value to the informed trader 
of p units of the option is given by
( v ; - v 0*) =  e
= E
q : ( S T , y l { S T ) \ i )
*2/* (St)
I Tr(ST,r))dri + p(t>(yl(ST))
Vo (St)
= : i ’p ( f ( S T))
Note that by the informed trader’s first-order conditions, the term in the brackets 
indeed only depends on /(*Sr)5 so that our notation is justified. Note also that by 
definition of the exercise policy, we have that Ip(Sr) =  1 if and only if ^ p(/(.S t)) >  0. 
We can thus write
(V; -  V0‘) = E[j>+ { /(S t )) ] , (5.22)
which in particular shows that the value of the option to the informed trader is non­
negative. The above expectation can be seen to be the arbitrage price of a derivative 
which pays off an amount ^ p ( f(S r )) if exercised. Indeed, consider the fictitious price 
process Pt := F(t, St). Note that Pt represents the best estimate of the true value of
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the asset, given the informed trader’s signal. Using Feynman-Kac and Ito we find
dPt = as (t)Fa( t ,S t)d W f .
In other words, the process Pt is a martingale under the original measure, so that
A
(5.22) is indeed the arbitrage price of the derivative that pays off iPp(Pt ) if exercised. 
We summarise our findings in the following
P ro p o sitio n  5.5.2 (E q u ilib riu m  P rice ) The equilibrium price of the option is 
given by
Ho(fi) = - E  [ (f ( S T)) ] . (5.23)P
This expression can be interpreted as the arbitrage price of an option which pays off 
an amount iI>p(Pt ) i f  exercised, written on the (expected) true value of the underlying 
asset, Pt = F(t, St).
Note in particular that the option price Ho(p) may depend on the quantity demanded, 
p. This reflects the fact that the equilibrium price of the option, unlike its arbitrage 
price, is indeed affected by the informed trader’s actions.
5.5.3 Implied Volatility and the Smile Pattern
Throughout this section, we restrict our analysis to the special case in which the 
option in question is a standard European call option, i.e. <p (Pt ) =  (Pt  — K)- To 
make the dependence on the strike price explicit, we denote the equilibrium price of 
such an option by H(f(p; K). Also, in order to be able to compare our results with 
those of classic Black-Scholes theory, we consider the special case where /  =  exp.
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In this case, the fictitious price process Pt follows a generalised geometric Brownian 
Motion:
^  =  v s (t) dWts . (5.24)
Pt
Note that this is just the standard Black-Scholes model with zero interest rates. 
Recall that in equilibrium, the market maker’s pricing rule is set to h = f  = exp. It 
is now straight-forward to see that the informed trader’s first-order conditions (5.12) 
and (5.13) in this case take on the following form:
y j ( s ) = 5  and yl(s) = s -  log(l  -  p).
In order to calculate the unit price of the option, we need to evaluate the term 
iPp ( P t ) / p . A direct computation yields
- M P t ) =  - { - P T l o g ( l - p ) - p K }
>-------------------' >---------V------—'
= :  k (p ) =  1/ k (p )
That is, the pay-off of the fictitious derivative which represents the equilibrium option 
price in our model can be expressed as a multiple of a simple European call option 
with a modified strike price K / k (p ). We have thus established the main result of 
this section:
T h e o rem  5.5.3 In the case where the informed trader’s expectations of the true 
value of the asset follow a geometric Brownian Motion, i.e. f  =  exp, the equilibrium 
price H q (p ; K ) of a European call option with strike price K  is given by
H fip ;  K)  =  k(p)Cb s(E0s , Po, K / k(P)) = CBS(Sjf, n(p)Po, K). (5.25)
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Here CBS(£ , P, K ) denotes the Black-Scholes price of a European call option with 
strike price K , given initial price P and price volatility S. Note that we need to use 
the Black-Scholes pricing theory for time-dependent volatility, with
:= /  as(T) dT■
The fact that we can identify the equilibrium price of the option as the Black-Scholes 
price of an option with modified strike price allows us to establish the usual compar­
ative statics results:
C o ro lla ry  5.5.4 (C o m p ara tiv e  S ta tics) The equilibrium price Hq (p ; K ) o f the 
European call option is decreasing in the strike price K , increasing in the signal 
volatility a s , and increasing in the initial level of the signal, So. Moreover, it is 
increasing in the number of options demanded, p.
All these results follow immediately from the corresponding properties of standard 
Black-Scholes option prices. Only the last, the dependence of the option price on 
quantity, is new compared to standard derivatives pricing theory. It is this property 
which is responsible for the emergence of the “smile pattern” of implied volatility in 
our model. By virtue of the above theorem, it is clear that implied volatility can be 
defined as the solution Eomp(/o; K )  of
CBS(EB k(p)P0, K)  =  CBS( £ r >(/>; K), P0, K )  (5.26)
This explicit expression allows us to examine the shape of the “smile pattern” analyt­
ically. It can be shown that for most reasonable parameter values, implied volatility is 
a decreasing function of the option’s strike price, cf. Appendix 5.B. These analytical 
results are confirmed by numerical computations. Calculations for different choices
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of the model parameters show an implied volatility curve which is monotonically 
decreasing and convex as a function of the option’s strike price. Figure 5.1 shows an 
example. Both the theoretical as well as the numerical results are consistent with 
the “skew smile pattern” which has been observed in most financial markets since 
the October 1987 crash.
As a final point, let us mention that our story of the smile being a consequence of more 
aligned derivative prices is consistent with recent empirical findings of Christensen 
and Prabala (1998). They find that after the October 87 crash implied volatilities 
have become far better predictors of realised volatilities and hence that option pricing 
schedules have been more consistent and stable after the crash.
5.6 Conclusions
We have studied the manner in which an option, held by a large, informed trader, 
changes the nature of equilibrium prices for the derivative and the underlying asset. 
We have shown that in the presence of such an option, the informed trader has 
an incentive to manipulate prices to push the option into the money, thus creating 
a price mark-up over the expected true value of the underlying asset. The cost 
of this manipulative bubble would have to be borne by uninformed traders. As 
a consequence, it is impossible for the market maker to sustain a stable market 
equilibrium if he has reason to believe that options are held by the informed trader. 
The implication of this is that in equilibrium, option prices have to be in line with 
the market for the underlying asset. We have demonstrated that this synchronicity 
requirement gives rise to a pricing schedule for options which is non-linear in quantity. 
Moreover, we were able to derive an explicit expression for implied volatility, and show 
that it displays the famous “skew smile pattern” which is one of the most prominent
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empirical puzzles in the theory of financial markets.
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis. To begin with, 
our results show that in the presence of asymmetric information, an OTC market for 
derivative securities which is insufficiently aligned with the market for the underlying 
can cause market failure. Moreover, bringing the OTC derivatives market in line is 
only possible as long as private information has not yet arrived. As soon as private 
information is present, the market maker is unable to set derivatives prices in such 
way that informed traders can be deterred from manipulating prices and thus cause 
market equilibrium to break down. Although this problem could be circumvented by 
introducing additional noise into the options market as in Back (1993), we believe our 
results to be important and interesting both from a theoretical as well as a practical 
point of view, in particular in view of the current debate concerning the regulation 
of derivatives markets. One extreme implication of our results is that derivatives 
markets would have to be closed down whenever there is asymmetric information 
regarding the underlying asset. This would be necessary to maintain stability in the 
underlying market.
We have shown how the smile pattern of implied volatility arises endogenously as a 
consequence of maintaining market stability. This is in contrast with the majority 
of the existing literature, where the smile is a result of additional exogenous noise 
or, as is the case in Platen and Schweizer (1998), of an equilibrium which is inher­
ently unstable. The shape of the smile pattern predicted by our model displays the 
same skewness that has been observed in most financial markets since the October 
1987 crash. This provides an interesting new angle on the interpretation of this phe­
nomenon. Our model explains the smile as a consequence of the attem pt to ensure 
market stability. This is consistent with market participants and regulators, hav­
ing been alerted by the 1987 crash, have implemented measures to reduce market
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manipulation and increase market stability.
5.A Appendix: Complements to  Section 5.4
L em m a 5.A .1 (F ilte rin g  P ro b lem ) Suppose the terminal pricing rule is given by 
h =  / ,  and that the informed trader follows the strategy defined in Theorem 5.4-1- In 
the case where no options are held, i.e. p = 0, the distribution 0, •) of the informed 
trader’s signal, St, conditional on the market maker’s information set, is normal with 
mean Y f  and variance
T
£(*) =  £  ds- 
In particular, at the terminal date T, the market maker can infer the signal St  with 
certainty, since St  = Yj> almost surely.
PROOF: The proof is identical to the one in Back and Pedersen (1996). For p =  0 and 
h =  / ,  the first-order conditions (5.12) and (5.13) for the informed trader’s problem 
simplify to j/*(6'r) =  S t ,  so that the informed trader’s strategy takes the form
6{t) =  a(t) (St -  Yts) .
Let := St — Yt; clearly,
d£t =  -a ( t )£ t dt -  oz {t) dWtz  +  <rs (t) dWts , 
dY* = a{t)it d tY (Tz{t)dW tz .
These can be interpreted as the transition and measurement equations of a linear 
continuous-time filtering problem. By linearity, the conditional distribution of
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given Yt9 is normal. Denote its mean by £t and its variance by E t . The correspond­
ing Kushner equation (cf. Kallianpur and Karandikar (1985)) implies the following
A A
system of equations for and E t:
d£t = -<*(<)?, dt +  -^ r-r  (a(t)E« -  <r|(i)) dUt,
^ Vt =  -2 a (f)E , +  o | ( i )  +  ( o t ( i ) t ,  -  a |( i ) )  .
Here, Ut is the innovation process, which is a standard Wiener process with respect 
to the filtration generated by the market maker’s information. It is easy to see that
A A
this system is solved by ( t = 0 and E t =  E(f), see Back and Pedersen (1996, Lemma
3).
□
Corollary 5. A .2 (R ationality) Under the assumptions of Lemma 5.A.1, the pric­
ing rule defined in Theorem 5.4-1 is rational, i.e. prices reflect expected terminal 
asset values conditional on the market maker’s information.
PROOF: From Lemma 5.A.1 we know that St conditional on Y f  is normal with mean 
Yte and variance E(f). Hence, S t  conditional on Yte is also normal with mean Y f and 
variance
E (t) +  cr|(s) ds = o2z (s) ds ,
which is the variance of Y% conditional on Y f . Hence, the expected terminal asset
value, conditional of Yte =  y , is
E l [ /Or) ],
which was to be shown.
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5.B Appendix: Complements to Section 5.5
P ro p o sitio n  5.B .1 (Sm ile P a tte rn )  For K  sufficiently small,
d K <p; K) <  o
PROOF: From the Black-Scholes option pricing formula it is immediate to see that
n n B S  f ) C B S
P - g p - V ,  P, K )  =  P, K) .
Differentiating (5.26) with respect to K , we find
oydmp F t r B S  .
= (£o, «(p)A, K)  -  ^ W p> A ,K )
=  i  (~K ’ *(*) a . K ) + ^ ( sorap, A, jo)
It is well-known that a European call option’s “vega”, i.e. the derivative of its Black- 
Scholes price with respect to volatility, is positive. Hence,
/  oy im p  \  /  f ) C B S  .  f ) C B S  • a \
sig“ ( K A  =  s‘gn \ ^ - K( p ) - g p ~ ( S o,  K(p)  A, K )  +  ~ g p - ( Eo"P> A, K ) j  .
Finally, it is straight-forward to see that
Hence, since K,(p) > 1, the term in the brackets eventually becomes negative for K  
small enough. This proves the desired result.
□
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Strike
Figure 5.1: The Smile Pattern 
This graph shows the implied volatility ( • )  compared to the signal volatility (o) as 
a function of  the option’s strike price. The informed trader is assumed to hold an 
option on 25% of the market.
C hapter 6
O ptions as Exchange R ate  
Policy Instrum ents
6.1 Introduction
Traditionally, central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market are imple­
mented almost exclusively by spot transactions. Historically, the intensity of inter­
vention increased steadily after the collapse of the Bretton Woods treaty. In the 
80’s, while the US adopted a “laissez-faire” approach, European central banks had 
to rely on intervention to keep exchange rates within the bounds of the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism. Europen intervention culminated in 1985, when the (G5) coun­
tries1 decided to “depreciate the dollar in an orderly fashion”, and even more in the 
late 80’s, when the (G6) agreed in the Louvre Accord of February 1987 to “stabilise
1US, Japan, Germany, France, UK
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exchange rates around their exisiting levels” .
The mechanics of traditional central bank intervention are comparatively straight­
forward. Central banks would simply buy or sell foreign currency in the spot market, 
thereby affecting money supply. In a “sterilised” intervention, this transaction is neu­
tralised by an offsetting domestic transaction. The survey by Edison (1993) studies 
the objectives and effectiveness of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange 
markets. Edison concludes that most central banks’ main objective is to “smooth 
nominal [and real] exchange rates and to achieve a target level of nominal exchange 
rates.” While the evidence with regards to sterilised interventions is inconclusive, 
unsterilised intervention has proven effective in controlling exchange rates. See also 
Almekinders (1995).
The use of options as instruments of exchange rate policy was first proposed by Tay­
lor (1995). He suggests that central banks should buy put options, written on the 
domestic currency. When the domestic currency depreciates as a result of a specula­
tive attack, Taylor argues, the option is deep in the money allowing the central bank 
to buy foreign currency at deflated rates, which can then be sold in the spot market 
to support the domestic currency. Breuer (1997) identifies five main drawbacks of 
the approach suggested by Taylor, the most important of which is related to what is 
called the destabilising effect of “delta hedging”: The options that the central bank 
buys are issued by market makers, who incur substantial risk from this transaction. 
To manage this risk, market makers would typically adopt trading strategies designed 
to replicate the option’s pay-off in order to eliminate the potential liability arising 
from their short option position. This kind of activity is usually referred to as “delta 
hedging” . In the scenario discussed here, the hedging strategy would require market 
makers to buy in rising markets and to sell when markets fall. Thus, the implemen­
tation of such strategies creates a positive feedback effect, amplifying exchange rate
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fluctuations. A detailed theoretical analysis of the destabilising effects of dynamic 
hedging is provided in Chapter 2. Empirical evidence supporting the importance 
of such effects has been reported, amongst others, by Malz (1995). He finds that 
even in large, extremely liquid foreign exchange markets, hedging activities can have 
a significant impact on exchange rates. Similar results have been reported by the 
Group of Ten (1993).
In view of this, both Wiseman (1996) and Breuer (1997) independently proposed 
an alternative way of utilising options as exchange rate policy instruments. Rather 
then buying put options, they argue, the central bank should write call options. As 
a result, market participants (other than the central bank itself) would end up with 
a net long position in option contracts. Strategies designed to hedge the risk in­
herent in such a position would exhibit negative elasticity, requiring the hedger to 
buy in falling markets and to sell when markets rise. Thus, Wiseman and Breuer 
argue, by issuing options the central bank could induce market participants to sta­
bilise exchange rates by delta hedging. The results of Chapter 2 confirm that if 
market participants content themselves with hedging their long position in currency 
options, a stabilising effect could indeed be achieved. However, the mechanism pro­
posed by Wiseman (1996) and Breuer (1997) makes very explicit use of the fact that 
exchange rates are affected by the hedgers’ trading activities. In other words, market 
manipulation is not an unwanted side-effect but rather the very tool by which the 
mechanism is implemented. This raises an important question: While it is true that 
the option induces extremely risk-averse market participants to hedge their positions 
thus stabilising rates, the situation might change drastically if instead the option is 
held by speculators who, being risk-neutral, have no incentive to hedge risk but to 
maximise expected profits.
In this chapter, we consider the situation in which a speculator, having bought the
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option issued by the central bank, instead of simply hedging her position strategically 
exploits the leveraged position in the market provided by the option. As theoretical 
framework, we chose the continuous-time model developed in Chapter 4, which in 
turn is based on the Back (1992) model. In contrast to the latter however, we assume 
prices to be given by Walrasian equilibrium rather than set by a market maker. The 
risk-neutral speculator interacts with “information traders” , who base their demand 
for foreign exchange on the flow of fundamental “news”. We assume that the central 
bank’s objective is to stabilise exchange rates and to keep them within a given “target 
zone”. While it is debatable whether this objective is in line with maximising social 
welfare, the discussion of this question is well beyond the scope of this chapter. We 
rather content ourselves with noting that this type of objective on behalf of central 
banks is supported by the empirical evidence, as outlined for example in Edison
(1993). In order to achieve their objective, the central bank can intervene using spot 
transactions or by issuing options. In addition to trading in the spot market, the 
speculator may purchase the options issued by the central bank.
It turns out that in the absence of options, the speculator has no incentive to manip­
ulate markets. In fact, in this case it is optimal not to trade at all in the spot foreign 
exchange market. The reason for this is that any potential gain from manipulation 
is neutralised by the price pressure that results when the speculator “unwinds” her 
position to realise these gains. In other words, in the absence of options it is only 
the arrival of “bad news” and the reaction to this by information traders that might 
push exchange rates outside the target zone. The violation of the target zone hence 
occurs as a consequence of rational behaviour based on the fundamental value of the 
domestic currency, rather than as the result of a speculative attack. An option issued 
by the central bank however creates an alternative way for the speculator to realise 
the gains from market manipulation. Upon arrival of “bad news”, when information
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traders cause the domestic currency to depreciate, the option creates an incentive for 
the speculator to squeeze exchange rates even further. Scenarios can arise in which 
without speculation, the central bank’s foreign currency reserves would have been 
sufficient to support the domestic currency, while they cannot sustain the additional 
pressure arising from the speculator’s manipulation. In other words, instead of pro­
tecting against speculative attacks, options issued by the central bank in fact create 
an additional vehicle for such attacks.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce 
the model and the mathematical framework for our analysis. The following section 
gives a brief account of the speculator’s optimisation problem, following closely the 
arguments developed in Chapter 4. Section 6.4 analyses the structure of equilibria in 
our model. Two distinct cases are considered; first the case in which the speculator 
simply hedges her option position, and second the case in which she acts strategically. 
Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 The M odel
We formulate the model in the general framework developed in Chapter 4, which in 
turn is based on the model introduced in Kyle (1985) and Back (1992). However, 
while in the latter prices are set by a competitive market maker, we consider here a 
Walrasian auction mechanism to determine equilibrium prices.
T r a d e d  A s s e t s :
Two assets are traded continuously over the period from time zero to some final date 
T. The first asset is a riskless domestic bond or money market account. We use the 
bond as numeraire, normalising its price to one thus making interest rates implicit in
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our model. The second asset, which we shall refer to as “foreign currency”, is risky. 
We denote the foreign currency’s price at time t by Pt , and refer to Pt sometimes 
also as the exchange rate. Note that this is the inverse of the notion of exchange rate 
as it is used in the U.K., where it specifies the amount of foreign currency that can 
be bought with one unit of domestic currency.
A g e n t s :
There are three types of agents in the economy, information traders, the central 
bank, and a rational speculator. Without at this point being specific about the 
precise nature of information traders, we assume that their demand for the foreign 
currency at any time t , given a quoted exchange rate p, is given by the demand 
function
p*-¥ D (t ,Z u p). (6.1)
Here, Zt summarises the information available to information traders, which deter­
mines their perception of the “true” value of the exchange rate. We can interpret Zt 
as a flow of macroeconomic “news” affecting the fundamental value of the domestic 
versus the foreign currency. We will provide more specific examples of such demand 
functions in later sections. For the moment, we content ourselves with assuming that 
D (t,z ,p )  is differentiable and
£ d >  0, ± D < t .  (6.2)
In other words, a decline in Zt means “bad news” for the foreign currency and “good 
news” for the domestic currency, causing information traders to short some of their 
foreign currency holdings.
The central bank on the other hand, implements an exchange rate policy aimed at 
stabilising exchange rates. In order to achieve this, the central bank may trade on
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the foreign exchange market. More specifically, the central bank’s demand at time t 
for the foreign currency, given a quoted rate p , is given by the policy function
pi-» C (t ,Z u p). (6.3)
Note in particular that we allow the central bank’s exchange rate policy to depend 
on Zt , i.e. we assume (quite reasonably) that macroeconomic news are observable 
by the central bank. Since the central bank seeks to stabilise exchange rates, it is 
reasonable to assume that it sells foreign currency when its price is too high, and 
buys it when the price is low. More specifically, we assume
| c < ° ,  | c <  0. (6 .4 )
Note in particular that, since the central bank’s objective is exchange rate stabil­
isation, it might be forced to act against fundamental macroeconomic news. This 
is reflected in the non-positive relation between the information process Zt and the 
central bank’s intervention function. In order to study speculative attacks on the 
domestic currency, we also assume that the central bank’s reserves of foreign cur­
rency are limited. Formally, we express this by assuming that C (t,z ,p )  is bounded 
from below, C (t , z,p) > —C_ for some constant C_> 0. We will provide more explicit 
specifications of the central bank’s policy function later.
The third player in the market, the rational speculator, is assumed to be a risk- 
neutral, perfectly informed profit maximiser. The speculator in this model plays 
the role of the “large trader” in Chapter 4. At any time t , the speculator observes 
Zt and determines his or her demand X t for the foreign currency. For reasons of 
expositional simplicity, we restrict the speculator to using trading strategies 0(t) so 
that the demand Xt is given by dXt =  6(t) dt. Note in particular that this assumption 
forces the demand process Xt  to be absolutely continuous. Although this assumption 
might seem unnecessarily restrictive, it can be shown that even if the speculator is
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allowed to choose from a larger strategy set, the optimal strategy will turn out to be 
absolutely continuous; see Back (1992).
In order to be able to study the effectiveness of options used as exchange rate policy 
instrument, we furthermore allow the central bank to issue options, written on the 
foreign currency. We assume that at the time when the central bank issues these 
options, it cannot observe whether the buyer is an information trader or a speculator. 
We assume that the option, if exercised, pays off an amount (p(Pr) at time T. A 
simple example would be a European call option with strike price K , in which case 
<p (Pt ) =  (Pt — K).  Options are sold only at date zero, and cannot be traded 
thereafter. In addition to the trading strategy 6(t), the speculator hence has to 
choose an exercise policy I  for the option, which we assume to be =  1 if the option 
is exercised and =  0 if not. As in Chapter 4, the speculator’s objective is then to 
choose a trading strategy 6(t) and an exercise policy I  such as to maximise expected 
terminal wealth. Note that both the optimal strategy as well as the exercise policy 
will depend on the number of options the speculator holds (which could be zero).
E q u il ib r iu m :
In the context of foreign exchange markets, it is appropriate to assume that the total 
supply of foreign currency is zero, reflecting the fact that all that matters is the net 
balance of foreign currency held by domestic traders versus domestic currency held 
by traders in the foreign country. The equilibrium exchange rate at any time t is then 
given as the solution Pt of the market clearing equation
D (t , Zf, Pt) +  C{t, Z*, Pt) +  Xt = 0. (6.5)
In order to bring the speculator’s profit maximisation problem into the formal frame­
work of Chapter 4, we define the pricing rule H ( t , z, x) associated with the equilib­
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rium equation (6.5) implicitly via
D (t , 2 , H (t , x , z)) +  C(£, 2 , H (t , x, z)) +  a; =  0. (6.6)
By differentiating this equation, we find that the hypotheses (4.1) imposed on the 
pricing rule in Chapter 4, are satisfied if
-^-D + ^ -C >  0 .
OZ oz
As we did in Chapters 4 and 5, we denote by corresponding lowercase letters any 
function evaluated at the terminal date T, for example, we write h(x , z) =  H (T , x, z). 
The terminal value to the speculator of the foreign currency is, just as in Section 4.2.2, 
the price at which the speculator can “unwind” his or her position in the market at 
time T. Denote this price by P£. Obviously, P£ =  /i(0, Zt ). Since there is no 
informational asymmetry in this model, the speculator’s expectation at time T  of 
the terminal value of the asset is hence also given by P%. Note that this notion of 
“unwind price” is in contrast with the majority of the literature. In most studies of 
similar problems of optimal trading, the terminal value of the asset is simply given 
by its current market price. In other words, this approach neglects the price pressure 
arising from the attem pt to actually realise potential gains from trade. We therefore 
believe our specification to be more realistic. Note also that this specification actually 
reduces the speculator’s incentive to manipulate markets, a fact which allows us to 
place more emphasis on the effect of options as central bank policy instrument. More 
precisely, in the absence of the option, any potential gain from market manipulation 
is consumed by the depreciation caused by the supply pressure that arises when 
the speculator “unloads” her position in the market. The option however allows 
the speculator to realise the gains from market manipulation without affecting the 
underlying exchange rates.
Finally, we define the “fundamental value” of the foreign currency as the equilibrium
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price that would obtain in the absence of both the speculator as well as the central 
bank. Denote this value at time t by P F. Obviously, P F =  H F{t, Z t), where H F(t , z) 
is the solution of the equation
D ( t ,z ,H F(t,z)) = 0.
We introduce this value only as a benchmark, since it reflects the information traders’ 
perception of what the exchange rate should be in the absence of speculation or 
intervention, given their information. We will use this benchmark in Section 6.4 to 
demonstrate how in our model situations are likely to occure in which,
(a) the fundamental exchange rate is well within the central bank’s target zone, so 
that in the absence of speculation no intervention would be necessary,
(b) even when the speculator is active, there is no incentive for manipulation, so 
that still no intervention is needed, but
(c) if the speculator holds an option, the manipulation incentive thus created is 
strong enough for the exchange rate to be pushed outside the target zone even 
though the central bank exhausts all its foreign currency reserves in the attem pt 
to support the domestic currency.
6.2.1 M athem atical Setup and N otation
As in Chapter 4, we will assume for expositional simplicity that the fundamental 
news process, Z t, is given by a generalised Brownian motion. More specifically, we 
assume that Zt is a solution to the stochastic differential equation
dZt = crz(t) dWtz , (6.7)
Chapter 6. Options as Exchange Rate Policy Instruments 159
where W f  is a standard Brownian motion, and crz(t) is a deterministic function. 
Note however that the results of this chapter can easily be extended to more general 
diffusion processes. A trading strategy for the speculator is a process 6(t), adapted 
to the filtration generated by Zt, such that the corresponding demand process
X f  : = X ° +  f  6{s)ds (6.8)
Jo
is well-defined. Note that we assume the speculator to possess perfect information 
regarding the structure of the economy, in particular the information trader’s demand 
function D (t,z ,p )  and the central bank’s policy function C (t,z ,p ) .  Thus, the news 
process Zt is a sufficient state variable for the speculator’s optimisation problem.
Let Pt'z be a weak solution to (6.7) and (6.8) conditional on Zt = z and X f  = x , 
defined on some suitable measurable space (f2, F).  We will omit the superscripts x or 
z whenever there is no ambiguity, and we also write P x,z for Pq'z. Denote by (Ft)t>o 
the filtration on (D ,^ ) generated by Zt, augmented to satisfy the “usual conditions” , 
see Karatzas and Shreve (1988, Section 1.2) for details.
6.3 The Speculator’s Problem
In this section, we will outline the solution of the speculator’s optimisation problem. 
From the speculator’s point of view, the equilibrium pricing rule H (t,X t,  Zt) can 
be considered exogenously given, so that the optimisation problem to be solved is a 
special case of the problem considered in Chapter 4. Therefore, we give here only a 
brief outline of the main result, Theorem 6.3.1. A detailed exposition can be found 
in Chapter 4.
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6.3.1 O bjective Function
The speculator’s objective is to maximise expected terminal wealth. Following the 
intuition developed in Chapter 4, terminal wealth in the absence of the option is 
given by
TBt + Vt-Xt = B0 + Vt-X0+ I (VT - P t-)9(t)dt.  (6.9)
Jo
Since Bo and Xo are exogenously given and thus irrelevant for the optimisation prob­
lem, we will assume Bo =  Xo =  0 and focus on the last term in the above expression. 
Given any strategy 0{t), the dynamics of the speculator’s demand process, X f ,  are 
given by (6.8). Equilibrium prices are given by the pricing rule Pt =  H ( t , X f , Zt). 
Recall that from the speculator’s point of view, the terminal value of the foreign 
currency is given by the “unwind value” P£ =  h(0, Z t) .  In the context of Chapter 
4, we can formalise this as f ( z )  =  h(0,z). Consequently, the expected terminal value 
at any earlier point in time t < T  is given by F ( t , z ) = Ef[ f (Z x )  ]. Using the law 
of iterated expectations, we can write the speculator’s expected terminal wealth for 
given strategy 0{t), conditional on Xo =  x, Z q =  z, as
, z t) - H ( t , x ° , z t) )e(t) dt 
=: n  ( t ,x ° , z t)
Note that the function I l ( t ,X f , Zt) has an economic interpretation: It describes the 
expected marginal benefit of holding an extra unit of the risky asset, F ( t , Zt), minus 
the current purchasing price, H ( t ,X f  ,Z t). Following our convention, we write
7r(x ,z)  := II(T, x ,z )  =  f ( z )  — h(x,z).
We now incorporate the option into the speculator’s objective function. For this part 
of the analysis, we take the number of options held by the speculator as exogenously
E x' f T (P£ -  Pt) 0{t) dt = E x,z f  (F{t 
Jo Jo v-----
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given. Recall that the option, if exercised, pays off an amount <p(Pr) at time T. 
Since the price Pt at time T  is given by Pt  =  we shorten notation by
setting ^>(x, z) := <p(h(x, z)). Hence, if the speculator holds p units of such an option, 
expected terminal wealth becomes
E x’z f  n ( t , X ? , Z t)0(t )d t  +  pI<t>{X%.,ZT) . (6.10)
. Jo J
Here, I  denotes the exercise policy, which we assume to be =  1 if the option is 
exercised, and =  0 if not.
6.3.2 Adm issible Strategies
The choice variables for the speculator are the trading strategy 6{t) and the exercise 
policy I. Note that due to our assumption of absolute continuity, the demand process 
X t is automatically predictable. This is in line with the intuition that the decision 
on what assets to hold over any period of time must be based upon the information 
available at the beginning of that period. It is also important for technical reasons, 
see for example Harrison and Pliska (1981) for a detailed elaboration on this issue. 
On the other hand, since the decision whether to exercise the option or not is made 
at time T, it can be contingent on all information available to the speculator at that 
time.
Formally, an admissible policy is a pair (9, /) , where I  is an .^-m easurable random 
variable taking values in {0,1}, and 0{t) is a process adapted to (Ft)t>o such that
•T
V 9' % x , z )  := E\ J  n(r, X eT, Z t ) 0 ( t ) dr + pI<j>{XeT, ZT)
is well-defined for every x , z  £ IR and t € [0,T]. We can interpret V e,r(t, x, z) as the 
gain that is made starting at Zt = z  and X f  = x at time t and following trading
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strategy 6 and exercise policy I  thereafter. The speculator’s problem is thus to find 
an admissible policy (0,1) which maximises V 6,I(t, x, z). As usual in the theory of 
stochastic control, we define the value function of the problem as
V*(t, x , z) := sup V e,I(t , x , z). (6.11)
(6J)
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem  6.3.1 (O ptim al Strategy) There exists a non-degenerate solution to 
the speculator’s problem if and only if  the equilibrium pricing rule satisfies H ( t , x, z) =  
E*[ h(x,ZT)  ]. In this case, there exist functions X *(t,z )  and I*(z) such that the 
optimum is attained by exercise policy I * =  I*(Zt), and any trading strategy of the 
form
8 ( t ) := a ( t ) (X * ( t ,Z t) - X > ) ,  (6.12)
where a(£) is any deterministic function with a(t)  — Y oo as t — Y T  fast enough to 
force the demand process X f  to converge to X*(t, Zt) as t — Y T.
Note that the necessary condition, H ( t ,x , z ) =  Ef[ h (x ,Z x)  ] can be interpreted as 
a no-arbitrage condition, since it requires the equilibrium exchange rate process in 
the absence of the speculator to be a martingale. In the examples considered below, 
this condition is satisfied by construction.
We give a brief outline of the proof of this theorem in the following section. A
detailed exposition can be found in Section 4.3. For general reference on the theory
of controlled diffusion processes see Fleming and Soner (1993) or Krylov (1980).
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6.3.3 P roof o f Theorem 6.3.1
The proof of Theorem 6.3.1 is essentially an application of Theorem 4.3.1 in Chapter 
4. As discussed there, the value function V *(t,x ,z )  can be characterised as the 
solution to the Bellman equation subject to appropriate boundary conditions. In the 
case considered here, the Bellman equation takes the form
s'y’{v< + \ a2zv” + (v* + Tl)0} = °- (6-13)
Since this equation is linear in 0, in order for the supremum to be finite the co­
efficient of 6 must be zero. We can thus split up the Bellman Equation into the
following two separate equations:
V, +  ~a2z Vzz =  0, (6.14)
V* +  n  =  0. (6.15)
Equation (6.14) is just the heat equation associated with two-dimensional Brownian 
motion. The Feynman-Kac representation theorem (see Karatzas and Shreve (1988, 
Theorem 4.4.2)) allows us to write its solution (if it exists) in the following form:
V ( t ,x ,z )  = E t t V ( T , x , Z T)} .
Equation (6.15) has a more economic interpretation. It states that the marginal 
gain Vy( t ,x ,z )  from holding an extra unit of the risky asset at time t , must equal 
the purchasing cost, H (t ,x ,z ) ,  minus the expected marginal benefit, F{t,z) .  For a 
detailed elaboration on the intuition behind this, see Section 4.3.4.
O p t i m a l  S t r a t e g y
Following the arguments developed in Section 4.3.5, the boundary condition for the 
Bellman equation will help us pinpoint the optimal strategy. Suppose the value
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function V * ( t ,x ,z ) exists and is sufficiently smooth. We know then that is must 
solve the Bellman equations (6.14) and (6.15). For any given admissible strategy 
6(t), Ito’s Lemma applied to the process V *(t,X f,  Zt), together with (6.14) and 
(6.15) allows us to write
V (0 , x, z) =  y ^ ( 0 ,  x, z) +  E z \ V*(T, X 9t , Zt ) -  pH ( X bt , Zt ) 1. (6.16)
=: q\X°T, Zr, I)
The above equation has the following interpretation; the quantity E z[ q*(Xj<, Z t ', I)  ] 
measures the difference between the value Vfl,/(0, x , z) of any given policy pair (0 ,1) 
and the maximal achievable value V*(0,x,z). The function q*(Xj; Z t ] I)  can thus 
be identified as the loss incurred by the speculator by deviating from the optimal 
strategy. In particular we deduce that E z[ q*(X%<, Z t ‘, I)]  must be non-negative, and 
zero at the optimum. We will reverse this argument to construct the optimal policy 
and value function. More specifically, we will construct a function q*(x,z]I)  and 
“optimality conditions” x*{z) and I*(z) in such a way that q*(x, z\ I)  >  0 and =  0 if 
and only if x =  x*(z) and I  =  I*(z). Based on this we use (6.14) and the Feynman- 
Kac representation to construct a candidate V *(t,x ,z )  for the value function which 
satisfies (6.13). From this and the above arguments we can conclude that an exercise 
policy I * ( Z t ) and a trading strategy which ensures that Xj> =  x * ( Z t ) will attain 
the optimum, and that V"*(^,s,y) is indeed the value function of the speculator’s 
problem. The formal proofs for all these statements can be found in Chapter 4. We 
interpret a;*(s) as the optimal “target position” towards which the speculator should 
trade as t — > T, conditional on Z t  = z. This is similar to the arguments presented 
in Back (1992) and Back and Pedersen (1996).
As shown in Chapter 4, evaluating the Bellman equation (6.15) at t — T  implies that
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the loss function q*(x, z; I)  must be of the form
p x * ( z )
q * (x ,z] I)=  /  7T(( ,z)d£  + pl*(z)<l>(x*(z),z)-pl(/>(x,z), (6.17)
*/ X
for suitably chosen x*(z) and I*(z). An intuitive interpretation of this equation is 
given in Chapter 4. By construction, the loss function defined in (6.17) satisfies 
the desired “boundary conditions” q*(x*(z), z; I*(z)) =  0. Our remaining task is 
hence to determine x*(z) and I*(z) in such a way that for each z the mapping
(x , I ) q*(x,z;I)  has a global minimum at x =  x*(z) and I  = I*(z). Following
the arguments developed in Chapter 4, we first keep the option exercise decision 
fixed and construct optimal targets x\(z)  and x$(z) conditional on the option being 
exercised or not, respectively. We can then establish the optimal exercise decision 
I*(z) endogenously. As shown in Chapter 4, the conditional target positions X q ( z )  
and x'Kz) can be characterised via the first-order conditions
f ( z )  =  h(xl(z),z) ,  and (6.18)
f ( z )  = h(x \(z),z)  -  p(j>x(xl(z),z) .  (6.19)
As shown in Chapter 4, it is then optimal for the speculator to exercise the option if 
and only if
[  *r(f, z) < p</>(xl(z), z). (6.20)
J x \ ( z )
The economic interpretation of (6.20) is as follows. Recall that X q ( z )  is the optimal 
target position conditional on no exercise. Hence the left-hand side of (6.20) is the 
loss incurred by trading towards x\(z)  instead of X q ( z ) .  The right-hand side however 
represents the gain made from the option’s pay-off. Hence (6.20) states that the 
speculator should exercise the option if and only if the loss incurred by deviating from 
the optimal position is outweighed by the option’s pay-off. Since by (6.20), optimality 
of exercise depends only on z, we can define the optimal exercise indicator I*(z) in
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the obvious way. Intuitively, the unconditional target x*(z) should then equal x\(z)  
whenever exercising the option is optimal, and X q ( z )  otherwise. Therefore we define
x*(z) := I*(z)x\(z)  +  (1 -  I*(z))x*Q{z).
The loss function q*(x,z',I) defined via (6.17) can then indeed be shown to have 
a global minimum at x =  x*{z) and I  = I*(z), see Proposition 4.A.3. From the 
arguments outlined in the beginning of this section it should now be intuitively clear 
that any strategy 0(t) which ensures that X f  — > x * ( Z t ) as t — > T  is a candidate 
for the optimum. We hence set X *(t,z )  := Ef[ x * ( Z t ) ] and define
9( t )  :=  a ( t )  ( X * ( t ,  Zt) -  X •) ,
where a(t) is a deterministic function with a(t) — > oo as t — > T  fast enough to 
make X f  converge to x * ( Z t ) as t — > T. A rigorous proof for the optimality of 6(t) 
is given in the appendix to Chapter 4.
6.4 Equilibrium
In this section, we will analyse the structure of the equilibria that arise in two quite 
different scenarios. First, we consider the case in which the speculator does not 
exploit her market power but instead simply hedges the option position, as assumed 
in Wiseman (1996) and Breuer (1997). Second, we study the case in which the 
speculator takes advantage of the fact that the option provides an opportunity to 
benefit from market manipulation. This case will be the main focus of our attention. 
Unsurprisingly, in the former case the presence of the option indeed does dampen 
the fluctuations caused by fundamental news, thus achieving the desired stabilisation 
of exchange rates. In the latter, speculative case however, the effect is reversed:
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While in the absence of the option, the speculator has no incentive to manipulate 
markets and may even act in the central bank’s favour, the introduction of the option 
provides a way to benefit from manipulation and thus creates an additional vehicle 
for speculative attacks on the domestic currency.
6.4.1 H edging Equilibrium
As a benchmark, we consider the case in which the speculator does not fully exploit 
her market power but simply implements a strategy designed to hedge the long 
option position. Note that, since the speculator’s trades affect underlying equilibrium 
exchange rates, solving the hedging problem is far more involved then in the classic 
Black-Scholes model. According to the classic theory, the strategy needed to replicate 
an option’s pay-off can be characterised as the solution to a linear partial differential 
equation. However, if the underlying market is imperfectly elastic, the activity of 
option hedging or replication creates a feedback effect which affects the underlying 
equilibrium price process. See Chapter 2 for a detailed elaboration on this issue.
The hedging problem in finitely elastic markets was solved by Jarrow (1994) in dis­
crete time, and later by Frey (1996) in continuous time. Frey considers a reduced-form 
equilibrium specification, in which prices are given by a “reaction function”, depend­
ing on the large trader’s position and some exogenous stochastic factor. The pricing 
rule derived in (6.6) is a special case of such a reaction function, where the role of the 
stochastic factor is played by the news process Zt. Frey shows that, if the option’s 
pay-off function is sufficiently regular, there exists a unique replicating strategy for 
the large trader. This strategy is characterised by a non-linear partial differential 
equation, which implies in particular that the cost of replication is not additive, i.e. 
replicating two options does not necessarily cost twice as much as replicating one.
Chapter 6. Options as Exchange Rate Policy Instruments 168
However, the one feature of replicating strategies which is essential for the analy­
sis here remains valid even in this more complex situation: Strategies designed to 
replicate convex pay-off patterns exhibit positive price elasticity, they require buying 
in a rising market and selling when prices fall. See Frey (1996) for details. Con­
versely, a strategy designed to hedge the risk of an option position exhibits negative 
price elasticity. As a consequence, if the speculator hedges her position, the result­
ing equilibrium exchange rate, Pt , is less volatile than its fundamental level, P f . 
In other words, the speculator’s hedging activity indeed serves to stabilise exchange 
rates. In particular, when fundamental news are bad, and information traders would 
sell domestic currency thus pushing rates outside the central bank’s target zone, the 
speculator’s hedging strategy requires selling foreign currency thus supporting the 
domestic currency.
6.4.2 Speculative Equilibrium
We now turn to the case which is the main focus of our attention. We assume that 
rather than simply hedging the option’s pay-off, the speculator acts strategically 
such as to maximise expected terminal wealth. We have seen in Section 6.3 that the 
speculator’s optimal strategy can be characterised in terms of a “target position” 
x * ( Z t ) towards which she should trade, conditional on the news process Z t . The 
target position is characterised by the first-order condition
f ( Z T) = h(x*(Zr), ZT) -  p r ( Z T) M ^ ( Z T), ZT) . (6.21)
=: r T
In equilibrium, we have X t  =  x * ( Z t ) ,  so  that the first term on the right-hand side 
of the above equation is simply the equilibrium exchange rate, h(x*(ZT), Z t)  =  Pt- 
Recall that the value of the speculator’s foreign currency position is determined by
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the price at which this position can be “unwound” in the market. Formally, this can 
be written as f (Z x )  =  P so that the first-order condition takes the form
Pt =  Pt +  P^t - (6.22)
The supply pressure resulting from unwinding a large position will cause exchange 
rates to depreciate, thus neutralizing any potential gain the speculator could have 
derived from manipulating exchange rates. Thus, in the absence of the option (p =  0), 
the speculator has no incentive to trade at all. More precisely, if p =  0, condition 
(6.22) simply requires Pt =  P }, which implies x*(Zt ) =  0. Hence we can interpret 
the term  Ft  as the additional price pressure resulting from the speculator’s incentive 
to manipulate exchange rates when she holds an option.
P ro p o s itio n  6.4.1 (E qu ilib rium ) In equilibrium, exchange rates satisfy
Pt  =  Pt  pFt -
In particular, in the absence of options (p = 0), the speculator does not trade at all.
Note that, since Ft  > 0, the above equilibrium equation implies that Pj< > Pf?. In 
other words, the equilibrium exchange rate in the absence of speculation will always 
be below the fundamental level. However, if the speculator holds options (p >  0), 
situations are likely to occur in which
P% <  P f  <  P% +  pVT .
In other words, while in the absence of the option, exchange rates would not exceed 
their fundamental level, P%', the existence of the option creates an incentive for the 
speculator to push exchange rates beyond P%. The intuition behind this result is as 
follows. From the analysis in Section 6.3 we know that the speculator’s incentive to
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manipulate exchange rates is stronger the more the option is likely to end up in the 
money. In other words, the speculator responds to the arrival of bad news regarding 
the domestic currency by manipulating against it, i.e. by increasing her position in 
the foreign currency. This effect is entirely due to the existence of the option! Rather 
than protecting the domestic currency from speculative attacks, options issued by the 
central banks in fact create an additional vehicle for such an attack.
6.4.3 A n Example with Linear Dem and
In this section we will analyse a specific example in which we assume for simplicity 
that the information traders’ demand function is linear. More precisely, recall that 
the “fundamental” exchange rate is given by P F =  H F(t, Zt). We assume that 
information traders buy foreign currency if the exchange rate is below its fundamental 
level and sell if it is above. Formally, we assume
D (t,z ,p )  = -  (H F(t,z)  - p )  ,K
which is obviously compatible with the definition of H F(t,z).  To give an explicit 
example, we may assume that P F =  H F(t, Zt) is simply an exponential martingale,
H F(t, Zt) =  £t(Zt) := exp ( z t -  i  j f  a2z (s)ds^ .
Moreover, we assume the central bank’s exchange rate policy to be of a very simple 
form. Suppose the central bank’s objective simply is to ensure that the exchange rate 
at the terminal date, Pt , does not exceed some intervention level Pj<. To simplify 
m atters even further, we assume that at the terminal date T, the central bank does 
nothing if the exchange rate is in the target zone (below Py), but sells all foreign 
currency reserves if it is not. In other words, the central bank’s policy function at
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tim e T  can be written as
10 i f p < P z -Cif
Strictly speaking, this example violates the differentiability assumptions made in Sec­
tion 6.2. However, the arguments developed below can be obtained by approximating 
the central bank’s policy function by sufficiently smooth functions and passing to the 
limit. Figure 6.1 shows the pricing rule at the terminal date arising from this spec­
ification. It is straight-forward to see that the speculator’s first-order conditions in
Price
P i -
Figure 6.1: Pricing Rule
this case are given by
Pj = h(xg, Zt )for /  =  0,
P} =  h(x\,Zi •) — pfor /  =  1.
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From this we can deduce that Xq =  0, and
if +  pK , < then x\  =  p, and
if P j  +  p K  >  P^, then =  C_ +  p .
In other words, if there is no option, then the speculator will have no incentive to 
trade, and the terminal exchange rate will be h(0, Zt ). However, if the speculator
does hold an option, it might be optimal to hold foreign currency. The intuition
behind this is simple. Without the option, the speculator cannot realise any gain 
from manipulating the exchange rate, since any potential gain will be neutralised 
by the price decline arising from the supply pressure when the speculator’s position 
in foreign currency is “unloaded” in the market. However, the option provides an 
alternative way to benefit from market manipulation, since its pay-off is settled at 
the equilibrium exchange rate before the speculator unwinds his or her position.
P ro p o s itio n  6.4.2 For any choice of parameters for which the option’s strike price, 
K , is below the intervention threshold, P f, there always exist outcomes with positive 
probability such that
(a) the fundamental exchange rate is within the central bank’s target zone, P% < 
P f, so that in the absence of speculation, intervention is not necessary,
(b) even when the speculator is active, without the option (p = 0) there is no 
incentive for manipultation, so that the equilibrium exchange rate equals the 
fundamental exchange rate, Pt  =  P>f < P?, and no intervention is necessary, 
but
(c) i f  the speculator does hold an option (p > 0), the equilibrium exchange rate 
will be pushed outside the target zone, Pt  > P f, even though the central bank 
exhausts all its foreign currency reserves to support the domestic currency.
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PROOF: We focus on those values of Z j  for which P^ =  < Pj-, but P^ + np > P f,
i.e.
h(0, Z t ) < P? < h(0, Z t ) +  Kp.
In other words, the fundamental exchange rate is within the target zone, but the 
marginal benefit from the option carries the exchange rate outside this region. An 
example of such a situation is depicted in Figure 6.2. Obviously, since K p  > 0, the set 
of such Zt:  is non-empty. In this case, the optimal trading targets for the speculator 
are #5 =  0 and x\ — C_ + p. Note that if the speculator trades towards X t  = 
the equilibrium exchange rate would be P£ +  Kp > P^. That is, although the central 
bank in this case sells off all its foreign currency reserves, it does not succeed in 
keeping the exchange rate within the target zone.
Recall from Section 6.3.3 that x\  is the speculator’s optimal trading target only in 
the case when it is optimal to exercise the option. It hence remains to show that 
there exists a set of Z t  with positive probability for which it is optimal to exercise. 
From Section 6.3.3 we also know that it is optimal to exercise the option if and only 
if
f  {Pt -  *(£, Zt )) d t < p  {h{x\, ZT) - K ) .  (6.23)
J X*
It is immediate to see that the integral on the left-hand side of inequality (6.23) 
corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 6.2. A straight-forward calculation gives
j P  {Pt -  ZT)) dt = Q  (P j -  J ? )  +  \ kP2.
The right-hand side of (6.23) is obviously equal to p (P j — K)  +  We can hence 
conclude that sufficient for optimality of exercise is
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Note that the right-hand side of (6.24) is simply a weighted average of K  and jRf. 
Since by assumption, K  < P?, it is obviously always possible to find a range of Z t 
for which
Pj + Kp > Pj > Pj >
P  +  L l
Since by construction, the distribution of P% has full support on IR+, it follows that 




x\ — C_ +  p
Figure 6.2: Optimal Exercise Decision
6.5 Conclusion
We have studied the theoretical implications of the proposal by Wiseman (1996) 
and Breuer (1997), according to which central banks should issue options in order 
to stabilise foreign exchange rates. We have shown that the desired stabilisation 
effect relies on the assumption that the buyers of such options content themselves




pO   jdF
I rp  ---- I  rp
optimum without option
Figure 6.3: Equilibrium
with hedging their positions, rather than exploit strategically the levaraged position 
in the market provided by the option. Our results confirm that, if this assumption 
is true, the implementation of the corresponding hedging strategies would indeed 
reduce exchange rate volatility.
More importantly however, we have shown that if the assumption fails to hold, i.e. 
if speculators strategically exploit their market power, the existence of such options 
might in fact achieve the opposite of the desired stabilisation effect. In the ab­
sence of options, there is no incentive for speculators to manipulate exchange rates, 
and fluctuations merely reflect changes in the economic fundamentals. By issuing 
options, the central bank in fact creates an additional incentive for market manip­
ulation. Upon arrival of “bad news” , when rational traders adjust their positions 
thus causing the domestic currency to depreciate, the option creates an incentive for 
the speculator to squeeze exchange rates even further. Scenarios can arise in which 
without speculation, the central bank’s foreign currency reserves would have been 
sufficient to support the domestic currency, while they cannot sustain the additional
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pressure arising from the speculator’s manipulation. In other words, instead of pro­
tecting against speculative attacks, options issued by the central bank in fact create 
an additional vehicle for such an attack.
While the mechanism proposed by Wiseman (1996) and Breuer (1997) can be shown 
to achieve the desired exchange rate stabilisation in some circumstances, it possesses 
an even greater potential for destabilisation in others. We therefore believe that de­
spite its potential benefits, the risk inherent in the proposed meachnism is intolerably 
high.
An obvious question ensuing from the discussion in this chapter is whether there are 
alternative ways in which options could be used as exchange rate policy instruments 
without creating an unnecessary risk exposure. More specifically, future research 




In this thesis, we have studied the manner in which different types of trading be­
haviour affects the nature of equilibrium prices when markets are imperfectly elastic.
We have seen that the additional demand generated by dynamic hedging strategies 
creates feedback effects which alter the volatility structure of the underlying price 
process, thus destabilising prices. These results are in line with the empirical evi­
dence. Due to this effect, simple Black-Scholes strategies are no longer sufficient to 
perfectly replicate an option’s pay-offs. However, we were able to demonstrate that 
such strategies can still be used to “super-replicate” the option’s pay-off, even if their 
implementation causes a violation of the very assumptions they are derived from.
Further, we have investigated the manner in which technical trading affects equi­
librium exchange rates. Technical trading leads to feedback effects similar to those 
inherent in the implementation of dynamic hedging strategies. As a consequence, 
technical trading causes exchange rate fluctuations of a magnitude far beyond the 
level justified by changes in the economic fundamentals. In other words, technical
177
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trading leads to the emergence of irrational price bubbles. Our results demonstrate 
that, while being ex-ante irrational, their very existence can make technical trading 
rules ex-post profitable. In other words, technical trading can be seen as a kind of 
“self-fulfilling prophecy”. These results are in line with the empirical evidence.
We have analysed the interplay between options markets and the markets for the 
underlying asset in the presence of asymmetric information. An option, held by a 
large, informed trader, creates an incentive for this trader to manipulate prices in 
order to push the option into the money. In other words, the option induces the 
informed trader to create a manipulative price bubble on the underlying market 
at the expense of uninformed traders. As a consequence, equilibria can only exist 
if the potential gain from manipulation is incorporated into the option’s price. The 
resulting equilibrium option price schedule gives rise to the “smile pattern” of implied 
volatility. The particular shape of the smile pattern predicted by our model is in line 
with the empirical observations made after the 1987 market crash. In view of our 
results, the post-crash shape of the smile could be interpreted as an indication that 
increased awareness amongst market participants and regulators has lead to a better 
alignment of option prices with the markets for the underlying.
Finally, we have analysed the implications of imperfect elasticity for the use of options 
as central bank exchange rate policy instrument. Following up on recent suggestions 
for central banks to write call options in order to induce stabilising “delta hedging”, 
we demonstrated the potential danger inherent in such a strategy. While an option 
issued by the central bank would indeed induce highly risk-averse market participants 
to reduce exchange rate volatility by hedging their option position, this is certainly 
not true if the option is instead used as a speculative instrument. A speculator, having 
bought the option from the central bank, would have a strong incentive to manipulate 
exchange rates in order to push the option deeper into the money. Thus, rather then
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protecting against speculative attacks on the domestic currency, the option instead 
creates an additional vehicle for such an attack.
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